Jan Robertson v. Guitar Center, et al.

PLAINTIFF JAN ROBERTSON’S MOTIONS TO QUASH, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LIMIT DEFENDANT’S DEPOSITION SUBPOENA SEEKING PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT RECORDS FROM (1) JUVO PLUS, INC., (2) CLARK EVERSON, LLP, AND (3) GARRY A. JONES & ASSOCIATES

 

MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiff Jan Robertson

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Guitar Center, Inc., and GTRC Services, Inc.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Jan Robertson is a former employee of Defendants Guitar Center, Inc., and GTRC Services, Inc., who alleges she suffered from disabilities including PTSD, an anxiety disorder, major depression, and symptoms related to anxiety and depression. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants terminated her employment while on medical leave.

Plaintiff now moves to quash the deposition subpoena seeking employment records from her subsequent employers (1) Juvo Plus, Inc., (2) Clark Everson, LLP, and (3) Garry A. Jones & Associates.  [FN 1] Defendants opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motions to Quash the Deposition Subpoenas are DENIED. The third parties are ordered to turn over all documents consistent with the Subpoenas.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.  

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff’s Motions to Quash

A. Legal Standard

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) A motion to quash the production of documents or tangible things requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.13459(a)(5).)  “[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.”  (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)

B. Analysis

Plaintiff moves to quash the deposition subpoena served on three of Plaintiff’s subsequent employers: (1) Juvo Plus, Inc., (2) Clark Everson, LLP, and (3) Garry A. Jones & Associates. The subpoenas appear nearly identical and seek 14 categories of documents, including Plaintiff’s “[a]pplication for employment, résumé, and interview notes,” documents relating to “job titles, duties, and compensation,” and documents related to “the reasons for the separation or end of [Plaintiff’s] employment.” (See Rodriguez Decls., Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff contends the documents sought are irrelevant to the instant case, overbroad, and infringe upon her right to privacy. Relying on the Evidence Code, Plaintiff also contends that documents relating to her job performance amount to improper character evidence.  

In opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has placed her employment history—including her physical and mental health conditions—at issue by bringing this lawsuit. In particular, they argue the records sought are relevant to Plaintiff’s mitigation of damages, accommodation requests, and the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s alleged mental and emotional distress.

“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552.)

Here, Plaintiff has a recognized expectation of privacy in her employment records, although to an extent, Plaintiff has reduced that privacy interest by bringing this case. It also appears there are no feasible alternatives to obtain the documents sought. 

When balancing Plaintiff’s privacy interests against Defendant’s interest in discovering documents that are particularly relevant to Defendant’s defense of the action, this court finds the balance shifts clearly in favor of disclosure. The court agrees with Defendant that the categories are relevant and not overbroad.  In addition to addressing Plaintiff’s work conditions at the subsequent employers and the interplay with her disability, the documents sought are relevant to Plaintiff’s performance as an employee—questions Plaintiff has put in issue by bringing this action.   To be blunt, this was not a close call.

Moreover, Plaintiff mistakes admissibility at trial with discoverability. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [“discovery is not limited to admissible evidence”].) Evidence is relevant if it “ha[s] any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code § 210.)  The discovery here sought is relevant, even if it is ultimately not admissible at trial—a question this court expresses no opinion on now. 

This conclusion is consistent with the legislature’s “very liberal and flexible standard of relevancy,” such that any “doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at 542.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motions to Quash are DENIED. The third parties are ordered to turn over all documents consistent with the Subpoenas.  

C. Sanctions

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

The Plaintiff’s ill-conceived request for monetary sanctions is DENIED, simply based upon the fact that she did not prevail in any of her motions to quash.  

1. The request should have been clearer as to the exact party against whom the sanctions were being requested.  Simply stating: “Defendants seek $500 in sanctions solely to deter Plaintiff and her counsel . . .” is not sufficient notice for “due process” purposes; and

2. Burying that request literally on page 20 at the end of the opposition also does not satisfy “due process.” [FN 2]

To be frank, if these sanctions had been properly requested, they would have been awarded against Plaintiff’s counsel for filing these rather specious motions to quash.  

All party’s counsel should act accordingly in the future.

Defendants to give notice, unless waived.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   May 08, 2024 ___________________________________