Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 20STCV40645, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs the People of the State of California, the County of Los Angeles, and Muntu Davis, M.D., M.P.H., brought this Complaint against Defendants Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc., Gardens of Paradise, LLC, Shaul Yakovi, and Ronit Waizgen. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from hosting gatherings during the Covid-19 pandemic and for alleged violations of the County Code.

Plaintiffs now move for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action (violation of Los Angeles County Code section 1.23.050) and Fourth Cause of Action (violation of California Unfair Competition Law.) Defendants have not filed an opposition.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294. Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.

Where a plaintiff moves for summary judgment, the burden is to produce admissible evidence on each element of a “cause of action” entitling him or her to judgment. (CCP § 437c(p)(1); see Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (1995) 37 CA4th 1282, 1287, 44 CR2d 335, 337 (citing text) (disapproved on other grounds by Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 C4th 826, 107 CR2d 841)). This means that plaintiffs who bear the burden of proof at trial by a preponderance of evidence must produce evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not. At that point, the burden shifts to defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1)).

In analyzing motions for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

Plaintiffs bring the Third Cause of Action under the Los Angeles County Code Nuisance Abatement Ordinance. The Ordinance provides that “[n]o person shall cause, maintain, or permit to be caused or maintained a public nuisance, as defined in this chapter, on any property, and every day such public nuisance continues shall be regarded as a new and separate violation.” (§ 1.23.050.) A “public nuisance” is broadly defined to include “[a]ny condition on a property that is maintained in violation of any provision of Titles 7 through 32 of this code.” (§ 1.23.040.) Where a nuisance exists, the “County Counsel may commence an action and/or proceeding for abatement, removal, or enjoinment of any public nuisance, and may take such other steps as necessary and may apply to any court as may have jurisdiction to grant relief for such abatement, removal, or enjoinment…” (§ 1.23.060.)

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants own and operate an events business at the property in Santa Clarita. (FAC ¶¶ 10-14.) During inspections of the property, the County found “a nonpermitted tent structure, on-site structures (specifically an office building and two bathroom buildings) being utilized without final occupancy being granted, and an absence of required on-site fire hydrants.” (Id. ¶ 35.)

Thus, Plaintiffs allege “Defendants violated Los Angeles County Code sections 6601.1 et seq., by failing to obtain the proper permits for the tent installed on the Subject Property. Moreover, Defendants continue to maintain the Subject Property in an unsafe condition, in violation of Los Angeles County Code section 111.1.1. In doing so, Defendants also violated Los Angeles County Code section 1.23.050.” (Id. ¶ 63.) “Defendants also violated Los Angeles County Code sections 1.23.050 and 22.244.040 by allowing multiple unpermitted uses (outdoor dance pavilion, event facility, two restroom structures, structure housing office/conference room, and guard shack) on the Subject Property, and undertaking development activity conducted and maintained within a significant ecological area without required Department of Regional Planning review.” (Id.)

Even where a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is unopposed, the moving party still must meet its initial burden. (Wright v. Stang Mfg. Co. (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1228; Harman v. Mono General Hospital (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 607, 613.) The burden begins with Plaintiffs to produce admissible evidence on each element of their cause of action entitling them to judgment. (CCP § 437c(p)(1).)

Plaintiffs present evidence that Defendants Yakovi and Waizgen own the subject property. (SSUMF 1.) Defendant Gardens of Paradise, LLC, operates an events business at the Property known as “Gardens of Paradise.” (SSUMF 4.) The property is made up of five parcels, all of which are zoned A-1 for light agricultural uses. (SSUMF 5, 8.) There are no active zoning permits associated with any of the parcels that make up the Property. (SSUMF 7.) Defendants have not obtained a conditional use permit to operate the events venue. (SSUMF 38-45.)

Despite the lack of permits, Defendants have constructed improvements on the property which include a large tent structure, and a building containing an office and bathrooms. (SSUMF 15.) GOP does not have permits for these structures. (SSUMF 17, 19, 20.) Additionally, there are no fire hydrants at the events center. (SSUMF 22.) Defendants were repeatedly cited for these violations. (SSUMF 23-30.)

Based on this evidence, Plaintiffs have established violations of the Building Code (LACC tit. 26, ch. 1, §§ 106.1, 106.2), Fire Code (LACC tit. 32, appx. C, C105.3, C106.1), and Zoning Code (LACC tit. 22, §§ 22.02.030(B), 22.16.030(B)). And under the Nuisance Abatement Ordinance, these violations are deemed to be “public nuisances” subject to “abatement, removal, or enjoinment…” (§§ 1.23.030-1.23.060.)

Particularly, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated the UCL by [a] “Conducting business operations in a large tent structure on the Subject Property without required permits in violation of Los Angeles County Code sections 6601.1 et seq.; [b] Conducting business operations on the Subject Property using buildings that do not have required occupancy permits in violation of Los Angeles County Code section 111.1.1; [c] Conducting business operations on the Subject Property without having an approved automatic sprinkler system and fire hydrants in violation of Los Angeles County Code sections 903.2.11; [d] Conducting business operations on the Subject Property that are not consistent with the Subject Property’s A-1 zoning designation in violation of Title 22 of the Los Angeles County Code; and [e] Maintaining a public nuisance on the Subject Property pursuant to Los Angeles County Code sections 1.23.040 and 1.23.050 and California Civil Code section 3490.” (FAC ¶ 67.)

Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice....” “The scope of section 17200 is broad, encompassing ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’ ... It governs ‘anti-competitive business practices’ as well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose ‘the preservation of fair business competition.’” [Citations.] (Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 115, 133); McAdams v. Monier, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 174, 187–88 [“a business practice need only meet one of the three criteria [unlawful, unfair or fraudulent] to be considered unfair competition”].) “To prevail on a claim under the unlawful prong of the unfair competition law, the plaintiff must show that a challenged [practice] violates any federal or California ‘statute or regulation.’ ” (Beasley v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc. (2022) 85 Cal. App. 5th 901, 912.)

A court’s remedial powers under the UCL are “extraordinarily broad.” (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 499, 540.) “Probably because ... unfair business practices can take many forms, the Legislature has given the courts the power to fashion remedies to prevent their 'use or employment' in whatever context they may occur.” (Id. [citations omitted].) This power “necessarily includes the authority to make orders to prevent such activities from occurring in the future.” (Id.)

Here, as discussed supra, Plaintiffs have established that Defendants’ unpermitted operation violates the Zoning, Building, and Fire Codes. Therefore, Plaintiffs have established “unlawful” conduct in violation of the UCL. By failing to oppose the motion, Defendants have not established a triable issue of material fact.

By this ruling, this court concludes only that Plaintiffs have prevailed on each cause of action. As requested by Plaintiffs, and as allowed by applicable law, this court defers a ruling on any potential remedies. At a later date, this court “may need to hear additional evidence that, while not relevant to proof of the elements of the offenses, is relevant to the proper exercise of [its] equitable powers in fashioning terms of injunctions and abatement orders, as well as in assessing appropriate amounts of civil penalties. The evidence heard on the [motion for summary adjudication] may be complemented by evidence later adduced to [fully] resolve these issues.” (People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior Ct. (Cahuenga's the Spot) (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 1360, 1387.)

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Plaintiffs served the motion on Defendants by email on May 17, 2024. (See Proof of Service.) Defendants received notice of the continued January 30, 2025 hearing date by mail notice from the clerk (see 10/28/2024 Certificate of Mailing) and also by email notice from Plaintiffs on November 5, 2024. (See 11/05/2024 Notice of Ruling.)

FN 2 - Facts pertaining to the conditional use permit appear in the Separate Statement under the Fourth Cause of Action. (See Separate Statement, beginning at p. 8.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.