Judge: Ralph C. Hofer, Case: 24NNCV00651, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCV00651 Hearing Date: April 17, 2025 Dept: D
TENTATIVE RULING
Calendar: 7
Date: 04/18/2025
Case No: 24 NNCV00651 Trial Date: None Set
Case Name: Mouradian v. SG Holding, LLC, et al.
MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
Moving Party: Defendants/Cross-Complainants Anna Khachatryan and Arthur Khachatryan
Responding Party: Defendant/Cross-Complainant SG Holding, LLC
RELIEF REQUESTED:
Determination that settlement described below was made in good faith
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Plaintiff Loosin Mouradian alleges that in October of 2022 on Pennsylvania Avenue in La Crescenta, defendants Anna Khachatryan, Arthur Khachikyan and Amber Trimble negligently owned, entrusted, managed, drove and operated their motor vehicles so as to proximately cause their vehicle to collide into plaintiff, causing injuries and damages.
The complaint also alleges that defendant SG Holding, LLC negligently maintained, controlled and operated the property and allowed the property to be in a dangerous and defective condition so as to cause plaintiff to sustain severe injuries when defendant vehicles collided with the premises. Plaintiff alleges that defendant SG Holding, LLC failed to erect steel or concrete barriers and failed to reinforce its old and decaying exterior office building walls, even though said building is immediately adjacent to a busy roadway. The form complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and premises liability.
Defendant SG Holding, LLC has filed a cross-complaint for indemnification, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, express indemnity and breach of contract against co-defendants Anna Khachatryan, and Amber Trimble. The cross-complaint is also brought against cross-defendant Hovhannes Sayadyan, who is alleged to have a written lease with cross-complainant SG Holding, LLC pursuant to which cross-defendant was to maintain the premises, and which contains an indemnity agreement. The cross-complaint also appears to name Vibe Auto Sales as a cross-defendant, without specifying the involvement of that cross-defendant.
Defendant Amber Trimble has filed a cross-complaint against co-defendants SG Holding, LLC, Anna Khachatryan and Arthur Khachikyan for equitable indemnity, implied indemnity, comparative indemnity and declaratory relief.
Defendants Anna Khachatryan and Arther Khachikyan have filed a cross-complaint against co-defendants SG Holding, LLC and Amber Trimble for apportionment of fault, indemnification and declaratory relief.
Cross-defendant Hovhanness Sayadan dba Vibe Auto has filed a cross-complaint against SG Holding LLC, Anna Khachatryan, Arthur Khachikyan and Amber Trimble for implied contractual indemnification, equitable indemnification and declaratory relief.
On February 13, 2025, defendant SG Holding, Inc. filed a Notice of Related Case, indicating that this case is related to a case titled, Amber Audrey Trimble, et al. v. Anna Khachatryan, et al., Case No. 24 NNCV04940, filed on October 17, 2024 and now pending in Department V in Alhambra, because the cases involve the same parties and are based on the same or similar claims. The instant case was filed on April 2, 2024, so is the older case.
On March 26, 2025, the parties filed a Stipulation to Consolidate Actions under this case as the lead case, indicating that this case and the Trimble case arise out of the same motor vehicle accident and involve the same parties and common questions of law and fact.
ANALYSIS:
APPLICATION FOR GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
Settling Parties: Plaintiff Loosin Mouradian and Defendants Anna Khachatryan and Artur Khachikyan (pursuant to Notice of Errata)
Basis, Terms and Amount of Settlement:
Plaintiff to accept the sum of $25,000 from defendants Khachatryan and Khachikyan, insurance bodily injury limit amount. Plaintiff will be responsible for all liens and execute a release of all claims and dismiss all insureds required to be released with prejudice.
SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE (Tech-Bilt 38 Cal.3d 488)
1. Plaintiff’s Total Recovery
$298,935.52 in treatment, of which insurance paid $106,067. Howell medical specials total $192,867.05. No loss of earnings claim.
2. Settlor’s Proportionate Liability
Argument that defendants are paying policy limits and that plaintiff has made a good physical recovery, sustaining an arm fracture, and undergoing surgery which was successful with a good prognosis according to cited medical records.
Argument that although Anna Khachatryan was the cause of the collision between the two vehicles, a proper barrier of the building owned by SG Holding, LLC would have prevented plaintiff’s injuries, as the use of cement pillars would have stopped the majority of the damage to the structure and stopped the vehicles from traversing the building and causing injury to plaintiff.
3. Amount Paid in Settlement
$25,000
4. Allocation of Settlement Proceeds Among Plaintiffs
Not applicable. One plaintiff.
5. Defendant’s Financial Condition
Defendants to pay entire bodily injury policy limit.
6. Existence of Collusion
Settlement was negotiated at arm’s length between counsel for plaintiff and defendants. [Slack Decl., para.11].
Under CCP section 877.6, a court may approve a settlement by determining it was made in good faith, and such a determination shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from further claims against the settling torfeasor. CCP section 877.6(d) provides that “The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”
Under Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the factors set forth above should be considered in determining the good faith of a settlement.
The trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether a settlement was entered in good faith and in allocating potential liability and exposure among joint tortfeasors. Norco Delivery Services v. Owens Corning Fiberglass (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 962. A reviewing court will “assess whether the trial court’s good faith determination is buttressed by any substantial evidence.” Id.
The court in determining the good faith of a settlement should recognize that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if found liable after a trial. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995, 2nd Dist.) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.
The valuation of the settlement figure must be based on facts known at the time of the settlement. See Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1497-1499.
Under CCP § 877.6(c):
“A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”
In Tech Bilt, the Supreme Court stated:
“’[A] defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be.’ (Torres v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 499, 509 [203 Cal.Rptr. 825].) The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”
Tech Bilt, at 499-500 (footnote omitted).
Here, defendants, cross-complainants and cross-defendants Khachatryan and Khachikyan argue that they have tendered their entire insurance policy limits for this accident, and appear to argue that plaintiff’s damages may not be high due to plaintiff’s positive outcome in treating her injuries. They also seem to argue that the party with proportionately largest fault is SG Holding LLC for its failure to have a proper barrier at the building to prevent the vehicles from reaching plaintiff and injuring plaintiff.
The moving parties seem to rely primarily on County of Los Angeles v. Guerrero (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1149, in which the Second District recognized that in the case of an insolvent and underinsured joint tort feasor, a settlement for policy limits, although disproportionately low, can still be determined to be made in good faith. In County of Los Angeles, the Second District affirmed the trial court’s order granting a motion for determination of good faith settlement in a case where a negligent driver settled for his $30,000 policy limits where the expected damages exceeded $1 million and the purported joint tortfeasor, the County of Los Angeles, likely faced proportionately minimal liability due to governmental immunities.
The Second District addressed the issue by reference to Schmid v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1244, and concluded:
“We therefore agree with the County that the $30,000 settlement is not within the reasonable range of Guerrero’s proportional share of comparative liability for the Russo’s injuries.
However, there are other relevant considerations. To reiterate: ‘[Even] where the claimant’s damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citations] (Ibid.). Tech-Bilt thus addresses this very fact situation. Here, as in Schmid, the scale of the potential damages and Guerreros’ modest ‘financial [condition] and insurance policy limits’ are necessarily controlling and effectively override the other Tech-Bilt factors.”
County of Los Angeles, at 1157-1158.
Moving parties rely on County of Los Angeles, but submit no argument or evidence which would establish that they have a modest financial condition or are insolvent, as was the case in the case relied upon.
An opposition to the motion has been filed by SG Holding LLC (SG Holding). The opposition first argues that the motion is defective on its face, as it is purported by be filed by defendants and cross-complainants Anna Khachatryan and Arthur Khachikyan, but seeks in the motion a determination of the good faith of the settlement as to Arthur Khachatryan, who apparently has no involvement in this matter. SG Holding points out that this matter has been defended and pursued throughout by Arthur Khachikyan. [See Slack Decl., Ex. A, Ex. B, Complaint and Cross-Complaint]. The opposition also points out that the insurance policy attached to the moving papers names as an insured “Artur Khachikyan,” not “Arthur” or “Khachatryan.” [Slack Decl., Ex. E]. The opposition argues that the motion should be denied on the basis that there is confusion of the parties and who is actually seeking the good faith determination.
Evidently in response to this argument, moving parties have filed a Notice of Errata Regarding Defendant and Cross-Complainant’s Misspelled Name in the Prior Pleadings, evidently giving notice that Artur Khachikyan’s first name in the Answer to Complaint and to Cross-Complaint and subsequent pleading was misspelled as “Arthur Khachikyan” instead of “Artur Khachikyan.” [Notice of Errata, filed 09/09/2025]. This Notice does not directly state that the good faith determination is sought by Artur Khachikyan rather than Arthur Khachatryan, but that now appears to be the case. The motion is not denied outright based on these errors.
The opposition also argues that the motion is premature, as there is pending a notice of related case, and a stipulation for consolidation of this case with another case currently pending in Department V of the Alhambra courthouse involving the same accident, in which Amber Trimble and minors Lorelai Trimble and Logan Trimble have filed suit against defendants Anna Khachatryan, Lili Khachatryan, Arthur Khachatryan, SG Holding, LLC, Hovhannes Sayadan and Vibe Auto. The opposition argues that the advent of the Trimble related case and its consolidation has delayed discovery and depositions, and requests that the motion for good faith settlement be continued until the depositions of Khachtryan, and Trimble are taken.
It is not clearly argued what facts could be pursued in those depositions which would have a bearing on the issues raised by this motion.
The opposition argues with respect to the good faith of the settlement that while the settling defendants argue that they are settling for their policy limit, that is not the end of the inquiry, as a relevant Tech-Bilt factor is the settling parties’ insurance policy limit and also their financial condition. The opposition argues that the moving parties have not provided evidence that this insurance policy is the only policy available to them, that they are underinsured or that they are relatively insolvent.
The opposition appears to argue that the motion should be denied for failure of moving parties to show this factor has been met. This argument misapprehends the burden on such a motion on the party challenging the good faith of the settlement to establish a lack of good faith. As set forth above, the Court in Tech Bilt stated:
“The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”
Tech Bilt, at 499-500 (footnote omitted).
There is some authority which recognizes that a party’s financial condition under Tech-Bilt, may be irrelevant where it is shown that the settlement is not disproportionately low. See L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 749-750.
There is no argument concerning how the settlement is so far out of the ballpark of the range of potential liability of the settling defendants to suggest a lack of good faith, particularly in light of the acceptance by plaintiff of the settlement sum upon advice of legal counsel, and the declaration of counsel for settling defendants concerning the arm’s length negotiation of the settlement between counsel for the settling parties. The court is within its discretion to find that the motion sufficiently supports a finding of good faith, and that opposing party has failed to show that the settlement sum is so far out of the ballpark in relation to the relevant factors to establish the settlement is not made in good faith.
In the alternative, the court would be within its discretion here to continue the motion for a further showing by both parties with respect to the Tech-Bilt factors.
The Second District in County of Los Angeles had continued the hearing several times to permit the County to challenge the showing of insolvency made by the driver (and to conduct his deposition). The showing there was summarized as follows:
“Guerrero is 33 years old, married, with three children; he is employed by Lockheed as a structures assembler and earns $ 550 gross per week; his only assets are $ 11,000 equity in his Palmdale home, two 1979 vehicles, and $ 100 in a checking account.”
County of Los Angeles, at 1153.
The Second District found that, particularly in light of the County’s lack of diligence in attacking this showing, the trial court had not erred in failing to continue the hearing any further, concluding from this showing that “It is established that Guerrero lacks the means to satisfy a judgment of any size.” County of Los Angeles, at 1159.
Here, SB Holding bears the ultimate burden to show a lack of good faith, by providing the court with evidence showing some sort of collusion or that any evidence of insolvency, or inability to satisfy a judgment, is not sufficient. The court will hear argument whether it should continue the matter to permit a clearer showing of the Tech-Bilt factors, particularly settling defendants’ financial condition, with an opportunity permitted to SB Holdings to challenge any such evidence, and to submit argument and evidence concerning the other factors impacting the good faith settlement determination. The court is inclined to order such a continuance and further briefing for the further purpose to the moving parties to clearly articulate the identity of the parties seeking the good faith settlement determination, and to, if this case is ultimately deemed related to the other pending action, permit any parties in the other case who are not parties to this case, specifically, the minor plaintiffs in that case, the opportunity to oppose the current motion.
RULING:
Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement of Defendants and Cross-Complainants Anna Khachatryan and Arthur Khachatryan is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.
Moving parties are required to provide the following information in order for the court and the other parties to evaluate the good faith of the settlement:
-Detailed financial information concerning available assets of settling defendants at the time of the settlement, including but not limited to number of family members, income of each member and moving defendants, education and training of moving defendants and employment history, funds in savings and checking accounts, and all assets, including real estate, retirement accounts or other accounts of any value.
The further briefing must include a notice of motion which correctly identifies the names of the parties seeking the good faith settlement determination.
If this case is deemed related to another case, notice of this motion, and all supporting documents, including those already on file, must be served on all parties in the other case, and proof of service showing such service must be filed.
Further briefing schedule is to be according to Code based on the new hearing date. [Matter is stayed until new hearing date].
DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE
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