Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 21STCV37191 2022-12-28 Tentative Ruling

This is a landlord-tenant dispute. Plaintiff Paul Fennell was a tenant of the premises at 2635 S. Western Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90018, owned or managed by Defendant Adams West Associates, LTD. Plaintiff alleges his unit had defective plumbing, leaking walls and windows, and a severe insect infestation, among other substandard conditions. Plaintiff brings causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) nuisance, (5) wrongful eviction, (6) negligence, and (7) violation of Civil Code section 1950.5(l).

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Plaintiff must demonstrate at the hearing how he can allege specific facts, and not mere conclusions, sufficient enough to support a claim for IIED or punitive damages, consistent with this ruling. If he cannot, no leave to amend will be given.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendant demurs solely to the Third Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant argues the allegations do not “support an intent by [Defendant] to cause [Plaintiff] emotional distress,” and do not “meet the requisite factual specificity.” (Dem. 3: 10-12.) Rather, “Plaintiff relies on mere legal conclusions without pleading sufficient material facts.” (Id.)

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) (internal citations omitted). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 215, 233.) Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’” (Id.)

Although a claim for IIED will generally present multiple questions of fact, a court may sustain a demurrer to the claim when “the facts alleged do not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.) The process has been described as “more intuitive than analytical.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671–672.)

The extent of the allegations are as follows. Plaintiff alleges his unit had “slum” and substandard living conditions, including: (a) Defective plumbing; (b) Broken doors; (c) Leaking walls and windows; (d) Deteriorated and defective flooring; (e) Deteriorated walls with holes and peeling paint; (f) Lack of heat; (g) General dilapidation; (h) Dampness of habitable rooms; (i) Severe insect infestation; (j) Inoperable appliances; (k) Broken shower; (l) Lack of ventilation; (m) Lack of waterproofing of ceiling and windows; and (n) Excessive rubbish which has caused a rodent infestation. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff notified Defendant of the conditions “over and over” but Defendant “failed and refused to properly fix anything.” (Id. ¶ 9.) As a result, Plaintiff “suffered health issues” and eventually vacated the premises. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.)

The cause of action continues with boilerplate allegations that Defendant knew Plaintiff “would be particularly susceptible to emotional distress and mental suffering.” (Id. ¶ 29.) They also “knew that the conditions…were substandard and dangerous.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s failure to remedy the conditions “was nothing less than conscious and reckless disregard” of Plaintiff’s health and safety. (Id. ¶ 31.) This conduct was “egregious, extreme and outrageous and done with reckless disregard of the likelihood to inflict severe emotional distress.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Defendant’s purpose was to cause Plaintiff “to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress” and was “a direct and proximate” cause of Plaintiff’s “severe mental and emotional distress.” (Id. ¶ 33, 34.)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead any specific facts meeting the required elements of IIED. The Complaint particularly lacks any allegation that Defendant acted with the intent of causing—or with a reckless disregard of the probability of causing—Plaintiff’s emotional distress. Standing alone, Defendant’s failure to repair the defective conditions despite numerous requests does not amount to outrageous conduct, as a matter of law. (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Plaintiff must demonstrate at the hearing how it can allege specific facts, and not mere conclusions, to support a claim for IIED.

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has failed to state colorable facts upon which to base his claim for punitive damages.” (Mtn. 6: 12-13.) Instead, the Complaint “merely alleges boilerplate habitability complaints and legal conclusions, which are not sufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages.” (Mtn. 6: 17-18.)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) permits an award of punitive damages “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” “When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)

Here, the court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts supporting an award of punitive damages against Defendant. The pleading contains no legally sufficient allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud, beyond conclusory allegations. Moreover, there are no specific allegations of fraud, oppression, or malice by any of Defendant’s employees—much less that such malice was “perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent.”

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED. If Plaintiff is given leave to amend its cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it will also be given leave to amend the stricken portions here. This will be discussed further at the hearing.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.