Ricardo Alfaro v. XJ Grand Hotel, LLC, et al.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Ricardo Alfaro

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants/Cross-Complainants XJ Grand Hotel, LLC, and Ya Ping Wang

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Ricardo Alfaro brought this employment action against his former employer, Defendant XJ Grand Hotel, LLC, alleging Defendants wrongfully terminated him based on age. Plaintiff also brought the action on behalf of other aggrieved employees under PAGA alleging unpaid wages and failure to provide meal periods, among other things.  

Defendant XJ Grand then Cross-Complained against Alfaro and other former employees alleging the employees embezzled money from the company.  Ming Ming Deng akak Marty Deng, who was named as a Defendant in the Complaint and as a Cross-Defendant in the Cross-Complaint, also filed a Cross-Complaint against XJ Grand.

Following a mediation and settlement, on February 21, 2023, Defendant/Cross-Complainant XJ Grand filed a request for dismissal which dismissed Cross-Defendant Ricardo Alfaro from the Cross-Complaint.  On March 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal which dismissed the PAGA cause of action.

Plaintiff now moves to recover its attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the settlement entered between Plaintiff and Defendants XJ Grand and Ya Ping Wang.  Defendants opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part, as modified herein. Plaintiff is awarded his reasonable attorney’s fees in the total amount of $153,000.00.

Plaintiff is awarded costs in the amount of $6,881.79.

Moving party to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

I. Attorney’s Fees

A. Background

Plaintiff now moves for its award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the settlement entered between the parties.  Per the parties’ Settlement Agreement, Defendants and Cross-Complainants XJ Grand Hotel, LLC dba Best Western South Bay and Ya Ping Wang (collectively “Defendants”) agreed to pay Plaintiff $125,000.00, plus reimbursement of Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, to be determined by the Court. In exchange for a dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, Defendants also agreed to dismiss, with prejudice, their Cross-Complaint. (See Chami Decl.  ¶ 4, Ex. A, p. 1.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff now seeks attorneys’ fees of $345,971.25.  This is arrived at the requested lodestar basis of $230,647.50 times the suggested multiplier of 1.5.  

B. Determination of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees

In California, “[a] party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly authorized by statute or contract.” (Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67 Cal. App. 5th 459, 464; See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, the parties’ settlement expressly provides for the award of Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees, to be determined by this court.  (See Chami Decl.  ¶ 4, Ex. A.) There is no dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees.

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.)  “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’”  “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”  (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’”  (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.)  The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

 

The court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94.  The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Attorney Pouya B. Chami billed the vast majority of hours for Plaintiff, all at a rate of $675.00 per hour.  (Chami Decl. ¶¶ 24, 25.) Attorney Michael Matta also worked on the case for Plaintiff at a rate of $450.00 per hour. (Id. ¶ 34.) 

This court finds that the hourly rates are reasonable and consistent with the general prevailing rates in the Los Angeles area and have been awarded to counsel by courts in similar circumstances. (Chami Decl. ¶ 24, Ex. C.) Defendant does not provide evidence suggesting that the quoted rates are unreasonable or excessive. 

But of course, when an experienced attorney bills at these types of “premium” rates, it comes with the expectation that the attorney uses his or her skills and experience to litigate the matter in an efficient and reasonable manner. This is discussed further below.

2. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel asserts it “devoted more than 350 hours to this case.” (Mtn. 4: 19.) In particular, counsel quotes 298.50 hours billed by Attorney Chami, and another 64.80 hours billed by Attorney Matta.  (Mtn. 10: 2-4.) Counsel contends this is “only a portion of the hours incurred” in this case. (Mtn. 10: 6-7.) 

“[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged [within the moving party’s verified billing invoice], with a sufficient argument and citations to evidence.  General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.”  (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)  

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff breach the confidentiality clause of the settlement agreement by including a full copy of the settlement with the instant motion. Thus, consistent with the liquidated damages provision in the settlement, Defendants contend the fee award should be reduced by $10,000 “for each time Plaintiff mentioned the Settlement Agreement” in the moving papers. (Opp. 8: 9-10.) 

Defendants cite no authority for that position, and this court declines to consider this factor in calculating the reasonable fee award.

Defendants next argue, also without citation to any authority, that Plaintiff cannot recover for those fees pertaining to Plaintiff’s defense of the Cross-Complaint. However, the settlement agreement resolved the Cross-Complaint as to Plaintiff, and it was Defendant who undertook the aggressive strategy of filing a Cross-Complaint in the first place.  “Parties who litigate with no holds barred…assume the risk they will have to reimburse the excessive expenses they force upon their adversaries.”  (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 653-654.) “A party cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 638; See also Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1251, quoting Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 158–159 [“‘Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff's various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.’”].)

Defendants’ remaining arguments are better taken. This court agrees, generally, that the quoted time is somewhat excessive or unreasonable under the circumstances, especially for a routine case that ended in settlement before trial. Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel routinely litigates these cases.  By and large, the issues involved in this case were applicable to other employment and/or PAGA actions, thereby triggering economies of scale in terms of Plaintiff’s counsel’s efficiency in litigating this type of case. 

Moreover, while the discovery here was fairly involved, it largely should not have required anything more than slight factual modification to existing boilerplate. As relevant here, a court may reasonably reduce counsel’s requested rates “based on its finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to trial; that the name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals.”  (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.) Whether counsel actually spent the quoted time is beside the point—even accepting that they did, it was unreasonable to do so under the circumstances.

Finally, although this court appreciates the contingent nature of the case, the court declines to apply a multiplier as there were few, if any, complex or novel issues of law.

Thus, using a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, this Court awards Plaintiff its reasonable attorney’s fees in the total amount of $153,000.00.  [FN 1]

II. Costs

Plaintiff also seeks litigation costs of $6,881.79.

In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding.  (Code Civ. Proc., §1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) 

Defendants’ opposition does not contend that Plaintiff’s costs of $6,881.79 are unreasonable or otherwise unrecoverable.  The court finds the costs are recoverable.  

Plaintiff is therefore awarded his full costs in the amount of $6,881.79.

Moving party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   April 13, 2023 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court


FN 1 -   Although it is well settled that the trial court need not “show its math,” this total amount was arrived at by finding the reasonable hours to be:  (Chami) 200 hours times $675/hr ($135,000) plus (Matta) 40 hours times $450/hr.($18,000).

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at  Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.