Judge Ralph C. Hofer, Case EC065134 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Nora Mendoza and Raul Mendoza allege that plaintiffs at all relevant times have resided in an illegally built structure located at 12223 Wick Street in Sun Valley, Unit A, since February 2009 to the present, pursuant to a written lease agreement with the former landlord. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Karen Baca is the true owner of the subject property and unit, and that defendant Ana Moreno has acted as property manager since September of 2015. Plaintiffs allege that during their tenancies at the unit and defendants’ ownership and operation of it, the unit has been unsafe, unsanitary, unhealthy, uninhabitable and in a serious state of disrepair, including that the unit was constructed and remodeled without required permits, and is substandard due to illegal occupancy.

The complaint alleges that on February 19, 2015, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety issued a Notice of Violation directing defendants to make repairs to the subject property and unit, but defendants did not make the required repairs within the 30 days, or at any time after receiving notice. Plaintiffs allege that at all relevant times, and through December 17, 2015, plaintiffs and defendants have been in a landlord-tenant relationship and that plaintiffs have paid rent to defendants until November 2015. The Mendozas also allege that they made complaints to the City of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Unit regarding untenantable conditions of the premises in February through August of 2015, and that defendants in retaliation filed an Unlawful Detainer action against all named and unnamed occupants of the premises, resulting in the plaintiffs being locked out of their home, and in removal from the unit of personal property and items.

On July 1, 2022, the court filed its Joint Statement of Decision, finding in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on seven of plaintiffs’ causes of action and awarding damages in the amount of $275,763.18, plus tenant relocations costs in an amount to be determined. The Statement of Decision states, “Any award of attorneys’ fees would be subject to a post judgment motion for attorneys’ fees.” [Statement of Decision, 38:11-12].

The First Amended Judgment was entered on September 8, 2022, with plaintiffs to recover from defendants, jointly and severally, the sum of $275,763.18. including, “For rent for uninhabitable dwelling pursuant to 1942.4 in the sum of $3,480.00.” [Judgment, 2:8, para. 4].

Under CCP section 1032(b), “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” Section 1033.5 (a) provides that an allowable cost under §1032 includes attorney’s fees, when authorized by contract, statute or law. CCP § 1033.5 (a)(10).

“(4) “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. When any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides...”

“(a) A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord's demand or notice:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord's agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

“(b)(1) A landlord who violates this section is liable to the tenant or lessee for the actual damages sustained by the tenant or lessee and special damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).

The notice of motion also refers to Health and Safety Code section 17920.3, which provides the conditions which qualify a building as a substandard building but does not appear to contain an attorney’s fees provision. In addition, it does not appear that this code section is mentioned in the judgment.

With respect to the amount of fees to be awarded, and fixed by the court, the motion is very brief, stating that the lodestar method should be applied, and submitting declarations of counsel stating that attorney Rodriguez spent a total of 303 hours on the matter, and is a 22 year attorney with a regular hourly rate of $450 per hour, and that attorney Kwasigroch spent a total of 98 hours on the matter, and is a 40 year attorney with a regular hourly rate of $650 per hour. [Rodriguez Decl., para. 2, Kwasigroch Decl., para. 2]. The total fees sought in the memorandum are $201,762.01, while the notice of motion seeks $202,186.14. The fees which are supported are $136,350 for attorney Rodriguez and $63,700 for attorney Kwasigroch, for a total of $200,050.00.

“the fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005 [185 Cal.Rptr. 145].) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Id. at p. 1004; Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.)

Thus, applying the lodestar approach to the determination of an award under Civil Code section 1717, the Court of Appeal in Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 77 [227 Cal.Rptr. 804] explained: “Section 1717 provides for the payment of a 'reasonable' fee. After the trial court has performed the calculations [of the lodestar], it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.”

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court .... [Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. [Citations.] The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624 [134 Cal.Rptr. 602].)

“The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong”-- meaning that it abused its discretion.”

While detailed billing records are not required, there remains some burden on a party seeking fees to establish some factual basis supporting the lodestar factors of reasonable billing rate and reasonable hours spent. The declarations here, which simply state years of experience as an attorney and the total hours spent on this matter, do not provide this essential information.

The court of appeal described the content of appropriate declarations of counsel made without production of detailed time records in Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Raukin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, in which the court of appeal affirmed a trial court order awarding attorneys’ fees, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting defense counsel’s computation of attorneys’ hours as hours spent reasonably working on the case. The court of appeal reasoned:

“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting defense counsel's computation of attorney hours as hours reasonably spent working on the case. It is well established that “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court's own view of the number of hours reasonably spent. [Citations.]” (Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards, supra, § 9.83, p. 9-70, and authorities cited therein; see, e.g., Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375–1376, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 [declarations sufficient and detailed billing records not required]3; *699 Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 64, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 413 [same]4; Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 677 [same];5 Trustees of Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Golden Nugget, Inc. (C.D.Cal.1988) 697 F.Supp. 1538, 1558–1559 [noting more lenient California rule on time records in setting fees under Civ. Code, § 1717].)

“Because time records are not required under California law ..., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve. See, e.g., PLCM Group[, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.] 1098, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511 (‘We do not want “a [trial] court, in setting an attorney's fee, [to] become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation. It ... is not our intention that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps dwarfing the case in chief,” ’ quoting *700 Serrano v [.] Unruh (Serrano IV) (1982) 32 C [al.]3d 621, 642 [186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985]). See, e.g., ... Jaramillo v [.] County of Orange (2011) 200 [Cal.App.] 4th 811, 830 [133 Cal.Rptr.3d 751] (noting that records included very general descriptions, e.g., “trial prep,” “T/C-Client”); City of Colton v [.] Singletary (2012) 206 [Cal.App.] 4th 751, 784 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 74] (declaration stating time spent on various activities); [citation].” (Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards, supra, § 9.84, p. 9-71.)

The type of categorical breakout of time expended by each attorney and paralegal provided here has been specifically lauded by Hon. Vaughn Walker, former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, as “an especially helpful compromise between reporting hours in the aggregate (which is easy to review, but lacks informative detail) and generating a complete line-by-line billing report (which offers great detail, but tends to obscure the forest for the trees).” (In re HPL Technologies, supra, 366 F.Supp.2d 912, 920.)

Finally, we observe that the three attorneys primarily involved in the litigation provided declarations under penalty of perjury in support of the hours sought, which were broken down by hours expended in each category of services rendered. Feeney also averred he had exercised his “billing judgment” to excise hours actually expended, but which he believed either exceeded the time required for the task or had other reasons to cut. Most importantly, the trial judge presided over the entire matter and was well able to evaluate whether the time expended by counsel in this case, given its complexity and other factors, was reasonable. We find no abuse of discretion here.

Similarly, in Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, the court of appeal found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting a motion for attorneys’ fees by a party prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion, where counsel had not submitted copies of its detailed billing statements. Raining Data Corp., at 1367. The court of appeal observed that in that case: “Raining Data's attorneys provided declarations detailing their experience and expertise supporting their billing rates, and explained the work provided to Raining Data.” Raining Data, at 1375.

Under these circumstances, the court and defendants cannot evaluate specific fees sought or their reasonableness. The court accordingly continues the motions to require plaintiffs’ counsel to submit more detailed declarations showing the basis for the billing rates, and for expending hours on various tasks in this matter.

This seems particularly necessary here, as the declarations refer to all fees incurred in this matter, which could well include fees incurred in prosecuting the related matter, and, in fact, plaintiffs have filed a virtually identical motion in the related case to be heard the same date, which requests the same amount of fees for that matter which are sought here in the memorandum (the notice of motion has a different figure), and the same hours are set forth in the papers. It is not clear whether the fees have been apportioned between the two matters, or whether plaintiffs are seeking their fees twice.

The file shows that this matter was originally filed by plaintiffs in pro per, and that attorney Rodriguez was substituted in fairly early. It is not clear when attorney Kwasigroch became co-counsel, and it is not clear from the showing if there has been any duplication of effort between the two attorneys. The matter involved attendance at status conferences, defending against a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground of res judicata/collateral estoppel with respect to an unlawful detainer action, which was continued with supplemental briefing prepared, discovery motions, a trial extending over ten days, and written briefing and oral closing arguments, as well as the preparation of this motion for fees.

The court recognizes that defendants have failed to file timely opposition to this motion, and that the court presided over these proceedings, and can ultimately determine the appropriate billing rate and reasonable hours expended and the quality of lawyering the court directly witnessed, but the court nevertheless cannot, on the showing now submitted, determine if the hourly rates claimed or hours spent were reasonable in the context of this action, particularly without more detail concerning the time spent on specific tasks, the allocation of the hours between the related actions, and any allocation of the hours between the time spent to prosecute the statutory claims, as opposed to the claims which are not subject to an attorney’s fees statute.

The motion also appears to seek “expenses,” in the sum of $2,136.14. These are apparently costs sought in plaintiffs’ memorandum of costs filed with the court on October 3, 2022 and will be awarded according to the procedures governing such a memorandum of costs.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have established that they were prevailing parties in this matter under their cause of action under Civil Code section 1942.4, which provides, at subdivision (b) that the “prevailing party shall be entitled to recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the suit in an amount fixed by the court.”

The motion is CONTINUED to January 27, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. for the submission of further declarations in support of the billing rates claimed and the hours sought to permit the court to fix the reasonable attorney’s fees. The hours must be broken down by hours expended by each attorney in each category of services rendered, e.g., attending trial, conducting discovery, preparing opposition to motion for judgment on the pleadings, preparing opposition to motion to dismiss, preparing trial briefing, etc. The declarations must also explain how the fees are apportioned between work on this matter and work on the related matter, and work on the claims based on Civil Code § 1942.5 and work spent solely on other claims. Further declarations to be filed by January 13, 2023. Opposition and reply to be filed according to code.

Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect/Microsoft Teams by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect/Microsoft Teams offers free audio and video appearance. Counsel and parties (including self-represented litigants) are encouraged not to personally appear. With respect to the wearing of face masks, Department D recognizes that currently, the Los Angeles Department of Public Health strongly recommends masks indoors, especially when interacting with individuals whose vaccination status is unknown; for individuals who have a health condition that puts them at higher risk for severe illness; individuals who live with someone who is at higher risk; and for individuals who are around children who are not yet eligible for vaccines. In accordance with this guidance, it is strongly recommended that anyone personally appearing in Department D wear a face mask. The Department D Judge and court staff will continue to wear face masks. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect/Microsoft Teams, or otherwise, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.