Felipe Mejia Iniguez, et al. v. A.G. Layne, Inc., et al.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIEN OF THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY

 

MOVING PARTY:  Plaintiffs Maria G. Mejia, individually and as successor-in-interest to Decedent Felipe Mejia Iniguez, Rodrigo Mejia, Rodolfo Mejia, and Rosalva Mejia

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Unopposed

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiffs Felipe Mejia Iniguez and Maria G. Mejia filed the instant action against various manufacturers of alleged toxic chemical products.  Felipe worked in mannequin manufacturing where he alleged he was exposed to harmful chemical products that caused renal cell carcinoma.  Felipe passed away from the cancer after filing this suit; his wife, as his surviving spouse and successor-in-interest, continues the suit on his behalf.  The First Amended Complaint also adds Felipe’s adult children as Plaintiffs, and asserts causes of action against the chemical manufacturers for (1) negligence, (2) strict liability – warning defect, (3) strict liability – design defect, (4) fraudulent concealment, (5) breach of implied warranties, and (6) loss of consortium.

On March 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case.

Plaintiffs now move to expunge the lien of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company. No opposition was filed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Expunge Lien is DENIED without prejudice.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Expunge Lien

I. Service on Lienholder

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs served the motion on the lienholder, Bernstein/Hartford, by mailing the motion to the following addresses:

Leo D. Bernstein & Sons, Inc.

Attn: HR/Legal Department

151 West 25th Street

New York, NY 10001

Brittany L. Sauer, Esq.

England Ponticello & St. Clair

701 B Street, Ste. 1790

San Diego, CA 92101

Leo D. Bernstein & Sons, Inc.,

d.b.a. Silvestri California

8125 Beach Street

Los Angeles, CA 90001

(See Proof of Service on Lienholder.) 

Plaintiffs’ counsel attests that Bernstein’s New York address is “the same address that Hartford used when it sent notices to Bernstein concerning Plaintiff’s claim for worker’s compensation benefits.” (Brust Decl. ¶ 12.) The other Bernstein address is apparently the location of its Los Angeles location where Mr. Iniguez worked.

Brittany L. Sauer is an attorney or “representative of Hartford” who Plaintiffs’ counsel communicated with by email on November 13, 2024. (Brust Decl. ¶ 16.) At that time, Ms. Sauer indicated that the firm of England Ponticello & St. Clair had been retained to “represent[] the interests of Leo Bernstein & Sons, Inc. d.b.a. Silvestri California/The Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company.” (Id., Exh. F.) Ms. Sauer further indicated that Bernstein/Hartford would be intervening in short order, either by stipulation or leave. (Id.) Ms. Sauer concluded: “Should you have any questions, concerns, or wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact handling attorney, Max Anikstein, or managing partner, Barry Ponticello, as they will be the primary contacts for this matter (I appeared and write today due to their scheduling conflicts).” (Id.)

Thus, Plaintiffs served the motion on Ms. Sauer, an attorney who worked on this matter but may not be the primary handling attorney. Plaintiffs did not serve the motion on Max Anikstein or Barry Ponticello, who are the “primary contacts” on the matter. (Id.) This does raise some concerns. 

Be that as it may, because Plaintiffs also served the motion directly on the employer in New York and Los Angeles, the court considers service of the motion to be sufficient.  

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs move to expunge a lien (or purported lien) of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (“Hartford”). Hartford is apparently handling the workers’ compensation claim on behalf of the decedent Felipe Mejia Iniguez’s former employer, Leo D. Bernstein & Sons (“Bernstein”).

Decedent Felipe Mejia Iniguez worked in mannequin manufacturing for Leo D. Bernstein & Sons (“Bernstein”) at their facility in Los Angeles where he was allegedly exposed to toxic chemicals, resulting in fatal renal cell carcinoma. (FAC ¶¶ 30, 31.) Plaintiffs Maria Mejia, Rodrigo Mejia, Rodolfo Mejia, and Rosalva Mejia filed their First Amended Complaint for survival and wrongful death on February 22, 2022, naming numerous Defendants who allegedly supplied or manufactured the toxic chemicals.

After multiple defendants raised Plaintiffs’ employer’s alleged negligence as an affirmative defense, Plaintiff gave notice to the employer of the pending action on March 18, 2021, and October 8, 2024. (Brust Decl. ¶¶ 10, 15; Exhs. B & E.) Plaintiffs’ counsel, Scott P. Brust, represents that “in November 13, 2024, a representative of Hartford sent an email to [his] office stating that Hartford had an ‘intent’ to intervene in the matter, and that ‘the necessary pleadings would be circulated and filed in short order’.” (Brust Decl. ¶ 16, Exh. F.)

Bernstein/Hartford, however, did not intervene. On March 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement of the Entire Case. The next day, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to “expunge and strike the purported lien of The Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company.”

In general, “when a worker is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for an injury, those benefits constitute the worker's exclusive remedy against his or her employer for injuries sustained in the course of employment.” (Emps. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co v. Tutor-Saliba Corp. (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 632, 637–38, citing Lab.Code, § 3602, subd. (a).) “Despite the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy against the employer, the worker may recover a judgment from a negligent third party. Likewise, an employer who pays or becomes obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to an injured employee may seek reimbursement from the third party.” (Id. [internal citations omitted].) An employer’s statutory right to sue third parties arises from principles of equitable subrogation. (Id.) 

An employer may pursue reimbursement from third parties in three ways: [1] “the employer ‘may bring an action directly against the third party (§ 3852), [2] join as a party plaintiff or intervene in an action brought by the employee (§ 3853), or [3] allow the employee to prosecute the action himself and subsequently apply for a first lien against the amount of the employee's judgment, less an allowance for litigation expenses and attorney's fees (§ 3856, subd. (b)).’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 637-38.)  

As to the first option, this court is not aware of any separate action(s) between Bernstein/Hartford and the third parties. To the second, it also does not appear that Bernstein/Hartford intervened in this action or is otherwise a party to it. And for the third, no notice of lien has been filed in this matter, and there is no indication from the motion and moving papers that any lien by Bernstein/Hartford actually exists.

Therefore, the instant motion appears to be a preemptive effort by Plaintiffs to expunge any lien that Bernstein/Hartford might bring. This puts the cart before the horse. Of course, Plaintiff may have an argument for waiver if Bernstein/Hartford attempts to exercise one of these options at a later date. This court makes no determination at this time as to whether they can do so.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Expunge Lien is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   April 16, 2025 ___________________________________