Judge: Ralph C. Hofer, Case: 23GDCV01277, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23GDCV01277 Hearing Date: February 9, 2024 Dept: NCD
TENTATIVE RULING
Calendar: 6
Date: 2/2/2024
Case
No: 23
GDCV01277 Trial Date: None Set
Case Name: Luna
v. GKJ Trans, Inc., et al.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR STAY (2)
Moving Party: Defendants
Allen Lund Company, LLC, GKJ Trans, Inc. and
Tajinder Singh
Defendant Shah
Truckline Corp.
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Alphonso Luna
RELIEF REQUESTED:
Order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
Order dismissing this action in its entirety,
or in the alternative, staying all further proceedings
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Plaintiff
Alphonso Luna alleges that in June of 2021, plaintiff was operating a tractor
and flatbed trailer on interstate 80 in Nebraska, in a reasonable manner, when
present on interstate 80 was a work zone with workers present, and warning
signs lining the roadway, alerting drivers of the need to slow down or
stop. Plaintiff alleges that as
plaintiff proceeded through the work zone, he put on his emergency flashers and
brought his tractor trailer to a stop due to traffic, when defendant Tajinder
Singh negligently operated a tractor trailer approaching plaintiff from the
rear at a high rate of speed, and, failing to recognize the roadway conditions
and failing to adhere to the work zone warnings, slammed into the rear of
plaintiff’s vehicle at highway speeds, causing plaintiff to suffer severe and
permanent injuries.
The
complaint alleges that at the time of the incident, defendant Singh was driving
the subject tractor trailer in the course and scope of his employment or agency
with defendants GKJ Trans, Inc. (GKJ Trans), Shah Truckline Corporation (Shah
Truckline), and Allen Lund Company.
The
complaint alleges that defendants GKJ Trans, Shah Truckline, and Allen Lund
Company breached their duties owed to plaintiff when they failed to investigate
Singh to determine whether he was competent to drive safely and able to comply
with the rules of the road and federal motor vehicle carrier safety
regulations, and that defendant Allen Lund Company was further negligent and
reckless in directing defendant Singh to subhaul, subcontract, double broker,
or illegally contract with another unknown motor carrier to ship the subject
load of produce with knowledge that it would be in violation of federal laws
and regulation, and would put the public at risk of an unqualified, untrained,
unregulated, unsafe, or dangerous motor carrier transporting the subject load,
which could create a high likelihood of causing a vehicle collision. The complaint alleges that Allen Lund Company
negligently hired Shah Truckline to transport the load, when it knew or should
have known that Shah Truckline had a substandard safety record, and engaged in
the practice of “double brokering loads,” and that Shah Truckline then in fact
hired GJK Trans to transport the load, when it knew or should have known GJK
Trans was not qualified to transport the subject load and had a safety
record.
The
complaint alleges causes of action for negligence and negligent
hiring/retention/supervision/training.
ANALYSIS:
Defendants GJK Trans, Allen Lund
Company and Singh bring a motion for an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint,
on the ground California is a seriously inconvenient forum for this action and
that the action should proceed in Nebraska or Colorado.
Defendant Shah Truckline has filed
a separate motion making the same arguments for the action to be heard in
Nebraska or Colorado. Defendant Shah
Truckline has also filed a Notice of Joinder in the motion to dismiss brough by
the other defendants, indicating defendant moves for dismissal of the complaint
on the same grounds identified in that motion.
CCP
§ 418.10 provides, in pertinent part:
“(a)
A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead, or within
any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a
notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:
(2)
to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum.”
CCP
§ 410.30(a) provides:
“When
a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of
substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state,
the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any
conditions that may be just.”
As
the moving party, defendants bear the burden of proof that the action should be
tried elsewhere. Stangvik v. Shiley,
Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751. Plaintiff’s choice of forum will not be
disturbed unless the court is convinced that (a) a
suitable alternative forum exists; and (b) that the balance of private and public interests’
factors make it just that the litigation proceed in the alternative forum. Stangvik,
at 751. “The granting or denial
of such a motion is within the trial court’s discretion, and substantial
deference is accorded its determination in this regard.” Stansvik, at 751.
To
establish that a “suitable” alternative forum exists, defendant must show that all
defendants are subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum or are willing
to submit to jurisdiction. American
Cemwood Corp. v. American Home Assurance
Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 431, 440; David v. Medtronic, Inc. (2015,
2nd Dist) 237 Cal. App. 4th 734, 743.
In addition, defendant must show that the
alternative forum provides a remedy for the claim sued upon. Stangvik,
at 764.
Defendants argue that Nebraska is a
more suitable forum and may exercise jurisdiction over the parties because it
already did so when the District Court of Nebraska oversaw the adjudication of
a complaint filed by plaintiff in federal court for well over a year. Defendants argue that now that the federal
court has dismissed plaintiff’s claims for lack of complete diversity, plaintiff
now filed these claims in California, thousands of miles from the accident
giving rise to plaintiff’s claims.
Defendants also argue that there are no statute of limitations concerns,
as Nebraska’s statute is longer than the applicable period in California, so
that plaintiff will suffer no prejudice if required to refile his claims in the
forum he first selected, the more convenient and suitable forum of Nebraska.
Plaintiff in opposition argues that
defendants have failed to provide evidence that all defendants would be subject
to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska or have agreed to jurisdiction in the
alternate forum and agree to waive the personal jurisdiction defenses.
Plaintiff indicates that in the
underlying federal action, only defendants Singh and GKJ Trans submitted to the
court's jurisdiction. By contrast, defendant Shah Truckline raised personal
jurisdiction as an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading, asserting
that Nebraska did not have jurisdiction over it. [Norton Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 3]. The attached Answer in the federal case asserts
as Shah Truckline’s third affirmative defense, “Plaintiff’s Complaint as to
Defendant Shah Truckline fails for lack of personal jurisdiction.” [Norton Decl., para. 13, Ex. 3, p. 10, para.
3].
The original motion does not, as
the court usually sees, explain how each moving defendant is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court in Nebraska. The
moving papers concede that defendants Allen Lund Company and GKJ Trans have
their principal places of business located in California, not Nebraska. There is also no declaration indicating that
any of the moving defendants are subject to or willing to stipulate to
jurisdiction in Nebraska.
The separate motion to dismiss
brought by Shah Truckline also does not address this issue, but presents
evidence that Shah Truckline is an active Virginia corporation with its
principal office in Winchester, Virginia.
[Stephanson Decl., para. 9, Ex. 2].
This showing does nothing to explain how Shah is subject to jurisdiction
in Nebraska, or that despite its position in the federal action, it is now
prepared to agree to jurisdiction there. The motion, at best, indicates that Shah
Truckline has, along with the motion to dismiss, filed its answer in this
action, making a general appearance in this action. [Stephanson Decl., para. 9]. There is no indication in the declaration
that Shah Truckline is amenable to submitting to personal jurisdiction in
Nebraska state court. This omission is
glaring in light of the fact that Shah Truckline could obviously have done so
in support of its own motion.
As
argued in the opposition, unless defendants meet the burden of showing a
“suitable” alternative forum, the court need not proceed to consider the
private and public interest factors. In
that scenario, the motion must be denied.
The
motion is currently in the posture where it is appears that plaintiff is a
resident of Littleton, Colorado, defendant Singh is a resident of Merced,
California, defendant GKJ Trans is a California corporation with its principal
place of business in Merced, California, defendant Allen Lund Company is a
California Corporation with its principal place of business in La Canada
Flintridge, California, and defendant Shah Truckline is a Virginia corporation
with its principal place of business in Manassas, Virginia. [Complaint, paras. 2-6; Wachal Decl., para. 4].
Neither
motion even attempts to establish that all defendants as a matter of law are
subject to jurisdiction in Nebraska, or that all defendants have stipulated to
submit to jurisdiction. Defendants accordingly
have failed to establish that a suitable alternative forum exists. To the extent the motions argue that in the
alternative the matter should be addressed in Colorado, no evidence at all is
offered with respect to the jurisdiction of each of the defendants in Colorado.
Defendants have failed to meet their
burden to establish that a suitable alternative forum exists. Hence, the motions are denied.
Plaintiff
in opposition argues that even assuming the parties improperly for the first
time in reply offer stipulations that all defendants voluntarily submit to
jurisdiction in either Nebraska or Colorado, defendants have nevertheless
failed to meet their burden of establishing that the balance of private and
public interests factors make it just that the litigation proceed in the
alternative forum. Stangvik,
at 751.
The California Supreme Court set forth the
interests to be considered as follows:
“[T]he next step is to consider the
private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining
the action for trial in California. The private interest factors are those that
make trial and the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and
relatively inexpensive, such as the ease of access to sources of proof, the
cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses. The public interest factors
include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars,
protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon
to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing
the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the
litigation. ( Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981) 454 U.S. 235, 259-261 [70 L.Ed.2d
419, 437-439, 102 S.Ct. 252]
(hereafter Piper); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert (1947) 330 U.S. 501, 507-509 [91 L.Ed. 1055, 1061-1063,
67 S.Ct. 839].)”
Stangvik,
at 751.
The burden of proving that both the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted is on the
moving party. Willingham v. Pecora
(1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 44 289, 295. A
determination of “change of place of trial for convenience for witnesses and
the promotion of the ends of justice is discretionary with the trial court and
subject to reversal only on a clear showing of abuse.” Flanagan v. Flanagan (1959, 2nd
Dist.) 175 Cal.App.2d 641, 643.
As
noted above, it appears that Shah Truckline is the only defendant named in this
lawsuit which is not a California resident.
Plaintiff is a resident of Colorado, who received all medical treatment
arising from the subject incident in Colorado, except for one day of
hospitalization in Nebraska. [Norton
Decl., para. 8].
Plaintiff
explains that the instant lawsuit follows a previous action filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska, which was initially filed
against only defendants GKJ Trans and Singh, and that in the underlying federal
action defendant Singh admitted that he was in the course and scope of his
employment with GKJ Trans at the time of the subject incident, and admitted in
deposition that the incident was "obviously [his] fault" and he was
not disputing liability. [Norton Decl., para. 10, Ex. 2 at 12:2-15, 14:18-16:23].
Plaintiff indicates that after litigating the dispute for nearly a year and
taking the deposition of Singh, plaintiff became aware that additional
entities, including defendants Allen Lund Company and Shah Truckline were
involved in the transportation and brokering of the subject load, and in
December of 2022 amended the complaint to add them as defendants. [Norton Decl., ¶ 11]. In February of 2023, defendant
Allen Lund Company filed a motion to dismiss the federal action, on the grounds
of preemption. [Norton Decl., para.
11].
On
March 29, 2023, while the motion to dismiss was pending, defendant Shah
Truckline filed its answer, discussed above, which asserted as an affirmative defense
that plaintiff lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. On April 26, 2023, the federal court ruled on
the motion to dismiss, determined there was not complete diversity among the
parties, and therefore the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
and the case was dismissed without prejudice.
[Norton Decl., ¶ 14; RFJN, Ex. B, Memorandum and Order, p. 2]. The federal court’s order states:
“On
initial review of Lund's motions and its corporate-disclosure statement (Filing
No. 63), the Court was unable to confirm the parties were completely diverse.
See Jet Midwest Int'l Co. v. Jet Midwest Grp., LLC, 932 F.3d 1102, 1104
(8th Cir. 2019) (noting § 1332 requires complete diversity and "[t]he
citizenship of . . . limited liability companies depends on the citizenship of
their members"). At the Court's request, Lund filed an amended corporate-disclosure
statement that revealed the parties were not completely diverse (Filing Nos.
71, 71-1, and 72). The parties agree on that point but disagree as to whether
the Court nonetheless has subject-matter jurisdiction of this case. Lund says
it does; Luna says it doesn't. Luna has the stronger position.”
[RFJN,
Ex. B, p. 2].
The federal action was then ordered
dismissed as follows:
“This
case is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff Alphonso Luna refiling it in
an appropriate state court.”
[RFJN,
Ex. B, p. 8, para. 3].
Plaintiff indicates that plaintiff
then refiled the case in the only state where plaintiff determined personal
jurisdiction existed against all parties, California. [Norton Decl. ¶ 15].
Plaintiff
argues that Singh has conceded liability, and the parties have already obtained
all evidence in the possession of Nebraska residents concerning the incident
itself and the one day of medical treatment plaintiff received in
Nebraska. Plaintiff argues that the main
issue remaining to be determined in this action pertains to defendant Allen
Lund Company’s relationship to the other named entities in this action, and
their involvement with the subject load, which originated in California, and
was being transported by a California driver, Singh. Plaintiff argues that Allen Lund Company has
its corporate headquarters in Los Angeles County, and plaintiff anticipates the
need to obtain discovery from Allen Lund Company’s employees involved in the
initial contracting with and hiring of defendant Shah Truckline, and with
knowledge of the level of control Allen Lund Company exercises over the motor
carriers it contracts with, as well as witnesses with knowledge of whether Shah
Truckline engaged in open and obvious double brokering in the past, Allen Lund
Company’s policies regarding double-brokering, and what efforts Allen Lund
Company undertakes to prevent double-brokering.
Plaintiff indicates that plaintiff further anticipates that documentary
evidence exists at Allen Lund Company’s corporate headquarters relating to
these topics, and defendant’s liability in this case. [Norton Decl., para. 21].
It
appears that under the circumstances, particularly the resistance of a critical
defendant to jurisdiction in Nebraska, and the focus of the case on the
potential liability of the entities in the corporate chain residing in
California, that this case was not unreasonably filed in California, and that
there are witnesses and evidence here to be obtained and possibly presented at
trial.
Although plaintiff here is not a
California resident, and plaintiff concedes that California court have reached
somewhat different results on how much weight should be given to a
non-resident’s choice of forum, plaintiff also points out that most of the
authorities cited by defendants concerned foreign national non-resident
plaintiffs, and that even under defendants’ cited authority, it has been held
that a domestic non-resident plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to at
least “due deference.” National Football
League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 902,
929. In National Football League,
the Second District conducted a review and analysis of the pertinent case law,
including that involving foreign national non-resident plaintiffs, and
concluded:
“We thus conclude from the
teachings of Archibald and Stangvik, as interpreted by the most
well-reasoned decisions of our court of appeal colleagues, that a resident of
one of our sister states who files suit in California is entitled to due
deference under the circumstances presented, not a strong presumption, in favor
of its choice of forum. That deference is to be weighed and balanced by the
trial court along with all the other pertinent factors, including the
defendant's residence or principal place of business, and has no direct bearing
on the moving defendant's burden of proof.”
National Football League, at 929.
Accordingly,
the choice of forum of plaintiff here, a resident of a sister state, which
appears particularly reasonable here in light of the procedural history of this
case, may and should, be afforded due deference.
Plaintiff
argues that defendant’s residence is also a factor to be considered in the
balancing process, and “[a] corporate defendant’s state of incorporation and
principal place of business is presumptively a convenient forum.” Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 1452, 1465, citing Stangvik, at 755. As noted above, defendant’s residence or
principal place of business is considered a “pertinent factor” in the
analysis. National Football League,
at 929. Here, three of the four
defendants bringing these motions are California corporations or residents. Plaintiff also argues that California has a recognized
interest in deciding lawsuits against California “resident corporations whose conduct
in this state causes injury to persons in other jurisdictions.” Stangvik, at 756, n. 10.
Specifically
with respect to convenience related to the expense of obtaining evidence,
plaintiff indicates that evidence from witnesses in Nebraska is overstated by
defendants, as there is only one witness related to the investigation of the
incident itself who resides in Nebraska, defendants have previously represented
that they are not aware of any bystander witnesses, and defendants already have
nearly all records from Nebraska, including plaintiff’s medical records from
the ambulance and two facilities in Nebraska for plaintiff’s one day stay
there, and all records from the Nebraska State Patrol. Any further records can be obtained through a
discovery request to plaintiff at no expense.
Plaintiff also indicates that to the extent defendants argue that
plaintiff’s treaters since his return from Nebraska do not reside in
California, those treaters also do not reside in Nebraska, but in Colorado,
undermining that argument. Plaintiff
indicates that plaintiff’s family who may testify at trial are willing to
travel to this state.
Plaintiff
also argues that given the focus of the case on the liability of the defendant
entities for the accident, and the evidence plaintiff will seek from California
corporate residents and its employees, as discussed above, as well as the fact
that two and a half years have passed since the subject incident, individuals
with knowledge concerning Allen Lund Company’s practices may be former
employees, and as third-party witnesses would be beyond the compulsory power of
the courts in Nebraska or Colorado.
Defendants
argue that eight witnesses, including plaintiff’s medical care providers, are
located in Colorado, the officer from the Nebraska State Patrol who
investigated the accident is located in Nebraska, the records from six of
plaintiff’s medical care providers are located in Colorado and Nebraska, and
the records of the Nebraska State Patrol relating to the accident are located
in Nebraska. [Wachal Decl, para. 9, Ex.
8]. Defendants argue that thus Nebraska
and Colorado are the only states where essential non-party witnesses beyond the
compulsory process power of this court can be compelled to testify. Defendants rely on discovery responses of
plaintiff’s identifying witnesses in the underlying case which were directed to
Singh and GKJ Trans, evidently before the potential involvement of Allen Lund
Company had been identified. [Id.
Response to Interrogatory No. 4].
It appears that many of these concerns with
respect to documentary evidence have already been addressed in the time the
parties were litigating in federal court in Nebraska or can be addressed
without undue expense or inconvenience.
The witnesses in Colorado would not be any more likely to be subject to
process in Nebraska than in California.
It appears obvious that only one witness, the Nebraska State Patrol
Trooper who investigated the incident, would be a witness which would pose some
difficulty here, and defendants have not made sufficient legal argument
concerning the inability to compel that witness to appear in for trial in this
state, and have not demonstrated that such a witness is not willing to
voluntarily appear in California.
The public interest urged by
defendants is primarily that the incident here occurred in Nebraska, which has
a clear interest in litigating issues arising from this injury occurring in the
state. Defendants argue that this case
would overburden California’s already overburdened court system, in a case in
which California jurors have no interest or stake.
However, as noted above, plaintiff
is arguing that plaintiff has alleged that the cause of the incident extends
before the incident, to events occurring in California with respect to the
hiring and training of the driver, the transaction with the shipper, and the
practices of the California defendants with respect to the safety of the
transport from California into another state.
It is not correct that California has no interest whatsoever in this
matter, which involves alleged misconduct by California resident defendants
occurring in California. This scenario suggests
that such matters involving the safe operation of California corporations would
be of interest to potential California jurors, including the interest in
evaluating the safety practices of corporate defendants, who continue to
operate in California. In addition, this
action, involving one plaintiff and four defendants, concerning a rear end
collision accident, does not present the type of action which would itself
overtax the court, or threaten to open the floodgates to more litigation in
this state.
Overall, the balance favors this
action continuing to be litigated in this forum, which plaintiff has chosen,
where all defendants are subject to or have submitted to personal jurisdiction,
where three of the four defendants reside and have their principal place of
business, and where significant potential evidence and witnesses are
located. These factors, when weighed
against the potential inconvenience demonstrated, which is not sufficiently
substantiated by defendants, and appears to be directed to only one significant
percipient witness, when weighed against the public interest of this state in
deciding actions against resident corporations whose conduct in this state
causes injury to persons in other jurisdictions, favors having the matter
determined in this forum. The motions to
dismiss accordingly are denied.
RULING:
Defendant Allen Lund Company, LLC, GKJ Trans, Inc. and
Tajinder Singh’s Joint Motion to Dismiss, or Stay, Plaintiff Alphonso Luna’s
Complaint on the Ground of Forum Non
Conveniens is DENIED.
The
Court finds that defendants have failed to establish that a suitable
alternative forum exists, as defendants have failed to establish that all
defendants are subject to jurisdiction in any alternative forum or are willing
to submit to jurisdiction.
Defendant Shah
Truckline Corp.’s Joinder to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Plaintiff
Alphonso Luna’s Complaint on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens is likewise DENIED.
Defendants’ UNOPPOSED Request for Judicial
Notice in Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss, or Stay, Plaintiff Alphonso
Luna’s Complaint on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens is GRANTED.
Defendant Shah Truckline Corp.’s Motion to
Dismiss or Stay Action is DENIED for the reasons stated above.
DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING
TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE
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tentative.