Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case Number: 25NNCV02625, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Montera Capital, LLC alleges that it is the legal owner of real property located at 6245 Mayfield Avenue in Los Angeles (La Canada Area), obtaining ownership after it purchased the property in March of 2025, and perfecting title under the sale as reflected in a grant deed recorded on March 7, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Vesnica Balija and all unknown occupants, tenants, and subtenants are occupying the property or claim a right to possess or occupy the property.

Plaintiff alleges that prior to plaintiff’s purchase of the property, on January 10, 2025, the former owners of the property served a Notice of Termination of Tenancy, which terminated defendants’ alleged tenancy of the property and provided defendants until March 31, 2025 to vacate the property, but defendants have refused to vacate the property by March 31, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff then served a Notice of Intent to Enter Premises on defendants, pursuant to Civil Code section 1954, demanding an inspection of the property on April 8, 2025 at 1:00 p.m., but the defendants did not allow Plaintiff to inspect the property as noticed and are currently in possession of, and occupying, the property without any right to do so.

The complaint alleges that in accordance with applicable laws, on April 10, 2025, plaintiff caused to be served on defendants a Notice to Occupant(s) to Quit and/or Vacate the Premises, but defendants have not vacated the property within the appointed time, or since surrendered possession of the property. Plaintiff alleges that after having been served with the Notice to Vacate, defendants were not entitled to any more than three days to quit the property, but more than three days have passed, and defendants have failed and refused to deliver possession of the property to plaintiff. Hence, the defendants remain in possession without plaintiff’s consent.

The complaint also alleges that the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the property is not less than $147.00 per day. Thus, defendants’ unlawful detention of the property has caused plaintiff damages which will continue to accrue at that sum from the date of the expiration of the Notice to Vacate until the time of judgment.

(5) State specifically the method used to serve the defendant with the notice or notices of termination upon which the complaint is based. This requirement may be satisfied by using and completing all items relating to service of the notice or notices in an appropriate Judicial Council form complaint, or by attaching a proof of service of the notice or notices of termination served on the defendant.”

Defendant argues that a valid and legally sufficient notice is a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer action, and that the three-day notice is defective because it disregards Glendale’s Just Cause Eviction Ordinance and the City’s Rental Rights Program, Ordinance no. 5922. Plaintiff argues that under the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, all “no-fault” evictions require landlords to state a legitimate, ordinance-permitted ground for eviction, provide a Declaration of Intent to Evict to the Los Angeles Housing Department, and pay mandated relocation assistance to the tenant.

The moving papers fail to provide the court with a copy of or request judicial notice of the applicable version of the referenced ordinance. There is no provision of a source to locate the ordinance, such as a website. The moving papers do not quote to any particular language from the ordinance. This showing does not provide the court with sufficient information to confirm that the ordinance requires what defendant claims it does or that it applies to this case. There is, in fact, no explanation or legal argument supporting the foundation of defendant’s argument, i.e., that the Glendale Just Cause Eviction Ordinance applies to the subject property, when the subject property is alleged to be located in the city of “Los Angeles,” not the city of Glendale. [Complaint, para. 1].

Under CCP § 430.30(a), an objection to a pleading may be taken by a demurrer "[w]hen any ground for objection to a complaint...appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice…"

Under the circumstances, defendant here has failed to establish any deficiency in the complaint from the face of the pleading and has not requested judicial notice of any matter. The demurrer is overruled.

Plaintiff in opposition argues that the complaint alleges each of the required allegations for unlawful detainer pursuant to CCP section 1161a, which outlines the requirements for a cause of action for post-foreclosure unlawful detainer, and provides, in pertinent part:

“(b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and continues in possession of a manufactured home, mobilehome, floating home, or real property after a three-day written notice to quit the property has been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as prescribed in Section 1162, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter: …

(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.”

The complaint here alleges that defendant has continued in possession after a three-day written notice to quit has been served where the property has been sold and title has been duly perfected. [Complaint, paras. 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, Exs. 1, 2].

Plaintiff in opposition also argues that to the extent defendant asserts plaintiff was required in the three-day notice to state a legitimate, ordinance-permitted ground for eviction, plaintiff’s Notice to Quit does that, as it states:

“Owner previously served a ‘Notice of Intent to Enter Premises’ on you, pursuant to Civil Code section 1954, demanding an inspection of the Property on April 8, 2025 at 1:00 p.m. However, at that date and time, you did not allow Owner to inspect the Property pursuant to Civil Code section 1954.”

(2) To make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations or improvements, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workers, or contractors or to make an inspection pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1950.5….

(d)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (e), or as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), the landlord shall give the tenant reasonable notice in writing of his or her intent to enter and enter only during normal business hours. The notice shall include the date, approximate time, and purpose of the entry. The notice may be personally delivered to the tenant, left with someone of a suitable age and discretion at the premises, or left on, near, or under the usual entry door of the premises in a manner in which a reasonable person would discover the notice. Twenty-four hours shall be presumed to be reasonable notice in absence of evidence to the contrary. The notice may be mailed to the tenant. Mailing of the notice at least six days prior to an intended entry is presumed reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”

Plaintiff argues that pursuant to the City of Glendale Municipal Code section 9.30.030(F), evidently the same Glendale’s Just Cause Eviction Ordinance relied upon in the moving papers, “a landlord may bring an action to recover possession of a rental unit as defined herein only upon one of the following grounds: The tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the unit for the purposes of making repairs or improvements, or for any reasonable purpose as permitted or required by the lease or by law, or for the purpose of showing the rental unite to an prospective purchaser or mortgagee.”

Plaintiff argues that therefore plaintiff’s Notice to Quit satisfies the requirements of the Glendale Municipal Code, the ordinance. Plaintiff also argues that defendant erroneously argues that plaintiff failed to provide a declaration of intent to evict to the Los Angeles Housing Department and failed to pay relocation assistance to defendant, but that the declaration and relocation assistance are only applicable to “not-at-fault” evictions, in effect, withdrawal of the rental unit from the rental market, whereas here, plaintiff’s unlawful detainer cause of action is based on defendant’s refusal to allow plaintiff reasonable access to the unit, which is recognized as just cause under the Glendale Municipal Code.

Plaintiff in the opposition, like defendant in the moving papers, fails to submit to the court the applicable provisions of the Glendale Municipal Code, request judicial notice, or provide a way for the court to access the referenced code sections. Again, it is not explained how the subject property, with a Los Angeles address, is subject to the Glendale Municipal Code.

In any case, the court has located what it believes to be the referenced ordinance and provisions, the City of Glendale, CA, Code of Ordinances, Title 9, Chapter 9.30, Just Cause and Retaliatory Evictions, which does provide at section 9.30.030:

“Notwithstanding California Civil Code Section 1946, a landlord may bring an action to recover possession of a rental unit as defined herein only upon one of the following grounds: …

F. The tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the unit for the purposes of making repairs or improvements, or for any reasonable purpose as permitted or required by the lease or by law, or for the purpose of showing the rental unit to any prospective purchaser or mortgagee.”

It is not clear from the moving papers where in this ordinance a requirement for the payment of relocation assistance is set forth. The opposition refers to section 9.30.035, which is entitled “Required payment of relocation fee,” and provides, at subsection A:

“If the termination of tenancy is based on the grounds set forth in subsection G (and the unit is on a parcel of five or more units), H, I or J of Section 9.30.030, then the landlord shall pay a relocation fee in the amount of the product of three times the greater of the amount of the current rent or the fair market rent as established by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for a rental unit of similar size of that being vacated in Los Angeles County during the year the unit is vacated, plus $2,000, which amount shall be reviewed periodically not to exceed three years by the city council and adjusted as necessary.”

In any case, as argued in the opposition, any such requirements do not appear to be required to be affirmatively pleaded by plaintiff in an unlawful detainer complaint. The ordinance in fact provides at section 9.30.050 A:

“Defense to Action to Recover Possession. Failure of a landlord to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter shall provide the tenant with a defense in any legal action brought by the landlord to recover possession of the rental unit or to collect rent.”

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