Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 20STCV15634 2023-03-13 Tentative Ruling

This is a landlord-tenant dispute. Plaintiffs are current or former tenants of the apartment building at 827 Beacon Avenue, Los Angeles, CA. Defendants Carolina Perez and Ricky Perez allegedly owned the apartment building from 2002 through late 2017. Defendant Red Hook Properties, LLC is the current owner. Plaintiffs allege the apartments contain(ed) numerous deficiencies and conditions that render them uninhabitable. Plaintiffs bring causes of action for (1) breach of warranty of habitability, (2) breach of statutory warranty of habitability, (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, (4) negligence, (5) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, (6) private nuisance, (7) violation of Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance, and (8) declaratory relief.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendants again demur to the Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance, arguing it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. This court previously sustained Defendants’ demurrer to that cause of action in the First Amended Complaint but granted leave to amend. (See Ruling, 11/2/2022.)

Defendants now argue the Seventh Cause of Action fails once again because Plaintiffs have not alleged harassing conduct by landlord that would violate the Act. “Merely not maintaining fire suppression systems and equipment as alleged,” Defendants argue, “is not itself sufficient to prove that Defendants were harassing Plaintiffs.” (Dem. 5: 13-14.)

The Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance is codified in Chapter IV, Article 5.3 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The legislature enacted the Ordinance on the finding that “landlords have been constructively evicting long-term tenants by engaging in harassing conduct in order to coerce vacancies.” (LAMC Ch. IV, Art. 5.3, § 45.30.) The Ordinance “augments existing protections provided to residential tenants under state, federal, and local laws to prohibit and deter tenant harassment by landlords in all rental units” and “provides an aggrieved tenant with a private right of action.” (Id., §§ 45.31, 45.35.) It goes on to enumerate sixteen nonexclusive categories of conduct that constitute “tenant harassment,” including but not limited to “[r]educing or eliminating housing services required by a lease, contract or law,” “[f]ailing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws;” and “[o]ther repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of a tenant(s) and that cause, are likely to cause, or are committed with the objective to cause a tenant(s) to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such tenancy.” (§ 45.33(1)-(16).)

Here, Plaintiffs allege they “have notified Defendants in writing concerning requested repairs and maintenance of the building, but Defendants refuse to make reasonable repairs or maintenance.” (SAC ¶ 40.) More specifically, Defendants “willingly and knowingly fail[ed] to maintain the building’s fire suppression systems and equipment, which in turn caused and/or contributed to fires in and around the building including the parking lot, which caused Plaintiffs’ property damage, loss of use, constructive eviction and fear and anxiety.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs allege that “[m]aintenance of the fire suppression systems and equipment was required under the Parties’ lease agreement and required by local, county and state laws and ordinances.” (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege they “complained to Defendants and the local fire department, yet Defendants failed to timely correct the issue, if at all.” (Id.)

There appears to be little, if any, cause authority addressing or interpreting the Ordinance—the parties cite none. When interpreting a statute, a court’s “fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.” (Collondrez v. City of Rio Vista (2021) 61 Cal. App. 5th 1039, 1052.) This starts by “examin[ing] the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning,” not in isolation, but “in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” (Id.) “If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” (Id.) “If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.]” (Id.)

Considering the Ordinance’s plain text, this court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants failed to maintain fire suppression systems and equipment—as required by the lease or applicable laws—are sufficient to allege a violation of section 45.33 and/or section 45.35. Defendants apparently do not dispute that maintenance of the fire suppression systems and equipment was required under the Parties’ lease agreement and/or by local, county and state laws and ordinances. This conclusion is also consistent with the statute’s apparently broad application, noted by its purpose of “augment[ing] existing protections provided to residential tenants under state, federal, and local laws.” (Art. 5.3, § 45.31.)

This court also rejects Defendants argument that the pleading is uncertain. “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored,” and are strictly construed “because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery.” (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1135.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.