Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 20STCV28648, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Defendant now moves for an order consolidating the arbitration proceeding with another arbitration proceeding, to wit, Guzman v. ProTec Association Services, American Arbitration Association Case No. 01-22-0004-6858, before Eric Epstein, Esq. (currently stayed in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV22560; Department 53). Plaintiff opposed.

Defendant moves for an order consolidating the instant arbitration proceeding with another arbitration proceeding, to wit, Guzman v. ProTec Association Services, American Arbitration Association Case No. 01-22-0004-6858, before Eric Epstein, Esq. (currently stayed in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV22560; Department 53).

Under CCP section 1281.3, “[a] party to an arbitration agreement may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings, and the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings when: [¶] (1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the same parties; or one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a third party; and [¶] (2) The disputes arise from the same transactions or series of related transactions; and [¶] (3) There is common issue or issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.”

Defendant argues consolidation of the arbitrations is appropriate because Defendant is a party to each arbitration; because the Plaintiff in each action worked for ProTec during the same time period and for the same supervisors; because each Plaintiff is alleging age-based discrimination; and because the Plaintiffs share the same counsel, among other reasons. Thus, Defendant argues there are common issues of law and fact that make consolidation not only appropriate, but necessary.

Plaintiff opposes the motion. Referencing the law regarding consolidation of cases, Plaintiff argues this motion needed to be filed in the older Guzman case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.350(a)(2)(A).) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant contractually waived its right to seek consolidation by mandating in the arbitration agreements that the arbitrations proceed on an “individual basis.” Finally, Plaintiff argues the two lawsuits “arise from a largely separate series of events and do not raise common issues of law or fact that could create the possibility of conflicting rulings.” (Opp. 6: 16-19.)

Although the argument was not raised by Plaintiff, this court declines to order consolidation for a simple reason. Under section 1281.3, the court “may” order consolidation when each of the three requirements are met. “As a rule of statutory construction, the word ‘may’ generally connotes discretionary action.” (Menefield v. Foreman (2014) 231 Cal. App. 4th 211, 218.) In other words, a court need not order the consolidation of arbitration proceedings even when the three requirements of section 1281.3 are met.

As particularly relevant, this court is mindful that once a matter is compelled to arbitration, “a court’s power to interfere in [a] pending arbitration [is] strictly limited.” (MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit Franchising, LLC (2011) 191 Cal. App. 4th 643, 658.) From this point, “the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration.” (Id.) Indeed, “[t]he purpose of the statutory stay [required pursuant to section 1281.4] is to protect the jurisdiction of the arbitrator by preserving the status quo until arbitration is resolved. [Citations.] [¶] In the absence of a stay, the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective. [Citation.]” (MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit Franchising, LLC (2011) 191 Cal. App. 4th 643, 658.) Therefore, to preserve the authority of the arbitrators and honor the statutory stay, this court declines to issue a ruling consolidating the arbitrations.

First, the court has doubts that the arbitrations actually do, in fact, share common issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting rulings. Based on the facts and evidence presented, Defendant has not established the possibility of truly “conflicting rulings.” Cases of discrimination, by their nature, are highly fact intensive and personal. The fact that the arbitrators could come to different conclusions on two different Plaintiffs’ age-based discrimination claims does not mean those rulings are conflicting.

Second, although section 1281.3 is silent on the point, the court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s analogy to the law governing the consolidation of cases for his contention that this motion should have been filed in the Guzman case.

Finally, the arbitration agreements’ language requiring that any arbitration proceed on an “individual basis” is somewhat ambiguous. While the court suspects that this language was included to contemplate a class or PAGA action—and not a consolidated action—it is well settled that “any ambiguities [in an arbitration agreement] must be construed against the drafting employer and in favor of the nondrafting employee.” (Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc. (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 233, 248.) Therefore, these considerations support denial of this motion.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.