Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 19STCV22031 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94. The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

This court finds that the hourly rates are not, on their face, unreasonable given the attorneys’ experiences. Plaintiffs have demonstrated these rates are consistent with the general prevailing rates in the Los Angeles area and have been approved by courts in similar circumstances. Indeed, Defendant does not provide evidence suggesting that the quoted rates are unreasonable or excessive, nor does it appear to even argue the point.

Thus, under the totality of the circumstances and based upon general prevailing rates in the Los Angeles area for this type of litigation, this court finds the quoted rates to be reasonable. Considering the large number of attorneys all billing at varied rates, for Lodestar purposes, this court will award an average hourly rate of $350 per hour for this particular case. This determination considers the complexity of the case, the quality of services provided, and the attorneys’ experience.

In total, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s records reflect 242.5 hours billed on this matter beginning to end. (Kirnos Decl., Exh. A.) "[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged [within the moving party’s verified billing invoice], with a sufficient argument and citations to evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

In opposition, Defendant first contends a reduction is warranted based on “Plaintiffs’ refusal to enter into the LA Model Protective Order.” (Opp. 4: 22-23.) Defendant contends this “stubborn refusal” was unreasonable and resulted in unnecessary motion practice, and thus Plaintiffs’ fees should be reduced by $4,827.50. Defendant also argues more generally that “[t]he case was overstaffed and handled inefficiently,” and that “there was nothing complicated or unusual about the work [Knight Law Group] performed.” (Opp. 5: 18-21.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 24, 39; Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal. App. 5th 240, 256 [reduction in fees warranted where “billing entries demonstrate[d] a lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks performed.”].)

The court appreciates that this case did potentially involve more law and motion practice than the average Song-Beverly case. This included, among other things, Plaintiff filing of a motion to compel and resulting IDCs; opposing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication; multiple depositions; and the preparation of trial documents.

By and large, however, the issues involved in this case were applicable to other consumers’ vehicles, thereby triggering economies of scale in terms of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s efficiency in litigating this type of lemon law case. This should not have required anything more than slight factual modification to existing boilerplate.

Considering these facts, this court agrees that in some instances, the time quoted is excessive under the circumstances. Notably, Defendant notes that more than half of the billing entries are for tasks that took 12-minutes or less. (Opp. 1: 16-17; Krinos Decl., Exh. A.) To this point, Plaintiff responds that these “fast tasks” are the result of “Knight Law’s strategy of having different, specialized attorneys work on different aspects of the case,” a system that “actually results in efficiency and efficacy.” (Reply 4: 13-16.) While this may be true in some instances, the use of voluminous attorney’s more likely results in unnecessary attorney time spent “getting-up-to-speed” on the case. This causes inefficiencies and ultimately, duplicative time entries.

In light of the foregoing discussion, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total amount of reasonable attorney’s fees in this case, using a lodestar methodology, is $61,250.00. This was calculated by multiplying the hourly rate of $350 by 175 hours, which this court deems to be the total amount of reasonable time spent in the instant case.

Plaintiffs seeks costs in the amount of $19,658.02. (See Memorandum of Costs.) Defendant filed a motion to tax costs on March 9, 2023. The only amount challenged is “$3,400 as to work their expert Anthony Micale expert allegedly performed on August 22, 2023.” (Mtn. to Tax 3: 6-7.) Defendants argue the twelve (12) hours of work performed by Mr. Micale on August 22, 2022, “are excessive and unreasonable”—especially when considering the deposition itself lasted only 3.5 hours. (Id. 5: 10-11.)

“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum.” (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) The period is extended two court days where, as here, the cost memorandum was served electronically. (Id.; See Proof of Service.) “The court may extend the times for serving and filing the cost memorandum or the notice of motion to strike or tax costs for a period not to exceed 30 days.” (Rule 3.1700(b)(3).) This rule also allows the parties to agree to extend the time for serving and filing the cost memorandum. (Id.)

Plaintiff served its cost memorandum electronically on February 16, 2023. (See Proof of Service.) Based on a 15-day timeline and absent an extension, Defendant’s motion to tax was due on or about Friday March 3, 2023. Then, considering a two court day extension for electronic service, the motion to tax was due on or about Tuesday March 7, 2023. Defendant filed its motion to tax two days later on Thursday, March 9, 2023. Defendant does not address the untimeliness of the motion or ask this court to extend the time for serving. This court therefore declines to extend that deadline. There is also no indication the parties themselves agreed to extend the deadline.

Were this court to exercise its discretion and extend the time for serving the motion to tax, the motion would still be denied. Defendant’s opposition is merely the blanket statement that the time spent was excessive and potentially inconsistent with the expert’s testimony at deposition that he was doing no further work on the case that day. But absent more, Defendant has not shown that the time spent was unreasonable or did not occur.

It is to be noted that the recoverable costs in a Song-Beverly action is much broader than the normal costs allowable under CCP § 1033.5. This includes any reasonable expert fees actually incurred by Plaintiff, despite the lack of any CCP § 998 situation. (See, CCP § 1033.5 (b)(1) – “Fees of expert not ordered by the court -- “except when expressly provided by law.” In this case expert fees are expressly allowed under Civil Code § 1794 (d). (See also, Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.3d 112, 137-138.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.