Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 20STCV28383 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 20STCV28383, Date: 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling

This is a lemon law action brought pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The parties settled the matter on January 18, 2022.

Plaintiff moves for an order awarding attorney fees and costs. Defendant opposed the motion.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN PART in the total amount of $15,750.00.

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s exhibits 1 through 20, as records of a court of California or the United States.

Plaintiff moves for an order awarding attorney’s fee in the amount of $24,744.50 plus an estimated additional $5,000 to review the opposition, draft the reply, and attend the hearing.[1] Plaintiff also seeks costs in the amount of $1,683.16.

(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing buyer. The only matter at issue is the reasonableness of the fees requested.

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94. The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $450.00 per hour. This court finds that the hourly rate is not, on its face, unreasonable given the attorney’s experience. However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below.

Plaintiff’s counsel states that he expended a total of 54.8 hours on this matter. Indeed, in his reply he also claims that he “could have spent one hundred (100) hours” for essentially working up this case well beyond what was necessary, and moreover, reasonable.[2]

Defendant contends the time quoted is excessive, and that a maximum of 39.9 hours should be awarded. This Court agrees with the former contention, but not necessarily to the latter one, in which the Defendant was being too kind.

"[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged [within the moving party’s verified billing invoice], with a sufficient argument and citations to evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

From the outset, this Court takes note of the complete absence of any law and motion, and the fact that the issues involved in this case were applicable to other consumers’ vehicles, thereby triggering economies of scale in terms of Plaintiff’s counsel’s efficiency in litigating this type of lemon law case. The Court acknowledges, however, that Plaintiff’s counsel prepared some discovery, which should not have required anything more than slight factual modification to existing boilerplate.

Indeed, Defendant mainly objects to Plaintiff’s quoted time on tasks which, by and large, were likely based on existing boilerplate. Defendant contends it is unreasonable to spend: 5.9 hours “preparing Plaintiff’s initial written discovery, Deposition Notice and correspondence”; 8.10 hours reviewing written discovery; and 5 hours to prepare deposition subpoenas and notices, among other things. This court agrees that the time quoted is grossly excessive under the circumstances.

In light of the foregoing discussion, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total amount of reasonable attorney’s fees in this case, using a lodestar methodology, is $15,750.00. This was calculated by multiplying 35 total hours by an hourly rate of $450.00 per hour.

The Court in its discretion declines to apply a multiplier given this was a relatively standard Song-Beverly case with no law and motion practice and no novel or complex issues of law.

Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $1,683.16. Defendant does not contest these costs.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

[1] In his reply, Plaintiff’s counsel revised his “reserve estimate” to a mere $3,735.00 in association with the fee motion. So much for minor miracles.

[2] This type of bold statement demonstrates exactly what is unreasonable about Plaintiff’s claimed fees in this particular case. “I could have billed more, if I wanted to” is not a very persuasive argument. This Court has no doubt that Plaintiff’s counsel could have done so. Of course, the critical issue would be whether that would have been reasonable. [Not-so-subtle hint: The answer is a resounding “NO!”]