Case Number: 20STCP02196    Hearing Date: March 8, 2023    Dept: 49

Tentative Ruling

Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Department 49

HEARING DATE:     March 8, 2023                        TRIAL DATE:  April 29, 2024 (Phase II)

CASE:                         American Modern Home Insurance Group, Inc. v. Vicki Laken, et al.

CASE NO.:                 20STCP02196

CROSS-DEFENDANT ROBERT MEEPOS’S MOTION FOR ORDER THAT ROBERT MEEPOS IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO THE PHASE II BENCH TRIAL

MOVING PARTY:               Cross-Defendant Robert Meepos

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Respondent/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Vicki Laken; Cross-Complainant Kent Sherwood 2011 Trust

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an interpleader action filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 386, by American Modern Home Insurance Group, Inc (“American”).  Respondents are Vicki Laken (“Laken”) and the Kent Sherwood 2011 Trust (“the Trust”) through its Trustee, Mihana Mitchell (“Mitchell”). 

Laken and the Trust both claim the right to the remaining insurance proceeds for dwelling repairs to a mobile home located at 30473 Mulholland Highway, No. 104, Agoura, CA 91301, which was destroyed by the Woolsey Fire in November 2018. 

Respondents have filed cross-complaints against each other.  Respondent Laken also filed a cross-complaint against Robert Meepos, the previous Trustee of the Trust, and Mihana Mitchell, the present Trustee of the Trust.

On May 10 and 11, 2022, this court held the Phase One Non-Jury trial to determine which party is entitled to recovery of the interpleaded funds.  This court found that Laken is solely entitled to the interpleaded funds at issue, but that the funds are not to be released until there has been a final resolution or determination of the remaining claims.

Cross-Defendant Robert Meepos now moves for an order that he is not a proper party to the Phase II bench trial.  Laken and the Trust opposed.

TENATIVE RULING:

Cross-Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

            Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Order that Robert Meepos is Not a Proper Party to the Phase II Bench Trial

Analysis

Meepos filed this motion as an ex parte application on February 9, 2022.  Finding the ex parte was more appropriate as a noticed motion, the court continued the hearing to this date and set a modified briefing schedule. (See Minute Order, 02/10/2023.)

As background, this is an interpleader action filed by plaintiff American Modern Home Insurance Group, Inc. (“AMHIG”) against Laken and the Trust. AMHIG’s Complaint in Interpleader sought to determine the entitlement of Laken, on the one hand, and of the Trust, on the other hand, to the remaining dwelling coverage insurance proceeds for a mobile home that was destroyed in the November 2018 Woolsey Fire. The court held a Phase I bench trial, between Laken and the Trust, in which this court found that Laken was entitled to the interpleaded insurance proceeds. Meepos, who resigned as Trustee of the Trust in 2019, was not a party in the Phase I bench trial.

On October 16, 2020, Laken filed Cross-Complaint asserting causes of action against Meepos and Mihana Mitchell, the successor Trustee, for (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) intentional interference with contractual relations, (3) tort of another, and (4) declaratory relief. Laken alleges wrongdoing by Meepos and Mitchell in their dealings with Laken, the Trust, and American Modern Insurance Group.

As to the claim for declaratory relief, Laken alleges that “[a]n actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Laken and the trustees concerning the rights and duties under the trust agreement, including but not limited to Laken’s exclusive right to and sole discretionary use of the remaining benefits owed under the Policy for damages arising from the Loss, and Laken’s entitlement to payment by the Trust for the full amount due and owing on the Loan.” (Cross-Complaint ¶ 51.) She seeks “a judicial determination of the parties’ rights and duties and a declaration as to Laken’s exclusive right to and sole discretionary use of remaining benefits to be paid under the Policy for damages arising from the Loss.” (Id. ¶ 52.)

The declaratory relief cause of action is set to be adjudicated by a non-jury trial. Meepos argues that as former Trustee, he is not a proper party to that non-jury trial. He contends “he has no continuing relationship with Laken and no current right or ability to control the present actions of the Trust to justify any declaration of future rights against him.” (Mtn. 1: 18-22.) Rather, he argues “only the Current Trustee, Mitchell, can direct the actions of the Trust.” (Id.) Therefore, there is no “actual controversy between Laken and Meepos, as Former Trustee, upon which to base a declaratory relief claim against him.” (Mtn. 3: 11-12.) Thus, the only claims in Laken’s Cross-Complaint to which Meepos is subject are those to be determined by jury trial. 

In opposition, Laken concedes that Meepos “is not a direct party to these claims,” but argues “he is still a party to this action and a key figure in the events which give rise to this action.” (Opp. 2: 26-27.) “Moreover, the issues to be decided in Phase II overlap with those which form the basis for Laken’s remaining jury trial claims.” (Id.) Laken expresses concern that Meepos’ absence will result in inconsistent factual findings, or that Meepos will attempt to argue that Phase II findings are not binding on him to the extent it is favorable for him to do so.

The Trust’s Opposition argues that Meepos is a proper party to the declaratory relief claim because “all of the causes of action against the Trust are from actions taken by the Trust during the period of time that Mr. Meepos was the Trustee.” (Opp. 3: 16-17.) Thus, “in order to have the Trust properly represented, Mr. Meepos' testimony and Ms. Mitchell's testimony should both be included.” (3:21-22.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1061, the court may refuse a judicial declaration “in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” “Declaratory relief operates prospectively[;] there is no basis for declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved.” (Osseous Techs. of Am., Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 357, 366 [citing 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed.2008) Pleading, § 869, p. 284].)

Here, the opposing parties fails to articulate what present or future interest a judicial declaration would serve, or what additional relief the declaratory relief cause of action could provide that the jury claims would not. (See Hood v. Superior Ct. (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 319, 324 [declaratory relief unnecessary when “issues invoked in that cause of action already were fully engaged by other causes of action”].) It appears virtually undisputed that Meepos has no present relationship with Laken, no control over the actions of the Trust, and is alleged to have committed only past wrongdoings, which are encompassed by Laken’s legal causes of action set to be determined by jury trial. (See Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1076 [“As a general rule, the trustee is the real party in interest with standing to sue and defend on the trust’s behalf.”]; see also Moeller v. Superior Ct. (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 1124, 1131 [“It has been the law in California for over a century that a new trustee ‘succeed[s] to all the rights, duties, and responsibilities of his predecessors.’”].) Therefore, this court agrees that Meepos is an unnecessary party to the Phase II bench trial.

Of course, this conclusion does not leave Laken without a remedy against Meepos.  Rather, her cross-claims against Meepos for (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (2) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, and (3) Tort of Another, still remain and will be adjudicated by a jury trial. Similarly, in the event that Meepos has knowledge or information related to the non-jury claims, there is apparently nothing preventing the parties from calling him as a witness during the Phase II trial, if necessary.

Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   March 8, 2023                                               ___________________________________

                                                                                    Randolph M. Hammock

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court