Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 20STCV40645, Date: 2024-06-07 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs the People of the State of California, the County of Los Angeles, and Muntu Davis, M.D., M.P.H., brought this Complaint against Defendants Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc., Gardens of Paradise, LLC, Shaul Yakovi, and Ronit Waizgen. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from hosting gatherings during the Covid-19 pandemic. Cross-Defendants then Cross-Complained against the County for (1) Violation of the First Amendment and California Constitution Article I, Section 2, (2) violation of procedural due process, (3) violation of substantive due process, (4) violation of Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment, (5) Violation of 5th and 14th Amendment Takings Clause, (6) Violation of legitimate police powers, and (7) declaratory and injunctive relief.

The County then moved to strike the Cross-Complaint pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute. This court granted the motion as to the First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh causes of action in their entirety. (See Ruling 11/9/21.) The Court also granted the motion as to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action “except to the extent premised on the denial of a CUP application.” (Id.)

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant County now demurrers to what remains in the Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendant initially filed the demurrer on September 2, 2021, and Cross-Complainant opposed on October 25, 2021. The court did not rule on that demurrer, instead striking certain claims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP motion. A stay was then entered pending appeal of the related preliminary injunction.

After the stay was lifted, this court re-calendared the hearing on the demurrer to the Cross-Complaint for June 7, 2024, and allowed each party to supplement their initial filings. Cross-Defendant filed its supplemental papers on May 9, 2024. Cross-Complainants did not file any supplemental response or opposition.

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Cross-Complainants have not demonstrated a reasonable possibility of amendment but will be afforded a final opportunity at the hearing to do so if they choose.

The Declaration of Attorney Amnon Siegel, Counsel for Cross-Defendant, reflects that the county met and conferred with Cross-Complainants before the filing of the initial demurrer. (CCP § 430.41.) The County attempted to further meet and confer with Cross-Complainants before the filing of the supplemental demurrer, but Cross-Complainants did not respond. Considering the circumstances, the court considers the meet and confer obligation satisfied.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Following the granting of Cross-Defendant’s special motion to strike, all that remains in the Cross-Complaint are the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, “to the extent premised on the denial of a [Conditional Use Permit] application.” (See 11/9/2021 Ruling.)
[FN 1]

Cross-Complainants operate an event venue in Santa Clarita. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 9.) Prior to the Covid-19 shutdown orders in March 2020, the venue hosted both religious and non-religious events. (Id.) After reopening in September 2020 once shutdown orders were lifted, the venue hosted religious weddings and functions exclusively. (Id.)

In 2012, Cross-Complainants allege they applied for a CUP to expand their use of the property. (Id. ¶ 20.) For the next nine years, Plaintiffs allege they “scheduled, requested and pleaded for final inspections of various building permits, which the County and its officials have arbitrarily, intentionally, and maliciously refused and/or cancelled to deny Cross-Complainants approved permits.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Ultimately, in April 2021, The County “arbitrarily denied Cross-Complainants’ CUP application.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert causes of action for (1) violation of procedural due process, (2) violation of 14th Amendment equal protection, and (3) violation of the 5th and 14th Amendment Takings Clause.

The County demurrers to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, arguing claims based on its “discretionary decision” to deny Cross-Complainants’ Conditional Use Permit application fail as a matter of law.

First, the County contends Cross-Complainants’ claims relating to the CUP application have already been litigated and lost. After the filing of the Cross-Complaint, Ben & Reef Gardens, Ronit Waizgen, and Shaul Yakovi filed a separate petition for writ of mandate in Case Number 22STCP03855, Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc. et al. v. The Department of Regional Planning for the County of Los Angeles. In that proceeding, the Petitioners sought “a writ of mandate compelling Respondent Department of Regional Planning (“DRP”) for the County of Los Angeles (“County”) to set aside its decision to deny Petitioners’ Conditional Use Permit (“CUP”) application, and to process the application so Petitioners can receive a decision on the merits.” (See RJN Exh. 13, p. 1.) On March 7, 2024, Judge Chalfant dismissed the petition with prejudice and entered judgment in the County’s favor after petitioners failed to prosecute the writ. (See RJN Exh. 13.)

Defendants opposed the initial demurrer but have not submitted an opposition to the supplemental demurrer. Because the County raised the argument that the CUP-related claims were nullified by Judge Chalfant’s ruling in the writ proceeding for the first time in its supplemental demurrer, Cross-Complainants have never responded to or opposed this argument.

As an independent basis for demurrer, the County also argues it is immune from the claims under Government Code section 818.4 because its decision to deny Cross-Complaints a CUP was discretionary. (See Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 188 [“a conditional use permit ... is, by definition, discretionary”].) Section 818.4 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the…denial [of]…any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization where the public entity or an employee of the public entity is authorized by enactment to determine whether or not such authorization should be…denied.” (Gov. Code § 818.4.) “Case law is clear that section 818.4 immunizes only discretionary decisions, not mandatory actions.” (Corona v. State of California (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 723, 733.) Cross-Complainants did not address section 818.4 in their 10/25/2021 opposition to the demurrer, despite the County raising it in its initial demurrer.

Considering the arguments and lack of opposition, the court agrees that the mandamus proceeding was Cross-Complainants sole remedy to dispute the denial of the Conditional Use Permit. (See, e.g., City of Santee v. Superior Ct. (1991) 228 Cal. App. 3d 713, 719 [stating that under certain circumstances, “a proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of the local-level agency”].) Second, the court also agrees that the county is immune from suit based on its discretionary denial of the CUP under Government Code section 818.4.

Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Cross-Complainants have not demonstrated a reasonable possibility of amendment, but will be afforded a final opportunity at the hearing to do so if they choose.

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1- In the anti-SLAPP ruling, the court (Hon. Judge John P. Doyle) concluded that allegations pertaining to the Conditional Use Permit were not protected under Prong-1 of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See 11/9/21 Ruling.) Thus, the court did not address the merits of the CUP claims under Prong-2.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.