Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case Number: 23GDCV00808, Date: 2025-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Adam J. Meyer and Rebecca D. Meyer allege that in June of 2020 plaintiffs purchased a 2020 Chrysler Pacifica, which was sold to plaintiffs with express warranties from defendant FCA US LLC (FCA) that the vehicle would be free from defects in materials, nonconformities, or workmanship during the applicable warranty period, and to the extent the vehicle had defects, FCA would repair the defects.

Plaintiffs allege that plaintiffs returned the vehicle to defendants for repairs under the warranties due to defects and nonconformities relating to the driver side daytime lamp, left side head lamp, seat heater, steering wheel, cooling seats heater and coolant control, touch screen dials, wiring, engine, and transmission.

Plaintiffs allege that plaintiffs delivered the vehicle to an authorized repair facility, defendant Glendale Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Glendale Dodge) to repair the nonconformities, but defendants have failed to make the vehicle conform to the applicable warranties, despite a reasonable number of attempts to do so.

The complaint also alleges that defendant Glendale Dodge breached its duty to use ordinary skill and care with respect to the vehicle in accordance with industry standards, as Glendale Dodge failed to properly store, prepare, and repair the vehicle, proximately causing plaintiffs damages.

The complaint alleges three causes of action for Violation of the Song Beverly Act, for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and violation of Beverly Act section 1793.2, as well as a cause of action for negligent repair.

The file shows that on November 15, 2024, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case. On December 20, 2024, the court received Defendants’ CCP 998 Offer to Compromise. On February 10, 2025, plaintiffs filed a Judgment by Court on Stipulation based on the signed written stipulation filed in the case, which entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant FCA US, LLC, in the sum of damages of $115,000.00, with Attorney fees, Costs and Interests per 998 Offer “TBD,” and was signed and filed by the court the same date.

It is not clearly explained how this court has jurisdiction to consider such a motion, when Judgment has been entered in this action pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation based on a CCP section 998 offer accepted by plaintiffs. This pleading is not a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement pursuant to any reserved jurisdiction of the court.

As pointed out in the opposition, Defendants’ CCP 998 Offer to Compromise here expressly addresses interest issues, including provisions which provide that “No interest will accrue” during the 90 day period between acceptance of the offer and plaintiff providing the items required, such as return of the subject vehicle and necessary paperwork, and FCA’s performance of its obligations, and that:

“If FCA does not timely perform pursuant to the terms set forth herein, Plaintiff shall be entitled to interest at a rate of 10% per annum, from the date of acceptance of this offer until the date the full Settlement Funds are received. Interest runs on the Settlement Funds amount until the Settlement Funds amount owed to Plaintiff’s counsel is received by Plaintiff’s counsel (i.e., the total not including the loan payoff, if any). Interest does not continue to run on Settlement Funds amounts that have been received by Plaintiff’s counsel.”

There is no mention in Defendants’ Offer to Compromise of any prejudgment interest to be awarded, which is presumably included in the total settlement damages sum. The time for plaintiffs to seek prejudgment interest was clearly before they accepted an offer to settle the case which did not specify that prejudgment interest remained an open item of damages, and before Judgment was entered.

This motion is not a motion to recover post judgment interest pursuant to the terms of Defendants’ Offer to Compromise, but a motion to recover pre-judgment interest, which should have been included in the Judgment based on the parties’ settlement of the claim. The Judgment itself states that the “Amount” is to include “Other…Interest per 998 Offer…TBD” [Judgment, filed 2/10/2025, para. 6 (a)(5)]. This provision limits any interest to that specified in the 998 Offer. The court cannot fathom how the court can award prejudgment interest in this matter in which Judgment has been entered based on a settlement on the amount of damages.

Defendants FCA and Glendale Dodge in opposition argue that a settlement agreement is simply a contract, and the court is powerless to impose on the parties more restrictive or less restrictive or different terms than those contained in the settlement agreement. Defendants point out that plaintiffs have failed to cite any authority to support that additional damages may be awarded beyond those agreed upon in the accepted 998 Offer, and that even had a proper motion under CCP section 664.6 been filed, the court would have no authority to impose terms the parties did not agree to. As set forth above, Defendants’ Offer to Compromise was accepted, has express provisions concerning interest, and does not allow for additional damages to include additional pre-judgment interest. This court has no authority to grant relief which contradicts the terms agreed upon by the parties.

“(a) A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt….

(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed.”

This situation is not a case where plaintiffs have established that they were entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, or that there was a right to recover such sum which vested on a particular day. As argued in the opposition, the damages here were not certain, as plaintiffs sought a repurchase as well as civil penalties and incidental and consequential damages under the Song Beverly Act, and plaintiffs’ recovery is also subject to a mileage offset under CCP section 1793.2 (d)(2)(C).

With respect to the right to recover being vested in plaintiffs on a particular day, as set forth above, Defendants’ Offer to Compromise expressly allows for interest from the date of acceptance of the Offer until the settlement funds are received. [Defendants’ Offer to Compromise, para. 6]. Defendants in opposition submit evidence that plaintiffs’ counsel has confirmed the understanding that Defendants’ Offer to Compromise fixed the date for interest to accrue, sending an email to defendants’ counsel stating, “Pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, Plaintiffs were to receive their settlement funds on or before February 6, 2025.” [Hanson Decl., Ex. B]. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that since FCA failed to timely pay the funds, “Plaintiffs are now entitled to interest from the date of acceptance of the 998 Offer to the date of receipt of the funds,” and provided interest calculations, with total interest due of $3,948.57. [Hanson Decl., Ex. B]. Defendants’ counsel states in counsel’s declaration, “FCA US agreed to pay the requested interest amount.” [Hanson Decl., para. 4]. The interest agreed to evidently has been paid.

This motion, filed after a fully negotiated settlement of the underlying claim had been accepted, and entered as judgment, clearly seeks damages beyond those for which there was a settlement, and is a waste of this court’s and the parties’ time. The motion is denied.

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