Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 20STCV42456, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV42456    Hearing Date: March 14, 2024    Dept: 49

Immigrant Rights Defense Counsel v. Luther Linton, et al.


MOTION TO TAX COSTS
 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Brandi Linton and Pecorelli Enterprises

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Counsel

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Counsel filed this action against Defendants Brandi Linton, Luther Linton, and Pecorelli Enterprises, alleging violations of the Immigration Consultant Act.  Defendant Luther Linton was dismissed on August 13, 2021.

After a bench trial on March 7 and 8, 2022, the court issued an informal statement of decision on April 7, 2022, finding in favor of Plaintiff. Judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendants was entered on April 29, 2022.  The court permanently enjoined Defendants from violating the Immigration Consultants Act for a period of ten years.

Defendants now move to tax the postjudgment Memorandum of Costs filed by Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Counsel on July 28, 2023.  Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff is to submit an Amended Judgment to reflect these awarded post-judgment fees and costs.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, unless waived. 

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Tax Costs

On July 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Memorandum of Costs After Judgment, seeking $5,274.00 in postjudgment costs. On August 10, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to tax costs. 

First, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs was untimely. They are incorrect -- it was not untimely filed. 

Defendants incorrectly rely on the specific rule of court for the timing of a cost memo seeking prejudgment costs. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.)  But the timing for postjudgment costs, as Plaintiff seeks here, is prescribed by statute. A judgment creditor claiming postjudgment costs as a matter of right under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.070 “shall” file with the court and serve on the judgment debtor a Memorandum of Costs “[b]efore the judgment is fully satisfied but not later than two years after the costs have been incurred.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (b).) 

Here, the judgment has not been fully satisfied, and Plaintiff filed and served the cost memorandum within two years of incurring the costs sought. The memorandum is therefore timely.

Second, Defendants argue the underlying judgment is stayed pending appeal. This is also incorrect. While the perfecting of an appeal generally stays proceedings in the trial court, the court “retains jurisdiction to entertain a motion for attorney fees despite an appeal[.]” (Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 360, citing Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1639.)  The execution of this judgment may be stayed pending appeal, since it is for costs and fees only; however, post-judgment matters involving the amount of the judgment in either fees and/or costs may still be adjudicated by the trial court.

Third, Defendants argue the attorney’s fees sought are not recoverable as costs.  This argument fails. “The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law.” (CCP § 685.040; see also § 685.070(a)(7) [“[the judgment creditor may claim under this section the following costs of enforcing a judgment:  (6) Attorney’s fees, if allowed by Section 685.040.”) 

The Immigration Consultants Act (“ICA”) provides that a party who claims a violation of the ICA and prevails in the action “shall recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22446.5(b).) Thus, where, as here, “a fee-shifting statute provides the substantive authority for an award of attorney fees, any such fees incurred in enforcement of the judgment are within the scope of section 685.040.” (Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 602, 614.)

Finally, Defendants contend the costs and interest sought are excessive, or at minimum, not supported with evidence.  Defendants claim they “doubt the veracity of IRDC’s costs.” (Mtn. 1: 13.)

However, there is no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements, or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum.  Only if the costs have been put in issue via a motion to tax costs must supporting documentation be submitted. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267.) 

A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety of the costs included therein, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary. (See Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass'n (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774-776; see also Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal. App. 4th 1475, 1486.) Moreover, Defendants’ merely claiming to “doubt” the costs, without any supporting evidence or argument to support that contention, is insufficient to meet their burden to tax. (See Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266 [mere statements in points and authorities and declaration of counsel insufficient to rebut prima facie showing].) Therefore, Defendants have failed to properly put the costs “at issue” in their motion to tax. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs is DENIED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   March 14, 2024 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.