Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 21STCV09084 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 21STCV09084, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Florence Fleming retained Defendant James Eliaser, an attorney, to represent her in a divorce from her ex-husband. Defendant represented Plaintiff in the divorce proceedings and the negotiation and drafting of the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”.) The Agreement provides for the disposition of a residential condominium (the “property”) on Wilshire Boulevard. The Agreement stated that the parties held title to the property as joint tenants. In reality, the Plaintiff and her ex-husband held that property as husband-and-wife community property. Plaintiff obtained title documents concerning the Property and learned that title was not held as joint tenants as stated in the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement but was held as community property. Upon further investigation, Plaintiff learned that Brian had recorded numerous fraudulent deeds of trust against the Property without her knowledge or consent by, among other things, forging Plaintiff's signature on loan documents and deeds of trust.

Plaintiff later learned that her ex-husband borrowed $50,000 from third party, John Evangelista, secured by a deed of trust on the Property. After her ex-husband’s death, Evangelista commenced a non-judicial foreclosure on the deed of trust, culminating with Evangelista purchasing an interest in the Property at a trustee’s sale by credit bid on or about November 18, 2020. Thereafter, Evangelista asserted that he was the owner of the entire property, locked Plaintiff out of the Property, posted Notices of Belief of Abandonment regarding any personal property located within the Property, and listed the entire Property for sale with a real estate agent. Plaintiff contends that had Defendant exercised reasonable care and verified that title to the Property was actually held in joint tenancy, and/or recorded the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement, Evangelista's deed of trust would have been extinguished by operation of law upon the ex-husband’s death through Plaintiff’s right of survivorship as a joint tenant. Plaintiff then filed this action, asserting causes of action against Defendant Eliaser for (1) Breach of Contract and (2) Professional Negligence.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294. Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389. A motion for summary judgment must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition Leyva v. Sup. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475) or where the opposition is weak. Salesguevara v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387.

A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858. Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto. § 437c(o)(2).

Where a plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of a cause of action, or where a complete defense is shown, a court must grant a motion for summary adjudication. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(1)-(2). A defendant meets its burden by showing that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” Id.; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853. Parol evidence cannot be used to supply unwritten details of an arrangement between the parties. Friedman v. Bergin (1943) 22 Cal.2d 535, 539.

When a defendant moves for summary judgment or adjudication on the basis of an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of establishing the undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467-68.

Plaintiff obtained title documents concerning the Property and learned that title was not held as joint tenants as stated in the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement, but rather, was held as community property. Upon further investigation, Plaintiff learned that her ex-husband had recorded numerous fraudulent deeds of trust against the Property without her knowledge or consent by, among other things, forging Plaintiff’s signature on loan documents and deeds of trust.

Plaintiff later learned that her ex-husband borrowed $50,000 from third party, John Evangelista, secured by a deed of trust on the Property. After the ex-husband’s death, Evangelista commenced a non-judicial foreclosure on the deed of trust, culminating with Evangelista purchasing an interest in the Property at a trustee's sale by credit bid on or about November 18, 2020. Thereafter, Evangelista asserted that he was the owner of the entire property, locked Plaintiff out of the Property, posted Notices of Belief of Abandonment regarding any personal property located within the Property, and listed the entire Property for sale with a real estate agent.

Plaintiff contends that had Defendant exercised reasonable care and verified that title to the Property was actually held in joint tenancy, and/or recorded the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement, Evangelista’s deed of trust would have been extinguished by operation of law upon her ex-husband’s death through Plaintiff’s right of survivorship as a joint tenant.

Plaintiff then filed this action, asserting causes of action against her former attorney for (1) Breach of Contract and (2) Professional Negligence. The Complaint alleges that Defendant was negligent for failing to verify that either the Settlement Agreement or a joint tenancy deed was recorded as provided in the Settlement Agreement, and by failing to record the same. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 12)

Defendant argues that the legal malpractice claim is barred as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations of CCP Section 340.6. Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 2, 2021. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was aware of the facts alleged in her Complaint more than a year prior to that date.

Plaintiff’s ex-husband passed away on October 24, 2019. Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark B. Simpkins, emailed Defendant (Plaintiff’s former attorney) on January 30, 2020, in an attempt “to find out if he had recorded either a joint tenancy deed or the Settlement Agreement.” (Simpkins Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant points to this email as evidence of “inquiry notice” of the alleged malpractice. That email chain is as follows.

Plaintiff’s current Counsel Mark Simpkins’ January 30, 2020, email to Defendant begins:

We (Norm Rasmussen and I) are representing Bo [aka Florence] Fleming. I’m sure that you recall that you represented Bo back in 2011 in her divorce from Brian. As part of the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement, Brian was to continue living in the condo on Wilshire Blvd., and was to continue to pay all expenses, but title was supposed to be transferred to both Bo and Brian as joint tenants. Brian has died, leaving substantial debt, with his second wife and minor children living in the property without paying any of the expenses (mortgage, HOA, etc.) We are trying to find out if a deed was ever recorded transferring title to Bo and Brian as joint tenants pursuant to the Settlement.

I just looked at the Judgment and confirmed with a title company that title to the Wilshire condo is in both their names, as community property, and has been since 2005. So I believe it is now hers by operation of law, and she can bring an unlawful detainer action or some similar action to take possession of the condo from Brian’s wife and kids. To my knowledge a Lien was not recorded for the past due spousal support, but at one time a Writ of Execution of issued. Please advise if you want me to scan you a conformed copy of the parties’ Judgment and a copy of the 2005 Deed on the Wilshire condo.

Thanks for the response. I have the community property deed, as well as the judgment. Just wanted to confirm that you’re not aware of any joint tenancy deed, because we ran a title report and the title company didn't even have the community property deed so wanted to make sure that it didn’t also miss a joint tenancy deed, as well.

Based on the above exchange, it is Defendant’s position that Plaintiff (through her counsel) was aware of the facts underlying the alleged malpractice by January 30, 2020, at the latest. Defendant argues this email exchange revealed “knowledge of the facts upon which liability is alleged – that the subject property was held in community property, not joint tenancy – was not only discussed, but confirmed.” (Dem. 3: 16-25.) Defendant also notes that “Plaintiff’s counsel characterizes the email as an effort to ‘confirm’ (what he already knew) that there was no joint tenancy deed.” (Id.) These issues are discussed below.

“Summary judgment [is] proper under section 340.6, subdivision (a)’s one-year limitations period only if the undisputed facts compel the conclusion that [the plaintiff] was on inquiry notice of his claim more than one year before the complaint was filed.” (Genisman v. Carley (2018) 29 Cal. App. 5th 45, 50–51.) Inquiry notice exists where “the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.” (Id.) But “[a] plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 51.)

Defendant argues the above emails reveal that by January 30, 2022, Plaintiff “already knew that property was held as community property” (UMF 2), that “Plaintiff’s counsel had the community property deed in hand by January 30, 2020” (UMF 3), and that “Plaintiff’s Counsel understood from the defendant’s response that there was no joint tenancy deed.” (UMF 4.) Thus, “[t]he facts constituting the alleged malpractice, averred in paragraph 10 of the complaint as ‘Defendant's negligent failure to confirm that title to the Property was, in fact, held in joint tenancy, [which] caused Plaintiff to later suffer substantial damages’, were known to plaintiff's current counsel no later than January 30, 2020.” (UMF 1). But because Plaintiff did not file her Complaint until March 8, 2021, the claim is untimely under the one-year statute of limitations of CCP Section 340.6.

Notably, Plaintiff’s counsel states that he found Defendant’s email response “inconsistent with the representations in the Settlement Agreement which states that ‘Title to the Wilshire Condominium is currently held jointly by the Parties.’” (Simpkins Decl. ¶ 7.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel states that Defendant’s email “did not confirm the condition of title and how title was vested,” and instead, “only raised more questions.” (Id. ¶ 8.) At this point, Plaintiff’s counsel “determined that it would be necessary to go to the LA County Clerk/Recorder's office to perform a grantor/grantee index to make a legally sufficient determination regarding the condition of title to the Property.” (Id. ¶ 9.) He intended to do so in March 2020 to perform the search, however, “the Recorder's office closed to the public due to Covid-19 and no searches could be done.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

Even given the above admissions, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s email “is not actual notice that title was held pursuant to a 2005 community property deed.” (Opp. 2: 1-7.) Plaintiff says this email was “insufficient as a matter of law to put Plaintiff or her attorney on notice that neither the Settlement Agreement nor a joint tenancy deed were actually recorded.” (Id.) Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s email “does not say that he had performed a review of the title documents on the official record with the County Clerk/Recorder, only that he had checked with a title company…” (PUMF No.12) and does not state whether Defendant “ever recorded the Settlement Agreement.” (PUMF No. 13.) Plaintiff insists the only way to clarify these questions was to perform a grantor/grantee index search on the computer terminals at the Los Angeles County Clerk/Recorder's office in Norwalk, which had become inaccessible in March 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.” Thus, until Plaintiff and her attorney could get to the County Recorder’s office, they “could not confirm or deny Defendant's negligence.” (Opp. 4:25-27.)

This court finds the undisputed facts show that once Defendant confirmed in email that he believed the property was held by Plaintiff and her deceased ex-husband as community property—and not as a joint tenancy—it placed Plaintiff on inquiry notice that a mistake had been made. Although this court agrees that the email exchange may not have been conclusive evidence of Defendant’s negligence, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff could “at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing” had occurred. (Genisman, supra, 29 Cal. App. 5th at 50–51.) It is irrelevant that Plaintiff was unaware of the “specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish the claim,” or could not verify the deed herself with the County Clerk Recorder until later[1]. (Id.)

While such an inquiry may have revealed “the specific facts,” the email itself undoubtedly established “a suspicion of wrongdoing.” Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff can argue in good faith that she was not “suspicious” of the email, such an argument fails. “Subjective suspicion is not required,” but rather, “[i]f a person becomes aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent person suspicious, he or she has a duty to investigate further and is charged with knowledge of matters which would have been revealed by such an investigation.’ [Citation.]” (Genisman, supra, 29 Cal. App. 5th at 51.)

Accordingly, this court concludes that no reasonable trier of fact could find from the undisputed facts that Plaintiff (or her attorney) did not have inquiry notice that Defendant had committed the alleged malpractice by the time of the January 30, 2020, email.

Although the one-year statute of limitations could begin to run at the time a plaintiff has inquiry notice of the claims, the limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff sustains “actual injury.” (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(1); Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 567.) Thus, even assuming the above is correct (that Plaintiff was on inquiry notice of her claim more than a year before she filed suit), summary judgment is appropriate only if she also sustained actual injury more than a year before suing. This court notes that the moving party’s Memorandum does not appear to address the “actual injury” tolling issue.

For purposes of section 340.6, “actual injury occurs when the plaintiff sustains any loss or injury legally cognizable as damages in a legal malpractice action based on the acts or omissions that the plaintiff alleged.” (Genisman v. Carley (2018) 29 Cal. App. 5th 45, 52.) “There is no bright-line rule to apply in determining when actual injury has occurred within the meaning of section 340.6.” (Sharon v. Porter (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 1, 7.) Instead, “[t]he facts of each case must be examined in light of the specific attorney errors the plaintiff in each case alleges.” (Id.) “When the material facts are undisputed, the trial court can resolve the question [of when the plaintiff sustained actual injury] as a matter of law according to the principles governing summary judgment.” (Id.; see Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 114 [“Plaintiffs first sustained actual injury when they were required to obtain and pay new counsel to file a lawsuit seeking to escape the consequences” of former attorney’s alleged malpractice]; Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217 [rejecting plaintiff's contention that it did not suffer actual injury as a result of the attorney's negligence until the time it lost the underlying litigation arising out of the alleged transactional malpractice].)

Counsel for Plaintiff states he learned in July of 2020 “that JP Morgan Chase Bank and John Evangelista had recorded notices of default as to their deeds of trust against the Property.” (Simpkins Decl. ¶ 10.) In response, Plaintiff filed a quiet title action in Los Angeles County Superior Court on July 14, 2020. The Quiet Title Action “contested the validity of the Chase Bank deeds of trust due to the fraud by [her ex-husband], contested John Evangelista's deed of trust as it was executed only by Brian, and contested Annie Campbell's[2] right to either title or possession of the Property.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff settled her claim against Campbell. After Chase Bank’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint was sustained without leave to amend, the suit ended with a dismissal in favor Chase Bank, and against Plaintiff, on September 28, 2021. (See Simpkins Decl., Exh. L.) Thus, Plaintiff argues, it was not until this date that Plaintiff suffered an actual injury. (Opp. 5: 12-15.) Conversely, Plaintiff appears to argue she did not suffer “actual injury” until lien holder John Evangelista foreclosed on the Property on November 18, 2020. (PUMF No. 21.) At the very least, Plaintiff contends the facts surrounding the time of injury are in dispute and cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s only cited case authority is the California Supreme Court case of Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 606, 609.) Plaintiff cites Laird for the proposition that “the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions commences on entry of adverse judgment or final order of dismissal.” (Opp. 14: 10-13.) But that case is of little help to the instant facts and may actually hurt her.

In Laird, the Court addressed whether the legal malpractice statute of limitations is tolled while a client appeals from a judgment on which the malpractice claim is based. (Id. at 608.) The Court held that under section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1), the limitations period commences on entry of an adverse judgment or final order of dismissal in the underlying case. (Id. at 609.) Accordingly, the Laird plaintiff “sustained actual injury when the trial court dismissed her underlying action, and she was compelled to incur legal costs and expenditures in pursuing an appeal.” (Id. at 615 [italics added].)

Here, unlike in Laird, the Plaintiff is not arguing that her “actual injury” occurred in the underlying representation; Rather, Plaintiff attempts to argue the actual injury occurred in the subsequent quiet title action which sought to remedy Defendant’s alleged malpractice. But the Laird court was not referring to an “adverse judgment or final order of dismissal” in a subsequent case brought to correct the alleged malpractice. It referred to a judgment or dismissal in the very case where the malpractice occurred. In fact, Laird could be read to suggest that Plaintiff’s actual injury occurred in the underlying representation—in this case as far back as August 8, 2011—at the entry of Dissolution and Settlement Agreement. Be that as it may, subsequent Courts have noted that Laird, “when considered in its context,” “does not purport to establish an adverse judgment or order of dismissal as the sole criteria for ‘actual injury’ under section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1).” (Foxborough v. Van Atta, 26 Cal. App. 4th 217, 225; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 739, 755 [“determination of actual injury does not necessarily require some form of adjudication, judgment, or settlement”].)

“There is no requirement that an adjudication or settlement must first confirm a causal nexus between the attorney's error and the asserted injury. The determination of actual injury requires only a factual analysis of the claimed error and its consequences.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal. App. 4th 102, 113.) “[W]hen malpractice results in the loss of a right, remedy, or interest, or in the imposition of a liability, there has been actual injury regardless of whether future events may affect the permanency of the injury or the amount of monetary damages eventually incurred.” (Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 217, 227.) Thus, courts “must distinguish between an actual, existing injury that might be remedied or reduced in the future, and a speculative or contingent injury that might or might not arise in the future.” (Sharon, supra, 41 Cal. App. 5th at 8 [italics in original].) Paying attorney fees to rectify the problem caused by a plaintiff’s prior attorney's alleged negligence can constitute actual injury. (Pointe San Diego Residential Cmty., L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 265, 275–76.)

Thus, for Plaintiff’s action to be timely, she had to sustain an actual injury no later than on or about March 8, 2020—one year prior to the date she filed this action. The moving party largely fails to address the “actual injury” issue. He does not address actual injury at all in his Memorandum and gives it only a single paragraph in the reply: “As to the argument of actual injury, Plaintiff's claimed injury is not the result of a court ruling which is now on appeal. The injury (if any) is from the underlying facts that gave rise to the need to file the action to quiet title in the first place. If Plaintiff was not already injured, the case was not ripe to have been filed, but it was.” (Reply 2: 13-16.) Though this court agrees that the “claimed injury is not the result of a court ruling which is now on appeal” (this appears to be Defendant’s attempt to distinguish this case from Laird, supra), Defendant fails to offer an interpretation of when actual injury did occur.

This court ultimately concludes there is a triable dispute of fact on this issue. There is a reasonable argument that Plaintiff did suffer an actual injury before March 8, 2020. As noted above, Plaintiff could be deemed harmed in 2011 when Defendant allegedly committed the malpractice which triggered the subsequent quiet title action.

Another possibility is the death of Plaintiff’s ex-husband on October 24, 2019, as the point of actual injury. Had Defendant verified that the property was actually held in joint tenancy, and/or recorded the Dissolution and Settlement Agreement, Evangelista’s deed of trust would have been extinguished by operation of law upon the ex-husband’s death through Plaintiff’s right of survivorship as a joint tenant.[3] Because that allegedly never happened, however, Evangelista was able to commence a non-judicial foreclosure sale on the deed of trust once Plaintiff’s ex-husband died. Finally, if actual injury did not occur at either of those points, there is still the fact that Plaintiff “hired [her] current attorney in January of 2020 to help [her] recover title and possession to the Property.” (Fleming Decl. 11.) Any of these three events could be considered an actual injury, and under all three, Plaintiff’s claim would be untimely under a one-year statute of limitations.

However, there are also potential points of “actual injury” that would fall timely within the one-year limitations period. Plaintiff did not file her action until July 14, 2020, to quiet her title to the property. Likewise, Plaintiff did not enter her settlement with Annie Campbell until September 11, 2020. Finally, John Evangelista foreclosed on his deed of trust against the Property and his Trustee's Deed upon Sale was not executed until November 18, 2020 and recorded on December 9, 2020. (P’s Response to D’s Separate Statement, 21.) If these points are deemed the time of actual injury, the claim is timely.

As this discussion demonstrates, “determining when actual injury occurred is predominantly a factual inquiry.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 739, 751.) This court emphasizes again the “determination of when attorney error has caused actual injury under section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1), cannot depend on facile, ‘bright line’ rules,” but “[i]nstead, the particular facts of each case must be examined in light of the wrongful act or omission the plaintiff alleges against the attorney.” (Id. at 764.) This reflects the reality that the “diverse tasks and responsibilities attorneys undertake can create many occasions for error and injury.” (Id) Thus, only the “alleged negligence and its consequences as revealed by the evidence, can establish when the plaintiff sustained actual injury under section 340.6.” (Id.)

Bottom line is this: In this case, that evidence of actual injury, and thus whether and for how long the limitations period was tolled, is inconclusive and cannot be resolved as a matter of law. It is a triable issue of material fact to be determined at the time of trial.

Finding the motion denied on other grounds, above, this court addresses this argument for discussion purposes. Plaintiff contends that Defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. “Although case law supports a general proposition that a party may be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, such estoppel requires, among other things, a plaintiff's ignorance of the true state of facts as well as reliance upon the inequitable conduct.” (Sharon, supra, 41 Cal. App. 5th at 11.)

Plaintiff says her and her attorneys “relied upon [Defendant’s email] in prosecuting Plaintiff's quiet title action against Brian's wife (Annie Campbell) as well as other holders of deeds of trust against the property.” (Opp. 6: 1-3.) However, it is unclear why her reliance on the email in prosecuting her quiet title action is relevant to the statute of limitations issue in her malpractice suit. Second, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert the theory that Defendant “willfully concealed” his negligence, that factor does not apply to the one-year statute of limitations for malpractice. Rather, as expressly denoted in section 340.6, an attorney’s willful concealment “shall toll only the four-year limitation.” (CCP § 340.6; Genisman, supra, 29 Cal. App. 5th at 53 [court need not address willful concealment argument because trial court granted summary judgment based on the one-year limitation”].)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

[1] Although the point is not material to this motion, this court notes that Plaintiff had well over a month after the date of the January 30, 2020, emails to visit the County Recorder’s office before the March 2020 Covid-19 shutdowns.

[2] Annie Campbell was apparently the second wife of Plaintiff’s ex-husband, who lived at the property at the time of his death.

[3] This court takes no position on whether Plaintiff’s legal theory is correct as that issue is not before it.