Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 21STCV01270 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 21STCV01270, Date: 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling

This action arises from a three-vehicle accident that occurred on the I-5 Freeway in which Plaintiff Miguel S. Avina sustained injuries. Defendants are Dewayne Higgins Trucking Company, Inc. (erroneously sued as Harold Dewayne Higgins), Debbie Jean Brantley, Albert Aghamalian, and Engine Shop and Parts, LLC, all of whom are alleged to be responsible in part for the accident. Plaintiffs Miguel Avina and Ruth Avina bring two motor vehicle causes of action seeking damages for wage loss, medical expenses, general damage, and loss of earning capacity. Plaintiff Ruth Avina brings a third cause of action for loss of consortium.

Travelers Property Casualty Company of America filed a separate action (21STCV18279) seeking damages from Albert Aghamalian, Engine Shop and Parts LLC, Jean Debbie Brantley, and Harold Dewayne Higgins, for their alleged negligence causing the accident. The matters have been consolidated, with 21STCV01270 being the lead case. (See 12/10/2021 Stipulation.)

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294. Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389. A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858. Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto. § 437c(o)(2).

As noted herein, this court finds Defendants have established a triable issue whether or not this courts considers the evidence objected to. It therefore declines to rule on these objections as they are not material to the disposition of the motion. (See CCP § 437c(q); Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-49.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel has submitted a declaration April 5, 2023, which appears to show the exhibits sent to Defendants’ counsel by electronic service under separate email on January 19, 2023. (See Wehrly Decl., 04/05/23.) This court will therefore consider the evidence, which appears to have been validly served and filed.

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

In the first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Albert Aghamalian negligently caused a motor vehicle accident on July 22, 2019, on the Northbound I-5 Freeway, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff Miguel Avina. Defendant Engine Shop and Parts LLC is alleged to be Defendant Aghamalian’s employer who also owned the motor vehicle operated by Aghamalian.

In the second cause of action for motor vehicle negligence, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Jean Debbie Brantley also negligently caused the July 22, 2019, motor vehicle accident. Defendant Harold Dewayne Higgins is alleged to be Defendant Brantley’s employer who also owned the motor vehicle operated by Brantley.

“To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 654, 662.) “[B]reach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury. If the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant's conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court. Like breach of duty, causation also is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 1687.)

In support of the motion, Defendants contend the undisputed evidence firmly establishes that Defendant Aghamalian caused the accident. They also argue that “Plaintiffs have yet to produce any credible evidence that defendant Brantley in anyway caused or contributed to the subject accident.” (MSJ 7: 6-7.) Thus, Defendants contend that Defendant Brantley did not breach her duty owed to Plaintiffs and also did not proximately or legally cause Plaintiff’s injuries.

The moving Defendants submit evidence in the form of deposition testimony from Plaintiff Miguel Avina, Defendant Brantley, and from Officer Marcelo Bembi, the lead officer at the accident scene. Defendants also submit evidence from Defendant Aghamalian’s own verified responses. Moving Defendants contend this evidence establishes that it was Defendant Aghamalian—and only Defendant Aghamalian—who was responsible for the accident. (SSUMF 6, 7, 8, 9.)

Plaintiff stated at deposition that he saw the flatbed GMC truck driven by Defendant Aghamalian hit the trailer driven by Defendant Brantley. Plaintiff also stated in his verified admissions that he witnessed Defendant Aghamalian “veering across the lanes prior to the collision.” (Id.)

The officer on the scene, Marcelo Bembi, testified at deposition that he believed Defendant Aghamalian made an “unsafe turn[]” which “allow[ed] [his vehicle] to veer to the right.” (SSUMF 15, 16; Bembi Depo. 59:17-60:11, 64:3-15.) But Plaintiff’s and Defendant Brantley’s vehicles, on the other hand, were “traveling normally northbound in their respective lanes at their respective speeds continuing to wherever they were going that day.” (Id.) Officer Bembi thus determined that Defendant Aghamalian was the sole cause of the accident. (SSUMF 16.)

Moving Defendants therefore claim this evidence establishes that “Brantley was not the cause of this collision, but merely inadvertently and unavoidably became part of the chain reaction that caused Plaintiff’s injuries, triggered by Aghamalian’s negligent driving.” (MSJ 11: 21-23.)

This court finds the moving Defendants have met their initial burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant Brantley breached any duty. For similar reasons, Defendants have met their burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant Brantley proximately or legally caused the accident. This switches the burden to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs point to Defendant Aghamalian’s deposition testimony, where he stated that Defendant Brantley cut into his lane causing him to hit the rear of Brantley’s trailer. (SSDMF 8.) Defendant Aghamalian’s response to Form Interrogatory 20.8 also stated that “[a]n 18-wheeler started to merge into [his] lane” and that he “swerved left to avoid contact.” (Id., Exh. 4.)

Plaintiffs also submit evidence that Defendant Aghamalian’s first language is Armenian, and that he “cannot speak, read, or write English with ease.” (PAMF 1.) For this reason, Defendant Aghamalian used an interpreter at his deposition. (Id.) Also for that reason, Defendant Aghamalian stated at deposition that he attempted to explain to Officer Bembi in broken English that Brantley’s vehicle cut him off. (Id. 2, 3.) Plaintiffs apparently attribute Officer Bembi’s findings, at least in part, to this language barrier.

Plaintiffs also note that Plaintiff Avina testified only to having observed Aghamalian's truck hit the rear of Brantley's trailer—but Plaintiff did not see what Brantley did immediately before that collision, if anything.

Plaintiffs also contend that statements the parties made to the investigating officer at the scene and later that day are inadmissible under Vehicle Code section 20013 and as hearsay. Even assuming they are correct, moving Defendants have not presented the report as evidence. Instead, they have presented only the deposition testimony of Officer Bembi. Section 20013 is therefore inapplicable. Be that as it may, Officer’s Bembi’s testimony is just one piece of the puzzle, and certainly not dispositive here. Indeed, whether this court considers Officer Bembi’s testimony in its entirety, or not at all, does not effect the outcome of this motion. In either scenario, there remains triable issues of fact.

Finally, in considering the evidence presented, there are no obvious inconsistencies among the statements made by Aghamalian at the scene of the accident and later in discovery. The same is true of those representations made by Plaintiff Avina. If anything, these are credibility issues for the jury to consider.

In coming to this conclusion, this court notes that it must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve any doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Medina v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2021) 68 Cal. App. 5th 868, 874.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.