TDI, LLC v. Sam Vaziri Vance, Inc.

(1) DEFENDANT SAM VAZIRI VANCE, INC.’S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA SERVED ON DR. RAM DANDILLAYA

(2) DEFENDANT SAM VAZIRI VANCE, INC.’S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA SERVED ON HSBC BANK

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Sam Vaziri Vance, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff TDI, LLC.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff TDI, LLC, alleges that it entered into a sales and purchase agreement with Defendant Sam Vaziri Vance, Inc., for the purchase of nitrile rubber gloves, by which Defendant agreed to deliver the gloves to Plaintiff in the United States by air freight.  Plaintiff alleges it wired $825,000.00 for air freight by chartered plane—however, Defendant had not obtained the gloves and had failed to take the legal steps necessary to ship them. Defendant then made repeated misrepresentations regarding the status of the shipment. At the time of the FAC’s filing, Defendant had not delivered the gloves or returned the $825,000.00. 

Defendant now moves to (1) quash Plaintiff’s subpoena served on Dr. Ram Dandillaya, and (2) to quash Plaintiff’s subpoena seeking records from HSBC Bank. Plaintiff opposed both motions.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion to Quash Subpoena Served on Dr. Ram Dandillaya is GRANTED.

Defendant’s Motion to Quash Subpoena Served on HSBC Bank is DENIED.

The Court declines to award expenses as the motions were not made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.  

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Quash Subpoena Served on Dr. Ram Dandillaya

A. Legal Standard

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) 

B. Analysis 

Defendant Sam Vaziri Vance, Inc., first moves to quash the subpoena served by Plaintiff TDI, LLC, on Dr. Ram Dandillaya. Dr. Dandillaya is the treating physician of David Wiggins, who is allegedly President of Defendant’s Medical Division. 

Defendant explains that prior to Wiggins’ February 6, 2023, deposition, Wiggins sought to reschedule due to medical issues. Wiggins submitted a letter from his physician, Dr. Dandillaya, attesting to these medical conditions. In response, Plaintiff served Dr. Dandillaya with a Notice of Deposition, requesting the production of documents and setting the Deposition date for March 23, 2023. 

Wiggins has since appeared for 5-hours of deposition on March 14, 2023, with more to follow. (Michel Decl. ¶ 5.) But Defendant still seeks to depose Dr. Dandillaya. 

In opposition, Plaintiff explains its suspicion that Dr. Dandillaya is based in Los Angeles, while Wiggins lives in Ohio. Plaintiff found these circumstances—combined with the fact that Dr. Dandillaya’s letter was dated on a Sunday the day before Wiggins’ deposition—to be “curious.” (Opp. 2: 21.) Thus, Plaintiff sought to “confirm the substance and authenticity of Dr. Dandillaya’s letter.” (Id. 2: 22.) Plaintiff also notes multiple deposition delays and scheduling difficulties, and that Wiggins’ deposition has been limited due to his health issues. Plaintiff further suggests that it is concerned that Wiggins’ “health conditions may impact his ability to appear and testify at trial.” (Id. 3: 4.) 

One of Defendant’s attorneys, Hayes Michel, is also a patient of Dr. Dandillaya. (Michel Decl. ¶ 6.)

The California Supreme Court has explained that while a party may “not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing [a] lawsuit, . . . they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864 [citation and footnote omitted].) However, “. . . privacy interests may have to give way to [an] opponent’s right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.) 

Here, while Wiggins is undoubtedly a critical witness, his health is not “at issue” in this case.  It has no relation to the allegations in the FAC.  Rather, it only became relevant when he delayed his deposition based on health issues. Moreover, Wiggins has already sat for 5 hours of deposition, with more to likely follow. 

Moreover, there is no indication now that Wiggins’ health will impair his ability to appear at trial. If it does, Plaintiff may then have a stronger case to seek Wiggins’ medical records.  At this time, however, that request is unnecessary and irrelevant, and Plaintiff provides no authority suggesting otherwise.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Quash the Subpoena Served on Dr. Ram Dandillaya is GRANTED.

Motion to Quash Subpoena Served on HSBC Bank

I. Analysis

Defendant also moves to quash Plaintiff’s February 22, 2023, subpoena served on HSBC USA Bank. The subpoena seeks “all bank account transaction records” of (1) Defendant, (2) of Defendant’s principal, Sheila Vance, and (3) of Defendant’s President of Medical Division, David Wiggins. (Michel Decl., Ex. A) The scope is July 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020. (Id.)

In support of its motion to quash, Defendant contends that “[n]either [the individuals] Ms. Vance nor Mr. Wiggins are parties to this litigation,” and “[t]hey should be entitled, at a minimum, to a protective order that limits disclosure of financial information.” (Mtn. 3: 14-16.) Defendant appears to implicitly concede the company’s records could be relevant, but argues the categories sought are overbroad.  Defendant does not raise problems with any particular category.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends the subpoenas seek relevant information because Plaintiff learned through discovery that third-party Smeed Global, Inc.—the entity that received the wired shipment funds for air freight directly from Plaintiff—relayed a portion of those funds to Defendant. (Opp. 2: 22-25.) Wiggins allegedly received a portion.  (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff contends the Subpeona is “likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding [Defendant’s] receipt and distribution of funds connected to” Plaintiff.  (Opp. 3: 3-5.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts there are questions as to “whether [Defendant] had the funds or ability to procure a supply of gloves to be able to follow through on its contracts.” (Opp. 6: 16-20.) At most, Plaintiff asserts a protective order should be imposed, if necessary.

Evidence is relevant if it “ha[s] any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code § 210.)  “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [“discovery is not limited to admissible evidence”].) “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552.)

When balancing the parties’ privacy interests against Plaintiff’s interest in discovering documents that are particularly relevant to its claims, this court find’s the balance shifts in favor of disclosure here. While the parties have a recognized privacy interest in their financial records, the categories sought here are relevant and not overbroad in light of the circumstances. The banking records are relevant, at minimum, to the receipt and distribution of funds at issue, and potentially as to whether Plaintiff had the ability to perform its end of the contract at issue in the first place. The temporal scope is also properly limited to the time period at issue.

This conclusion is consistent with the legislature’s “very liberal and flexible standard of relevancy,” such that any “doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at 542.)

Moreover, these records can easily be protected from public disclosure at this time by means of the standard LASC Protective Order.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Quash Subpoena Served on HSBC Bank is DENIED.

Sanctions

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

The Court declines to award expenses as neither motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  April 12, 2023 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.