Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 19STCV34231, Date: 2025-01-09 Tentative Ruling

In August 2019, a fire broke out at the residence of the Ortega Family. The fire caused injuries to to the family and tragically, the death of Ashley Ortega, who was 17-years old. Plaintiffs then filed this action against the owners of the property and Southern California Gas. Plaintiffs contribute the fire to a possible case leak and assert causes of action against SoCal Gas for negligence, wrongful death, and negligence infliction of emotional distress.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294). Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.) Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto. (§ 437c(o)(2).)

Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Jeff Hughes, numbered 1 through 70, are OVERRULED. The court concludes Hughes is qualified to provide expert testimony for purposes of this motion. “The rule that a trial court must liberally construe the evidence submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion applies in ruling on both the admissibility of expert testimony and its sufficiency to create a triable issue of fact. [Citation.] In light of the rule of liberal construction, a reasoned explanation required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to a summary judgment motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that required in expert testimony presented in support of a summary judgment motion or at trial.” (Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 173, 189.)

Additionally, Mr. Hughes’ lack of certain qualifications (as noted in great detail by the Defendant in its objections) go to the weight of his expert opinions, as opposed to its admissibility. He clearly possesses “special knowledge, skill, experience, training and education” which is “sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact,” as to the opinions he has offered in this case. Evidence Code §801.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the Complaint. Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish that it breached any duty owed to Plaintiffs or that Defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing Plaintiff’s harm. These issues are both based on the critical issue in this motion, that is, whether a natural gas leak is to blame for the fire at the Ortega family home. “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: duty; breach of duty; legal cause; and damages.” (Friedman v. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 454, 463.)

First, the court must “identify the issues framed by the pleadings.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) This action follows the tragic death of 17-year-old Ashley Ortega from a fire at her family’s home on August 25, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege the owners of the property committed negligence by failing to provide properly functioning smoke detectors and maintaining defective or non-operational metal bars on the windows. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege a “possible gas leak” caused the blaze. (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendant SoCal Gas is alleged to have “negligently manufactured, sold, installed, maintained and/or inspected the gas pipes…” (Id. ¶ 29.)

The burden begins with Defendant to show that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) Investigator Robert McLoud of the LAPD’s Arson Unit investigated the origin and cause of the fire. (SSUMF 12.) Based on the burn patterns and physical evidence he observed, Investigator McLoud determined the fire originated on or near the base of the armrest of the sofa located on the east end of the porch, near the front door. (SSUMF 13.) Combustible materials were present in this area. (SSUMF 14.)

The natural gas meter and regulator were located near the southeast corner of the porch, underneath the porch. (SSUMF 15.) However, the natural gas meter and regulator and surrounding did not sustain significant thermal damage. (SSUMF 16.) Therefore, McLoud ruled out a leak at the gas meter as the cause of the fire. (SSUMF 16.)

The night following the fire, SoCal Gas also tested the soil for natural gas near and around the service line, gas meter, and regulator. (SSUMF 18.) The tests confirmed there was no natural gas in the area. (Id.) Based on these facts, it is Defendant’s position that natural gas did not cause the fire. (Id. 20.)

Considering this evidence, Defendant has met its initial burden to establish that a natural gas leak was not the cause of the fire, and thus, that Defendant cannot establish the essential elements for negligence.

This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Plaintiffs provide evidence that in July of 2017—two years before the fire—there was a gas leak at the property. (P’s SSUMF 5.) A employee from SoCal Gas investigated the leak and addressed the issue. (SSUMF 6, 9.) Thereafter, however, Plaintiffs testified to continuing to smell gas near the porch at the residence. (P’s SSUMF 14.)

On the night of the fire, Plaintiffs Juan and Juana Ortega heard a noise they described to a fire investigator as a “crash” or “thunder” like sound. (P’s SSUMF 19, 20.) They went to the window but saw nothing out of the ordinary. (Id. 21.) About ten minutes later, Plaintiffs saw fire in the living room, which they believe started near the couch on the front porch and came through the window. (Id. 22.) Notably, a few months prior to the fire, Plaintiff Juan Ortega enclosed the porch by adding a “blind” and “sliding door.” (P’s SSUMF 64.) The gas meter was located underneath the enclosed porch.

Plaintiff provides a declaration from its expert, Jeff Hughes. Hughes is “a Construction Manager at APERTURE and a General Contractor in the State of California and possess a General Contractor B license.” (Hughes Decl. ¶ 2.) Hughes attests to “have significant experience in evaluating fire damage and incidents similar to those experienced at the subject property” and is a “certified fire and smoke consultant.” (Id.)

It is Hughes’ opinion that natural gas was leaking intermittently from beneath the porch. (Hughes Decl. ¶ 62.) Hughes states that the “enclosing of the porch is consistent with less moving airflow on the porch which would be consistent with the natural gas vapors leaking through the porch floor boards from the piping associated with the meter beneath the porch (as agreed to by Investigator McCloud) and forming a explosive vapor cloud at or near the southeast corner of the couch on the porch.” (Id. ¶ 65.)

Once the natural gas accumulated in the enclosed porch, it was ignited by an electrical outlet near the couch—which is consistent with the “crash” or thunder sound heard by Plaintiffs shortly before the fire. (Id. ¶¶ 67-68.) The couch, itself combustible, was covered with clothing. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 71.)

To summarize, it is Hughes’ opinion that the evidence “allows no other reasonable explanation of the incident other than the scenario of a natural gas explosion, supplied by a leak beneath the porch at or near the southeast corner of the couch, ignited by the nearby outlet spark, catching fire to the couch and/or the clothing and then spreading into the house after the front porch window collapsed.” (Id. ¶ 76.)

Plaintiffs also call the negative soil samples performed by the SoCal gas investigator into question. Plaintiff presents evidence that soil samples from the previous 2017 leak also came back negative for gas, even though the investigator confirmed the presence of a gas leak through other means. (Castro Decl., Exh. 13, 14.) Plaintiff asserts that “[t]his means Defendant SCGC’s soil sampling method does not yield accurate results.” (Opp. 10: 9-10.) Plaintiff’s expert also challenges the failure to conduct any other testing methods, such as “pressure testing,” “bubble testing,” or “dye testing.” (Hughes Decl. ¶ 44.) In his opinion, a soil test by itself is “totally insufficient” to rule out a gas leak. (Id.)

Courts must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Doing so here, Plaintiffs have established a triable issue of material fact as to whether a natural gas leak caused the fire. The dueling theories regarding the cause of the fire are issues to be left to the trier of fact. Therefore, there exists a triable issue as to whether Defendant breached its duty owed to the Plaintiffs.

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s own negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm. In particular, Defendant argues Plaintiffs stored combustible clothing items near or on the couch which “fueled the fire and caused it to rapidly progress around the front door.” (Mtn. 10: 7-8.)

First, as noted by Plaintiffs, investigator McLoud testified at his deposition that the sofa, itself a “large fuel load,” would have caused the same damage even without the clothing. (Castro Decl., Exh. 8, pg. 141.)

Second, even assuming Plaintiffs were negligent, this would not be a total bar to recovery. In California, where a plaintiff's conduct is a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, courts use comparative fault principles to apportion responsibility for the injury. (See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 829 [“[I]n all actions for negligence resulting in injury to person or property, the contributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ negligence, if any, is not a total bar for purposes of this motion.

The parties appear to agree that all three causes of action against Defendant are essentially based on negligence principles. Therefore, as discussed herein, a triable issue remains as to all causes of action.