Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 19STCV44262 2022-10-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 19STCV44262, Date: 2022-10-06 Tentative Ruling

This is an employment dispute. Plaintiff Jeannette Zanipatin (“Zanipatin”) a formerly worked as a Legislative Staff Attorney for Defendant Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (“MALDEF”). Plaintiff alleges that MALDEF forced her resignation in response to her request for a reasonable accommodation: that she be allowed a temporary transfer from Sacramento to Southern California, so that she could personally attend to the serious health conditions of her daughter and mother-in-law. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for violations of FEHA and related claims.

Plaintiff now moves to (1) quash Defendant’s deposition subpoena seeking Plaintiff’s medical records, or in the alternative, for a protective order, and (2) to quash Defendant’s deposition subpoena seeking Plaintiff’s employment records. Defendant opposed both motions.

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 requires that a motion to quash a subpoena be “reasonably made,” but does not explicitly require that the parties first attempt to resolve the issue informally. (Hollander v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 16, 2007, No. B200615) 2007 WL 2326820, at *1.)

A motion to quash the production of documents or tangible things requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.13459(a)(5).) “[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.” (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)

Plaintiff moves to quash Defendant’s deposition subpoena for medical records, or in the alternative, seeks a protective order. On May 12, 2021, Defendant served subpoenas to Kaiser Permanente and Kaiser Permanente that requested the following:

All documents referring or relating to every visit, consultation, examination, or communication between Kaiser Permanente and/or any medical doctor associated therewith, and Plaintiff Jeannette Zanipatin including, but not limited to: charts, diaries, logs, histories, video/audio tapes, diagnoses, prognoses, analyses, letters, charge slips, memoranda, prescriptions, and any other medical records related to Jeannette Zanipatin.

Plaintiff objects to this requested production as “overly broad as to time and subject matter, an invasion of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy, and unnecessarily invasive.” (Mtn. 4: 26-28.) Plaintiff does not object to any categories in particular.

Defendant contends the evidence is relevant, as Plaintiff alleges that she has “suffered physical sickness, pain and suffering, resulting humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and emotional distress” as a result of MALDEF’s alleged conduct. (Complaint at ¶¶ 27, 37, 45, 53, 61, 68, and 73.) Plaintiff further alleges in her Prayer for Relief that she is entitled to “damages for physical illness, emotional distress, humiliation and mental anguish...” (Prayer for Relief at ¶ 2.) Further, Defendant notes that Plaintiff alleges that her daughter has general anxiety disorder and that her husband’s mother is prone to stroke and stroke complications. (Complaint at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff claims these were two of the reasons why she needed to relocate her family to Los Angeles. (Id.) Accordingly, MALDEF argues that reviewing the medical records will help establish if Plaintiff’s emotional and physical conditions were caused by MALDEF, or if Plaintiff already was suffering from these conditions prior to the alleged wrongful conduct of MALDEF.

The California Supreme Court has explained that “plaintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury’; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing [a] lawsuit, . . . they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864 [citation and footnote omitted].) However, “. . . privacy interests may have to give way to [an] opponent’s right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)

Here, there is little doubt the documents sought are relevant to this case. Records demonstrating Plaintiff’s mental and physical health are relevant to determine the existence, cause, and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, and whether some other cause may be attributable to the alleged pain and suffering. It would be difficult––if not impossible¬¬¬––for Defendant to defend against the allegations of the complaint, particularly Plaintiff’s claims for damages, if Defendant was blocked from obtaining Plaintiff’s physical and psychological history. Because there is a genuine dispute of whether Plaintiff’s alleged pain and suffering is attributable to Defendant, all information during the relevant period is discoverable. It is also unlikely Defendant could obtain full and accurate records through other, less intrusive means than the medical records themselves.

The court does, agree, however, that the time period sought is overbroad. The subpoenas contain no temporal limitation—they simply seek all documents. While medical records reflecting conditions at or near the time of the alleged termination are certainly relevant, Defendants have not shown they are entitled to all records going back for as long as those records were kept.

The court will therefore reduce the relevant time period to five (5) years preceding Plaintiff’s termination. Although the Complaint is silent on the exact date of Plaintiff’s termination, it appears to have been in the late months of 2018. (Complaint ¶¶ 11, 12, 14, 18.) Accordingly, deposition subpoenas are limited to “all documents” going back to January 1, 2014, up to the present. This is an attempt to balance Defendant’s compelling need for the documents against Plaintiff’s fundamental right to privacy.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Subpoena for medical records is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The third-parties are ordered to turn over all documents from January 1, 2014, to present. The subpoenas are otherwise unmodified.

All employment records, including but not limited to, the personnel file, performance reviews, disciplinary records, termination records, if applicable, payroll and/or salary records, workers’ compensation claims, if any, medical records, employee benefit records, charges or complaints whether state, federal administrative or otherwise, correspondence and notes concerning [Plaintiff].

Plaintiff argues that much of the information sought—such as medical records, performance reviews, workers’ compensation claims, or any complaints she made against her current employer—will not lead to admissible evidence and is therefore not discoverable. (Mtn. 3: 10-12.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that records related to her salary and benefits, which go to the issue of economic damages, are discoverable.

Defendant argues these documents are directly relevant to the claims and defenses asserted in this case, especially where Plaintiff claims MALDEF failed to engage her in an interactive process to determine what accommodations, if any, were necessary to allow Plaintiff to continue to perform her work duties at MALDEF. Defendant further contends the records “will assist MALDEF in its analysis of Plaintiff’s employment, accommodations implemented, industry-specific earning potential, mitigation efforts, earnings capability, contributing factors to her ongoing emotional distress, and employability in general.” (Opp. 5: 16-26.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s employment records from Drug Policy Alliance will further assist MALDEF in establishing their other defenses, including evidencing a pattern and practice of making unsubstantiated workplace allegations for personal gain if Plaintiff has made other frivolous claims against her current employer. Lastly, the records sought are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s motive, credibility, and veracity. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff has a recognized expectation of privacy in her employment records, though to an extent, Plaintiff has reduced that privacy interest by bringing this case. It also appears there are no feasible alternatives to obtain the documents sought.

When balancing Plaintiff’s privacy interests against Defendant’s interest in discovering documents that are particularly relevant to Defendant’s defense of the action, this court find’s the balance shifts in favor of disclosure. The court agrees with Defendant that the categories are relevant and not overbroad. The documents sought go directly to Plaintiff’s performance as an employee, a factor Plaintiff has put in issue by bringing this action. Such documents could demonstrate or negate a claim that Plaintiff has a habit of engaging in conduct for which disciplinary action would be necessary.

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.