Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 20STCV27868 2022-09-01 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Ramanand Singh and Nirmala Singh bring this action individually and as successors to the interests of their daughter, Gayatri Singh. On or about October 29, 2019, Gayatri Singh was driving a 2015 Honda Civic when she was struck from behind by Defendant Mone Danette Sanchez. The impact caused the driver’s seat back to fail and collapse rearward. Ms. Singh suffered immediate injuries from the impact and passed-away two days later.

Plaintiffs bring causes of action for (1) strict product liability and (2) negligence against Defendants Honda Motor Company, LTD, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and FAA Poway H, Inc. Plaintiffs seek punitive/exemplary damages on these causes of action. Plaintiffs also bring a separate claim for negligence against Defendants Mone Danette Sanchez, Cynthia Sanchez, Everardo Hidalgo-Carrillo, Alexis Hidalgo Velazquez, and Rogelio Villanueva.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294. Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389. A motion for summary judgment must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition Leyva v. Sup. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475) or where the opposition is weak. Salesguevara v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387.

A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858. Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto. § 437c(o)(2).

Where a plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of a cause of action, or where a complete defense is shown, a court must grant a motion for summary adjudication. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(1)-(2). A defendant meets its burden by showing that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” Id.; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853. When a defendant moves for summary judgment or adjudication on the basis of an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of establishing the undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467-68.

Defendant American Honda moves for summary adjudication of the prayer for punitive damages. Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides that “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs seek punitive/exemplary damages against Defendant on the First and Second Causes of Action. (See Compl. ¶¶ 27-29; UMF 4.) Punitive damages may be recovered under section 3294 “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (§ 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined by statute as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct [FN1] which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. § 3294(c)(1)). “Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. § 3294(c)(2)). “Fraud” is defined as “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. § 3294(c)(3)).

As framed by the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the subject Honda vehicle exhibited design and manufacturing defects that made the vehicle unsafe. (FAC ¶ 19.) These defects included a defective and unsafe driver’s seat and back, a defective and unsafe restraint system, and inadequate warnings of said defects. (FAC ¶ 20.) The Complaint contains numerous allegations that Plaintiffs contend show oppression, fraud, or malice on behalf of Defendants, including:

Defendants “have known since the early 1970's, that most of their vehicles’ front seat backs, when the seats are occupied, are so weak and poorly reinforced, such that they can and do collapse rearward and occupants of those seats will move rearward into the rear seat passenger compartment and suffer secondary impacts inside the vehicle including striking the rear seats of the vehicles in a 30-35 mile per hour rear end collision.” (FAC 27A.)

“Defendants intentionally designed the seats in their vehicles, including the seats and seatbacks in the SUBJECT VEHICLE and vehicles within the subject vehicle platform to be so weak and poorly reinforced that the seat would collapse, and the occupants’ bodies would be unrestrained and would be thrown rearward into the rear compartment of the vehicles resulting in catastrophic and/ or fatal head and spinal injuries.” (Id. at 27B.)

Defendants conducted safety tests that demonstrated their vehicles “were weak, improperly reinforced and dangerous and defective and would catastrophically fail in a foreseeable rear end accident …and that the vehicles’ occupants would suffer from catastrophic and fatal head and/ or spinal injuries.” (Id. at 27H.)

“[D]efendants intentionally failed to provide any warnings of the known dangers and defects and when these defendants knew that such warnings were necessary. These defendants failed to provide the warnings knowingly and fraudulently so as to hide the dangers and defects from the public and those who would purchase the vehicles in an effort to misinform and mislead the public and potential purchasers so as to deceive them. This was done in order to advance the profit margins and pecuniary interest of these defendants at the expense of the safety of the public in a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others.” (Id. at 27L.)

“[D]efendants have engaged in a concerted effort to hide the dangers of their seats in their vehicles[.] For instance in 2015 these defendants were fined $70,000,000 by the United States government for hiding and failing to report deaths and injuries due to defects in their vehicles.” (Id. at 27M.)

Defendant argues that summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages is appropriate because Plaintiffs have failed to produce “clear and convincing” evidence to substantiate the allegations that Defendant Honda acted with the oppression, fraud, or malice. To meet its initial burden on summary judgment, a moving defendant may “present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 854.) “A defendant can satisfy its initial burden to show an absence of evidence through ‘admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing’ or through discovery responses that are factually devoid.” (Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1302 [citing Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.) A Defendant, however, must still support the motion with evidence including “affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice” must or may “be taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).)

Defendant here relies on Plaintiff’s “factually devoid” discovery responses to meet its initial burden. Defendant does not present any affirmative evidence showing a lack of malice. Defendant’s evidence is solely Plaintiff’s lack of evidence, as purportedly demonstrated by Plaintiff Nirmala Singh’s discovery responses. [FN 2] Defendant contends it propounded Form Interrogatories (Set Two), Special Interrogatories (Set Two), Requests for Admission (Set Two), and Requests for Production (Set Two) on Plaintiff. (UMF 19.) Among other things, Defendant asked Plaintiff to state all facts, identify all witnesses, and identify and produce all documents supporting their claim for punitive damages against AHMC. (UMF 20, 22, 24, 26.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff responded to AHMC’s requests with “a laundry-list of objections” [FN3] and failed to set forth any facts, witnesses, or documents supporting punitive damages. (UMF 21, 23, 25, 27.)

Arguing this is enough to switch the burden, Defendant cites to Union Bank v. Superior Ct. (1995) 31 Cal. App. 4th 573, 592–93.) There, the defendant moved for summary judgment on a fraud claim and relied on the plaintiff’s admissions responses and form interrogatory answers to meet its initial burden. The plaintiff’s only response to the discovery was that the plaintiffs “believe[d] that [defendant] knowingly and fraudulently” assigned assets, but without any evidence to support the allegation. (Id. at 578.) The Court of appeal found these that these interrogatory answers, “which contained no facts supporting the existence of misrepresentations or a fraudulent conspiracy,” shifted the burden of proof in connection with the summary judgment. (Id. at 581.)

Defendant's separate statement cites facts which prove that the repossession of the scanner took place in accord with the terms of the lending documents; plaintiff's interrogatory responses demonstrate they have no evidence defendant made any fraudulent representations; plaintiffs' interrogatory responses indicate they have no evidence defendant was a member of a fraudulent conspiracy; and plaintiffs admitted defendant had done nothing wrong in connection with the actual lending of the money and repossession of the scanner. This was sufficient to shift the burden of proof to plaintiffs pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (o)(2).”

The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Union Bank. Here, Plaintiff’s response to the discovery was in the form of objections and without a substantive response, which were never challenged by the Defendant. This court does not view an objection as conclusive evidence of an admission that no evidence exists. Moreover, and perhaps more important, the moving defendant in Union provided not only the plaintiff’s devoid discovery responses, but also provided additional facts in the separate statement “which prove[d] that the repossession of the scanner took place in accord with the terms of the lending documents.” (Id.) Thus, it appears the moving defendant in Union Bank provided not only substantive discovery answers demonstrating a lack of evidence of fraud, but also their own evidence showing the same. Such is not the case here.

As noted earlier, Defendant’s only evidence offered in its separate statement is evidence that Plaintiff responded to discovery with blanket objections. But unlike Union Bank, Defendant presents no other evidence that it did not commit the wrongs alleged that would support punitive damages. On these facts, this court does not find that Defendant has met its initial burden to demonstrate that Defendant is entitled to a summary adjudication of the punitive damages, as a matter of law. Thus, the burden never shifted to the Plaintiff to establish any triable issue of material fact.

FN1 -- “Despicable conduct” is conduct that is “ ‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by most ordinary decent people.’ ” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 330.)

FN2 -- It does not appear that Defendant’s motion or Separate Statement addresses what discovery (if any) was propounded on the other Plaintiff, Ramanand Singh.

FN3 -- This court is not concerned with the validity of these objections when ruling on this motion. Indeed, no motion to compel a further response was ever made to challenge those objections, frivolous as they may be.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.