Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case Number: 24GDCV02750, Date: 2025-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Linda M. Toutant alleges that plaintiff owns property which abuts property owned by defendants Hamlet Sahakyan and Karine Sahakyan, and is downhill from the Sahakyan property with a significant change in grade and elevation between the two properties. Plaintiff alleges that the hillside between the properties was previously planted with old oak growth and covered with natural plant materials which had existed in place since 1999, and supported the privacy between the two properties.

Plaintiff alleges that in June of 2018, plaintiff was notified by the City of Glendale that the Sahakyan defendants had applied to construct an addition to the home on the Sahakyan property. Plaintiff reviewed the plans, found that as displayed they would not impact plaintiff’s privacy or require construction upon or impact to the hillside between the properties, and so, in reliance on the plans as presented, did not voice any objections to the proposal, which was approved.

Nothing happened at the property for many years, except for demolition of walls in the areas where the addition had been proposed. Plaintiff alleges that in late 2022 the Sahakyan defendants severely trimmed the oak tree between the properties, removing major branches and portions of the tree, contrary to the law and without required permits.

The complaint alleges that in January or February of 2023, the Sahakyan defendants, along with defendant L.A. Drill, began to undertake construction on the hillside between the Sahakyan and Toutant properties that was not indicated on the plans submitted by the Sahakyan defendants or approved by the City of Glendale, including stripping the hillside of all plant material, using major earth-moving equipment to alter the natural hillside and drainage, and impacting the existing nature of the land, and its drainage and support of adjacent land, as a result of which earth, dirt, debris and water flowed to the Toutant property. Plaintiff alleges that defendants were cited by the City, ordered to cease work and restore the hillside to its former condition, but failed to do so, and that further citations and stop work notices were issued, with which defendants did not comply.

Plaintiff alleges that the illegal, intentional and negligent acts and omissions of defendants have resulted in damage to the Toutant property, including to its existing drainage, soils, and lateral and subjacent support, including to the home’s foundation and framing, walls and plaster, and its value. The complaint alleges that the conduct of defendants and their unauthorized work and structures have and continued to otherwise harm and diminish the value of plaintiff’s property, including relative to its privacy, safety, and transferability.

The file shows that on November 14, 2024, the court signed and filed an order approving a Stipulation between plaintiff and moving defendant L.A. Drill to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees from the complaint without prejudice, and to allow defendant an extension of time to file any further challenge to the complaint.

“In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (Courtesy Ambulance Service v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1519, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 161; Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 91, 168 Cal.Rptr. 319; see California Judges Benchbook, Civil Proceedings Before Trial (1995) § 12.94, p. 611.)”

Specifically, with respect to claims for punitive damages, Civil Code § 3294 (a) authorizes recovery of punitive damages on the basis of findings that “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice…” “Oppression” is defined to mean “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Civil Code § 3294 (c)(2). “Malice” is defined to mean “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Civil Code § 3294 (c)(a).

“Despicable” has been defined as a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible”. College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725. Such conduct has been described as “[having] the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894, quotation omitted. Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are “reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.” Tomiselli v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.

It is held that claims for punitive damages cannot be alleged by conclusory allegations that defendant acted intentionally, willfully or fraudulently. Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872. It is also held that a punitive damages claim must include factual allegations of wrongful motive, intent, or purpose. Cyrus v. Haveson (1976, 2nd Dist.) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 317.

“Defendants' acts and omissions were malicious, oppressive and fraudulent, and in conscious disregard of the rights of Toutant, and therefore, support punitive damages in a sum sufficient to punish and deter.”

Punitive damages are sought here in connection with the third cause of action for nuisance, and the fourth cause of action for trespass. These are intentional torts, and it is held that in the case of intentional torts, “[m]alice is properly pleaded by alleging the wrongful motive, intent or purpose” and that “[a] general allegation of intent is sufficient to support a claim for exemplary damages.” Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 632.

There is case authority recognizing that punitive damages can upon a proper showing be awarded on nuisance claims. See Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920 (“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort. If the latter, then exemplary damages are recoverable.” (citing Sturges v. Charles L. Harney, Inc. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2s 306, 321.). Moreover, to the extent the allegations are that defendants’ conduct resulted in the intentional and unauthorized entry upon plaintiff’s property, “including by means of dirt, water, and other debris and run off,” these are sufficiently alleged to constitute acts of trespass, which claims are also recognized to in appropriate circumstances support a claim for punitive damages. See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615.

Moreover, as argued in the opposition, defendant’s argument disregards the extensive factual allegations concerning defendant’s conduct being undertaken without required building or design review and approval, without permits, without required plans and testing, and in direct contravention of express no work orders issued by the City of Glendale forbidding the drilling and excavation that occurred. [Complaint ¶¶ 10-14]. This conduct is sufficiently alleged to be in violation of law. It is also alleged that after being cited and ordered to stop work, defendants did not stop work, but engaged in intentional efforts to hide the conduct which defendants knew violated the law:

“Instead, on or about May 25, 2023, Defendants returned and continued digging into the hillside, this time using workers and hand tools—apparently intending to avoid detection and further citation. They even planted bushes at the Toutant property line to hide their activities.”

Overall, sufficient facts are alleged of intentional and malicious misconduct, and conduct engaged in conscious disregard of the rights of plaintiff to survive a motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. The motion to strike is denied.

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