Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 21STCV15095 2022-09-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 21STCV15095, Date: 2022-09-22 Tentative Ruling

“[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence . . . .” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284). “In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration [citation]. The court should attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353). “Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n v. State (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205).

“[A] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284).

“If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. . . .” (CCP § 1281.4.)

California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving disputes. “Even so, parties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so.” (Avila v. S. California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 835, 843.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Id.)

An arbitration agreement is a contractual agreement. “General contract law principles include that ‘[t]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] ... The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” [Citations.] (Garcia v. Expert Staffing W., 73 Cal. App. 5th 408, 412–13.)

Accordingly, the Agreement here, which covers “[a]ny claim or dispute…which arises out of or relates to your…purchase or condition of this vehicle,” covers the instant Song-Beverly claims. (See Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189 [noting that “arbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question”].)

Plaintiff first argues that Defendant waived its right to compel arbitration. When considering if waiver occurred in the context of arbitration, courts consider “(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected, misled, or prejudiced’ the opposing party.” [Citations]. (Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 375).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived the right to arbitrate because it waited “nearly 17-months” to file this motion, “engaged in discovery,” and “intended to participate in mediation.” (Opp. 5: 26-28.) Citing the delay, Plaintiff also argues she will be unduly prejudiced if the motion is granted because “Plaintiff was forced to disclose more of its trial tactics to Defendant than otherwise required to disclose in arbitration.” Plaintiff also contends she “will be unable to compel discovery or benefit from discovery it has conducted for nearly 17 months.” (Opp. 6: 9-12.)

Here, this court recognizes the significant delay. But that alone is insufficient. Indeed, courts have found similar delays that did not amount to waiver. (See Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal. App. 4th 651, 663 [a 14-month period from the filing of the original complaint to the filing of the motion to compel was insufficient to support the waiver].)

Importantly, there is no evidence that Defendant has “invoked the litigation machinery” in this case. (Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 375). While Plaintiff has propounded discovery on Nissan, to date, Nissan has not undertaken any discovery of its own. (Chung Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.) As a comparison, Courts have found a waiver when the party seeking to compel arbitration did so only after “sen[ding] two sets of lawyers to the third-party depositions and t[aking] full advantage of every opportunity to cross-examine the deponents.” (Guess?, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 553, 558. They also “t[ook] full advantage of the opportunity to test the validity of Guess's claims, both legally and factually, primarily at [the plaintiff’s] expense.” (Id.) Such is not the case here. Any advantage to Defendant, and resulting prejudice to Plaintiff, is negligible.

Moreover, “courts will not find prejudice where the party opposing arbitration shows only that it incurred court costs and legal expenses.’[Citation.] ‘Prejudice typically is found only where the petitioning party's conduct has substantially undermined this important public policy or substantially impaired the other side's ability to take advantage of the benefits and efficiencies of arbitration.’” (Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 377). The evidence of that here is minimal.

Considering the above, this court finds no waiver of the right to arbitrate. Moreover, “any doubts regarding a waiver allegation should be resolved in favor of arbitration. (St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 31 Cal. 4th at 1195.) Based on the record before it, this court cannot find a waiver in light of the strong public policy in favor of arbitration.

It is undisputed that Defendant is not a signatory to the RISC, which contains the arbitration clause. Generally, a party must be a signatory to a contract to enforce the arbitration clause. (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 (JSM).) There are exceptions, however, as discussed below.

“As a general rule, only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement. [Citation.] However, there are several exceptions that allow a nonsignatory to invoke an agreement to arbitrate. [Citation.] The doctrine of equitable estoppel is one of the exceptions. (Ibid.)” (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 486, 495, review denied (Nov. 24, 2020)). Under equitable estoppel, “as applied in ‘both federal and California decisional authority, a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations.’ [Citations.] ‘By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement.’ [Citation.] (Id.)

As relied on by Defendant, in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 489, the plaintiffs sued a car manufacturer and car dealer for violations of Song-Beverly. The dealer moved to compel arbitration of the claims based on an arbitration provision. (Id.) The trial court ordered arbitration of the claims against both the dealer and manufacturer. The plaintiffs then dismissed the dealer, and arbitrated its claims with the manufacturer. (Id.) After the trial court confirmed the arbitrator’s decision, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court could not order plaintiffs to arbitrate the claim with the manufacturer because it was a nonsignatory to the sales contract. (Id.)

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. The court explained that the express warranties allegedly breached by the manufacturer arose from the sales contract. (Id. at 496-97). “Because the [plaintiffs] expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle – even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract – they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against [the manufacturer].” (Id. at 497).

As relied on by Plaintiff, however, in Ngo v. BMW of America, 23 F.4th 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion. There, the plaintiff sued BMW, who manufactured the car, but did not include the dealer. Notably, the arbitration provision was nearly identical to the one in Felisilda. The manufacturer then attempted to compel arbitration based on the provision. The Court rejected this attempt, finding equitable estoppel theory inapplicable to the manufacturer. As the court explained:

It makes a critical difference that the Felisildas, unlike Ngo, sued the dealership in addition to the manufacturer. In Felisilda, it was the dealership—a signatory to the purchase agreement—that moved to compel arbitration rather than the non-signatory manufacturer. See id. at 489, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 (“Relying on the retail installment sales contract ... signed by the Felisildas, Elk Grove Dodge moved to compel arbitration.”). Furthermore, the Felisildas dismissed the dealership only after the court granted the motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, Felisilda does not address the situation we are confronted with here, where the non-signatory manufacturer attempted to compel arbitration on its own.

Plaintiff argues that because the RISC expressly calls for the application of the FAA and federal law, this court must apply Ngo, the federal authority. The Agreement here provides that “[i]f federal law provides that a claim or dispute is not subject to binding arbitration, this Arbitration Provision shall not apply to such claim or dispute.” (Chung Decl. Exh. 3.)

Defendant recognizes that Ngo is squarely against it but argues that the court “can and should ignore Ngo because federal authorities are not binding on this Court.” (Mtn. 11: 13-14.) It cites authority from the Supreme Court of the United States stating that the FAA does not “purport[] to alter background principles of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by them).” (Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle (2009) 556 U.S. 624, 630.)

Generally, this court would agree with Defendant. Here, however, the arbitration agreement does not merely provide that the FAA applies. In addition, it also provides that “[i]f federal law provides that a claim or dispute is not subject to binding arbitration, this Arbitration Provision shall not apply to such claim or dispute.” (Emphasis added.) This appears to be an express contractual agreement that federal law will govern the interpretation of the Agreement. Accordingly, this court will apply federal law in determining if non-signatory Defendant can compel arbitration here.

Were this court, however, to rely solely on California authority (i.e. Felisilda), the court would come to the opposite conclusion. A close reading of Felisilda does not indicate that the California Court of Appeal considered it material whether the plaintiff named the dealership in the suit, or whether the dealer (but not the manufacturer) was the party seeking to compel arbitration. Indeed, the Felisilda court expressly stated it was dealing with the case where a “nonsignatory may compel arbitration.” (Felisilda, 53 Cal.App.5th at 496) (Emphasis added). Rather, the court appeared more focused on the fact that the arbitration provision expressly extended to third parties, as it also does here. (Id. at 498). There is nothing in the decision that implies it would have come out differently had the manufacturer alone been the one who compelled arbitration.

As was the case in Felisilda, Plaintiffs’ claims against Nissan relate directly to the condition of the vehicle. Because the Plaintiffs expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle––even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract like Nissan––Under Felisilda, they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against the manufacturer. Be that as it may, because the Agreement calls for the application of federal law, it is Ngo—and not Felisilda—that controls the analysis here.

Defendant also argues it can compel arbitration as a third-party beneficiary of the RISC. To permit a third-party action to go forward, three factors must be established: (1) the third party would in fact benefit from the contract; (2) a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party; and (3) permitting the third party to bring its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and reasonable expectations of the third parties. (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.)

Plaintiff again relies on the federal case Ngo in support. Ngo also directly addressed the third-party beneficiary theory and applied the Goonewardene factors. There, the Court found that BMW could not show it would benefit from the arbitration agreement (prong 1) because “only three parties—Ngo, the dealership, and the assignee—may compel arbitration.” (Ngo, supra, at 946.) The court recognized that the contract “defines ‘you’ as Ngo and ‘we’ as the dealership and its assignee,” and specified that “[e]ither you or we may choose to have any dispute between us decided by arbitration and not in court or by jury trial.” (Id.) The court found any benefit to BMW was “peripheral and indirect.” (Id.) Applying the second prong, the Court found for similar reasons that it was not a “motivating purpose” of the contracting parties to confer a benefit on BMW. And applying the third prong, the court found extending coverage to BMW was not consistent with “the objective of the contract.” The Court reasoned that “[n]othing in the contract here evinces any intention that the arbitration clause should apply to BMW. The arbitration clause's enforcement provisions are limited to the dealership, the assignee, and Ngo. The compelling inference from this arrangement is that the parties knew how to give enforcement powers to non-signatories when they wished to do so but gave none to BMW.” (Id. at 948.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.