Showroom Interiors, LLC, v. Hercules Development, LLC, et al.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Showroom Interiors, LLC 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Unopposed

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Showroom Interiors, LLC, brought this action against Defendants Hercules Development, LLC, Ezequiel Serebrisky, and others.  Plaintiff alleged the parties had a written agreement for Plaintiff to provide furniture and other items to stage the property at 2284 Hercules Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90046. The agreement required that the furniture be used for staging purposes only.  Plaintiff alleged Defendants used the property and staging furniture as a rental, in violation of the Staging Agreement. 

The matter proceeded to a bench trial against Defendants Hercules and Serebrisky. This court found that Plaintiff prevailed on all of its causes of action against Defendants and entered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor in the total amount of $151,945.30, in addition to any recoverable attorney’s fees and costs.

Plaintiff now moves to recover its attorney’s fees and costs. No opposition was filed. 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the requested amount of $80,945.50.

Plaintiff is also awarded its costs in the requested amount of $5,420.12. 

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice and may file and serve a proposed amended judgment consistent with this ruling. 

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

A. Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 3.

B. Background

Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants after providing staging furniture to Defendants pursuant to a written agreement. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants breached the agreement by using the staging furniture for non-staging purposes.

A bench trial was held on September 16, 2024. The trial lasted less than eight (8) hours. On October 10, 2024, this court issued its Informal Statement of Decision. This court found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Hercules Development, LLC and Ezequiel Serebrisky jointly and severally, in the total amount of $151,945.30, “in addition to any recoverable costs and/or attorney’s fees which may be allowed by law.” (See 10/10/2024 Informal Statement of Decision, p. 2-5.) 

C. Entitlement to Fees

As the prevailing party at trial, Plaintiff now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $80,945.50. Plaintiff relies on the underlying Staging Agreement as the basis for fees. 

In California, “[a] party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly authorized by statute or contract.” (Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67 Cal. App. 5th 459, 464; See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Civil Code section 1717(a) provides:

In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.

“California courts liberally construe the term ‘on a contract’ in Civil Code section 1717.” (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894.) “‘As long as the action “involve[s]” a contract, it is “ ‘on [the] contract’ ” within the meaning of section 1717.’ ” (Id.) “To determine whether an action is on the contract, we look to the complaint and focus on the basis of the cause of action. [Citations.] Any action that is based on a contract is an action on that contract regardless of the relief sought.” (Yoon v. Cam IX Tr. (2021) 60 Cal. App. 5th 388, 392.)

First, there is no question that the action here was “on a contract.” The basis of the action was Defendants’ breach of the Staging Agreement. 

Second, there is also no question that Plaintiff is the prevailing party here, having been awarded damages in the amount of $151,945.30 at trial.

Finally, the Staging Agreement “specifically provides” for recovery of attorney’s fees. The Staging Agreement contains a provision labeled “Attorneys’ Fees and Costs” which provides: “For the parties’ mutual benefit, if any action is commenced to enforce or interpret, or in any way relates to this Agreement, the prevailing party is entitled to its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Pugh Decl., Trial Exh. 1, ¶ 22.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff, being the prevailing party in the action to enforce the Staging Agreement, is “entitled to its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Id.) The court now continues to address the reasonableness of the fees sought.

D. Reasonableness of Fees

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.)  “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’”  “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”  (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’”  (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.)  The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

Plaintiff utilized two attorneys on this matter: Saul Reiss and Fay Pugh. Mr. Reiss has 52-years of experience as an attorney and billed at a rate of $900 per hour. (Reiss Decl. ¶ 3.) Ms. Pugh has 25-years of experience as an attorney and billed at a rate of $500 per hour. (Pugh Decl. ¶ 14.) 

Here, this court finds the quoted hourly rates are reasonable based on the complexity of the case, the quality of services provided, and the attorneys’ high experience levels. Therefore, the court will award the quoted rates of $900 and $500 for Mr. Reiss and Ms. Pugh, respectively. 

2. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff has provided the billing records from this matter. (See Reiss and Pugh Decls., Exh. 2.) Attorney Pugh billed a total amount of $52,615.00 in fees which, when accounting for an hourly rate of $500 per hour, results in about 105 hours worked. (Id.) Attorney Reiss billed a total of $28,330.50 in fees which, when accounting for an hourly rate of $900 per hour, results in about 31 hours worked. (Id.)

In sum, from inception through trial, Plaintiff’s counsel worked about 136 hours on this matter. Based on the nature of the case, that time appears entirely reasonable. By failing to oppose, Defendants have not shown otherwise. (See Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 [“[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged [within the moving party’s verified billing invoice], with a sufficient argument and citations to evidence”].)

Thus, using a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, this Court awards Plaintiff its reasonable attorney’s fees in the requested amount of $80,945.50.

E. Costs

Plaintiff also seeks to recover costs in the amount of $5,420.12. (See 11/26/2024 Memorandum of Costs). 

Defendants have not filed a motion to strike or tax costs. “Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum.” (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) The period is extended two court days where, as here, the cost memorandum was served electronically. (Id.; See Proof of Service.) “The court may extend the times for serving and filing the cost memorandum or the notice of motion to strike or tax costs for a period not to exceed 30 days.” (Rule 3.1700(b)(3).) This rule also allows the parties to agree to extend the time for serving and filing the cost memorandum. (Id.) Thus, the time for Defendants to move to strike or tax these costs has passed.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded its costs in the requested amount of $5,420.12. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   February 5, 2025 ___________________________________