Rita Watnick, et al. v. Eyal Abergel, et al.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Eyal Abergel and Binyamin Sasy

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Rita Watnick and Michael Stoyla

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiffs Rita Watnick and Michael Stoyla, as Trustees of the Watnick/Stoyla Revocable Trust, own real property in Beverly Hills. Plaintiffs’ property is downhill from real property currently owned by Defendants Eyal Abergel and Binyamin Sasy. Until about 1960, Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ properties were a single parcel under common ownership. A dispute has now arisen over the property line between the two properties. Plaintiffs allege portions of their driveway, pool, and other fixtures lay partly on Defendants’ property. Plaintiffs’ allege Defendants have failed to maintain their property, causing damage to Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs bring causes of action for (1) willful trespass, (2) negligence, (3) abatement of private nuisance, (4) prescriptive and equitable easement, (5) adverse possession, (6) reformation of deed, (7) quiet title, and (8) declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants now move for summary adjudication of issues. Plaintiffs opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fifth Cause of Action is GRANTED. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action is DENIED.,

Defendants are ordered to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

I. Evidentiary Objections

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court only rules upon objections asserted against evidence which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion, as follows:

Defendant’s objections to the Declaration of Michael Stoyla, numbered 1 through 18, are OVERRULED.

II. Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.  Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741. 

III. Analysis

Defendants move for summary adjudication of various issues in the First Amended Complaint corresponding to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action. [FN 1]

A. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

Plaintiffs own real property located at 9486 Lloydcrest Drive, Beverly Hills, California. (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs acquired the Property in 1998. (Id.) Defendants reside at the property “adjacent to, approximately to the north of, and uphill from Plaintiffs’ Property.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendants acquired the property in 2021. (Id. ¶ 7.) Each property contains a single-family residence. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.) 

Plaintiffs allege “that prior to 1960, Plaintiffs’ Property and Defendants’ Property were a single parcel under common ownership. In or about 1960, the then-owner of the parcel subdivided the property into the two present parcels for the for the purpose of enabling the construction of a single-family residence on the flag-shaped parcel.” (Id. ¶ 11.) 

“In 2020, Plaintiffs hired a surveyor to determine the precise location of the property line between Plaintiffs’ Property and Defendants’ Property.” (Id. ¶ 20.) The survey “purports to show” that a section of Plaintiffs’ driveway lies on Defendants’ Property. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Long before the parties to this dispute acquired their respective properties, the common owner of the properties “constructed a pool and surrounding pool deck adjacent to Plaintiffs’ residence.” (Id. ¶ 25.) The pool deck abuts a pool wall, which “has been treated by Plaintiffs, Defendants, and their respective predecessors in interest as demarcating the property line dividing Plaintiffs’ Property and Defendants’ Property.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiffs allege the “original common owner intended Plaintiffs’ Property to encompass the entirety of the pool and surrounding deck up to, but not including the Pool Wall, and intended that the property line between Plaintiffs’ Property and Defendants’ Property would be contiguous with Plaintiffs’ side of the Pool Wall.” (Id. ¶ 28.) 

The 2020 survey, however, “purported to show that the legal description of Defendants’ Property and Plaintiffs’ Property, as set forth in their respective deeds, placed a triangular-shaped area at two corners of the deck and the pool (the “Pool Area”) within Defendants’ Property.” (Id. ¶ 29.) 

To determine their respective rights in the property, Plaintiffs now assert causes of action against Defendants for (1) willful trespass, (2) negligence, (3) abatement of private nuisance, (4) prescriptive and equitable easement, (5) adverse possession, (6) reformation of deed, (7) quiet title, and (8) declaratory and injunctive relief. 

B. ISSUE ONE: Prescriptive Easement (Fourth Cause of Action) 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claim for a prescriptive easement over the driveway and pool area fail because the claimed easement “would effectively prohibit Defendants from using that portion of their land which Defendants own in fee simple.” (Mtn. 7: 27-28.) They assert that “a property owner cannot acquire such an exclusive prescriptive easement that is equivalent to a fee title over an adjacent property owner’s land.” (Id. 8: 1-3.) 

Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ contention that Defendants are the true owners of the Pool Area and Driveway Area “on various grounds, including without limitation the fact that the applicable legal descriptions do not support Defendants’ position, and if they did Plaintiffs would nonetheless be the true owners of the Pool Area and Driveway Area under the agreed boundary doctrine.” (FAC ¶ 54.) In the alternative, “Plaintiffs are entitled to a prescriptive easement, or an equitable easement, for use of the Driveway Area and Pool Area.” (Id.) 

Within the Fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs advance two theories: a prescriptive easement or an equitable easement.  Defendants challenge only the former theory. (See Issue One.)

Plaintiffs argue, initially, that the motion for summary adjudication of the prescriptive easement is an improper attempt to adjudicate an issue that does not dispose of the cause of action in its entirety. Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides that “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Emphasis added.)

Defendant cites two cases for the proposition that it can summarily adjudicate these issues, to wit, Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110 and Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848. In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not distinguish these cases or provide a citation to any other authorities. 

This cause of action could have easily—and perhaps, more appropriately—been brought as two separate causes of action. (See Ameron Internat. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1370, 1386 [When characterizing a complaint, it is policy to “emphasiz[e] substance over form].) The court therefore concludes the cause of action for prescriptive easement can be challenged by summary adjudication. 

Here, Plaintiffs seek use of the Driveway Area and Pool Area. (FAC ¶ 54.) As a practical matter, the Driveway and Pool Area belong to Plaintiffs in the sense that they have controlled and occupied that area for decades. But technically speaking, a 2020 survey revealed that a portion of the Pool Area and the entire Pool Wall are actually located on the Abergel/Sasy Property. (SSUMF 22.) The same survey revealed that portions of Plaintiffs’ driveway are also actually located on the Abergel/Sasy Property. (Id.)

“An easement is, by definition, ‘less than the right of ownership.’ [Citation]. Examples of easements include a right-of-way over another's land or the right to pasture on another's land.” (Hansen v. Sandridge Partners, L.P. (2018) 22 Cal. App. 5th 1020, 1032.) An easement by prescription is acquired by “occupancy.” (Id.) “To establish the elements of a prescriptive easement, the claimant must prove use of the property, for the statutory period of five years, which use has been (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) hostile to the true owner; and (4) under claim of right. [Citations.]” (Id.) 

Unlike adverse possession, a prescriptive easement does not require payment of taxes. (Id. at 1033.) It is easier to obtain a prescriptive easement than it is to obtain adverse possession. (Id.) “The reason for the difference in relative difficulty is that a successful adverse possession claimant obtains ownership of the land (i.e., an estate), while a successful prescriptive easement claimant merely obtains the right to use the land in a particular way (i.e., an easement).” (Id.)

Courts have recognized that the relative difficulty of obtaining adverse possession, as compared to a prescriptive easement, presents the potential for abuse. To prevent that run around, “if the prescriptive interest sought by a claimant is so comprehensive as to supply the equivalent of an estate, the claimant must establish the elements of adverse possession, not those of a prescriptive easement.” (Id. at 1033.) In other words, where the interest sought by a claimant is “the practical equivalent of an estate,” the action is one for adverse possession, not prescriptive easement. (Id. at 1034 [rejecting prescriptive easement for farming that would not allow the owner “to use the [d]isputed [l]and for any ‘practical purpose’ ”]; Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305, 1308 [rejecting prescriptive easement that was limited to “landscaping and recreation” because the easement would leave the owner with “only a minimal right to use it”]; Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 558, 564 [rejecting prescriptive easement for an enclosed yard that would “amount[ ] to giving [the true owner's] land completely, without reservation, to [the encroacher]”]; Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093, [rejecting prescriptive easement for use as a woodshed because “ ‘as a practical matter [such use] ... prohibits the true owner from using his land’ ”].) 

As noted by Plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of California held that this logic does not apply to “implied easement” cases. (See Romero v. Shih (2024) 15 Cal. 5th 680, 697 [“while it may be necessary to prohibit courts from recognizing prescriptive easements that effectively exclude the property owner from the easement area, the same is not true in express or implied easement cases”].) However, the court appeared to speak favorably on the line of cases addressing prescriptive easements. (Id.) 

This court therefore agrees with Defendants that if the prescriptive easement sought is the “practical equivalent” of an estate, the easement is unavailable. Instead, in that case, Plaintiffs would need to establish the elements of adverse possession.  

Here, however, the moving party has not presented evidence to demonstrate that a prescriptive easement under these particular facts would be the practical equivalent of an estate over the Pool Area and Driveway. This court sees no citation to evidence in the moving party’s Separate Statement on this issue that directly addresses that point. 

The court in no way suggests that this is a high burden. A declaration from the Defendant(s) explaining the nature of the property and why a prescriptive easement would effectively deprive the Defendants of the property would likely be sufficient. But in that absence, the moving parties cannot carry their initial burden to refute this theory.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action is DENIED.

A. ISSUES TWO, THREE, and FOUR: Reformation (Sixth Cause of Action)

Next, Defendants argue the reformation cause of action fails as a matter of law for three reasons:  “(1) common owner Ted Brown did not and could not make any mistake when he transferred the Watnick/Stoyla Property in 1975 because Covenant 3304 required the entire legally described Abergel/Sasy Property (including where the Pool Area and Driveway Area are located) to be held as one parcel with the restriction that “no portion be sold separately,” (2) none of the specific deeds or contracts Plaintiffs are requesting to be reformed are identified as required by a complaint for reformation, and (3) reformation cannot be predicated on the agreed boundary doctrine as the boundaries of the Subject Properties are easily determined by a survey and there is zero evidence of any “agreement” to fix the true boundary at any location other than the boundary as set forth in the historical legal descriptions.” (Mtn. 11: 5-14.) 

Plaintiffs allege that “the true intent of the common owner and successors in interest was that Plaintiffs would own the land up to, but not including, the Pool Wall, and that the property line between Plaintiffs’ Property and Defendants’ Property would be Plaintiffs’ side of the Pool Wall.” (FAC ¶ 73.) Plaintiffs allege “that both the actual legal descriptions set forth in these conveyance instruments and Defendants’ erroneous assertions regarding these legal descriptions are inconsistent with the true intent of the original common owner who subdivided the property and his successors in interest, which is that the Pool Area and Driveway Area would be part of Plaintiffs’ Property and the Fence Area would be part of Defendants’ Property.” (Id. ¶ 76.) Plaintiffs allege “[t]he erroneous belief by Plaintiffs, Defendants, and their predecessors in interest, that the property line as described in their conveyance instruments was contiguous with the apparent boundary between the two subject parcels constitutes a mutual mistake.” (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiffs seek to reform the deeds “to set the property line (as described in both deeds’ legal descriptions) just south of the Pool Wall, Crib Wall foundation, and Chain Link Fence.” (Id. ¶ 78.) 

1. Issue 2: Mistake

Civil Code section 3399 provides: “When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and for value.” (Civ. Code § 3399.) 

“Reformation is an equitable remedy the essential purpose of which is to ensure the contract, as reformed, reflects the parties’ mutual intention.” (Komorsky v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (2019) 33 Cal. App. 5th 960, 974.) “In the classic reformation case a contract is formed, but a provision of the writing that is executed, through mistake such as a scrivener's error, contradicts the terms to which the parties agreed. In such a case, upon evidence of the actual agreement a court is empowered to correct the error by striking the mistaken language in the instrument and inserting appropriate language.” (Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct. (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 576, 593, abrogated on other grounds by Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal. 4th 362, 885 P.2d 994.) It is well-established that “the mistake of a draftsman is a good ground for the reformation of an instrument which does not truly express the intention of the parties.” (Mills v. Schulba (1950) 95 Cal. App. 2d 559, 561.) 

The facts supporting reformation must be shown by “clear and convincing” evidence. (See Shupe v. Nelson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 693, 700 [“In order to reform a written instrument, the party seeking relief must prove the true intent by clear and convincing evidence.”].) Thus, this “higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication.” (Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Ct. (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4th 757, 762.)

First, Defendants argue that “[b]ecause the purpose of reformation is to reflect the intention of the parties, Plaintiffs must prove that the parties to the contract (here the 1975 Deed from Ted Brown to Barry A. Rose transferring the Watnick/Stoyla Property) intended that the legal description of the Watnick/Stoyla Property include the Driveway Area and Pool Area.” (Mtn. 12: 24-27.) 

Here, the court would agree that it would appear unlikely, as a matter of common sense, that the parties to the deed would intentionally convey the property in a manner that segregated the house’s pool and driveway. This suggests a mistake in the 1975 deed from Brown to Rose. Therefore, there exists a triable issue of material fact on this point. 

2. Issue Three: Failure to Identify Deeds

Next, Defendants argue the reformation claim fails because Plaintiffs “have not identified the specific deeds to be reformed or the specific language of said deeds, making their claims hopelessly uncertain.” (Mtn. 15: 1-2.) Plaintiffs counters that the “Sixth Cause of Action would set forth the true property line and state that the contrary deeds held by the parties to the action are so reformed.” (Opp. 15: 4-6.) 

A defendant's motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint” and its legal effect is the same as a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 1118; Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1375-1376, 1384; Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier Service (1984) 162 Cal. App. 3d 1236, 1244.) “When a motion for summary judgment is used to test whether the complaint states a cause of action, the court will apply the rule applicable to demurrers and accept the allegations of the complaint as true.” (Am. Airlines, Inc., supra, 12 Cal. 4th at 1118.) Where a defect appears at the summary judgment stage, the court “may elect to…grant the opposing party an opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the defect.” (Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal. App. 4th 614, 625.) 

Turning to the pleading, it appears clear based on the nature of the allegations that Plaintiffs seek to reform the deed pertaining to the initial conveyance and all of those subsequent. Therefore, the pleading is not uncertain. 

3. Issue 4: Agreed Upon Boundary

Defendants argue that the reformation claim fails based on the “theory of agreed boundary because the boundary of the properties are easily determined by a survey and there is zero evidence of any agreement to fix the true boundary at any location other than the boundary as set forth in the historical legal descriptions.” (Mtn. 18-21.) 

In opposition, Plaintiffs concede that this theory is inapplicable on the facts of this case. Be that as it may, because a motion for summary adjudication must completely dispose of a cause of action, this issue is not ripe for adjudication at this stage.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Sixth Cause of Action is DENIED. 

B. ISSUE FIVE: Adverse Possession (Fifth Cause of Action)

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiffs cannot establish adverse possession because they did not pay any property taxes assessed on any portion of the Abergel/Sasy Property, including the driveway or pool area. 

Plaintiffs allege they “are now the fee simple owners of the Pool Area and Driveway Area under the doctrine of adverse possession.” (FAC ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs allege that for the five years before filing the complaint, they and their predecessors (1) “have had exclusive use of the Driveway Area and Pool Area, and this use has been continuous and uninterrupted”; (2) that the “use of the Driveway Area and Pool Area was open and easily observable to Defendants (and their predecessors)”; (3) they “possessed the Driveway Area and Pool Area under claim of right because the disputed areas were enclosed by fences or walls and the disputed areas contained improvements (a pool, pool deck, and driveway)”; (4) they “did not recognize that Defendants (or their predecessors) had any ownership rights in the Driveway Area and Pool Area”; and (5) they “have paid all applicable taxes assessed on the Driveway Area and Pool Area.” (Id. ¶¶ 64-68.)

“To establish adverse possession, the claimant must prove: (1) possession under claim of right or color of title; (2) actual, open, and notorious occupation of the premises constituting reasonable notice to the true owner; (3) possession which is adverse and hostile to the true owner; (4) continuous possession for at least five years; and (5) payment of all taxes assessed against the property during the five-year period.” (Hansen, supra, 22 Cal. App. 5th at 1032–33.)

David Tokushige, the PMK from the county assessor’s office, testified that appraiser’s reference only “assessor’s maps” when assessing the land. (SSUMF 25, 26, 27; Tokushige Decl., p. 115-116.) When asked if the property tax being assessed to Plaintiffs’ property was “as to the property within the boundaries of that parcel,” Tokushige replied: “generally that’s so, yes.” (Id. at 116.) Defendants have therefore met their burden to establish that Plaintiffs have not paid taxes on the disputed areas.

This switches the burden to Plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists. (§ 437c(o)(2).) Plaintiffs contend in opposition that “the taxes they paid included tax on the value of the entire driveway and the entire pool area.” (Opp. 16: 22-23.) Their argument rests on the theory that the tax assessor assessed the value of the property for tax purposes based on the price Plaintiffs paid for the property in 1998. And because Plaintiffs believed they were purchasing all of the pool and driveway, “the tax assessor charged property taxes on the value of the entirety of the pool and driveway.” (Opp. 21: 3-4.) Stoyla states in his declaration that “the tax assessor has billed [Plaintiffs] for property taxes based on the value that we paid for the home, as incrementally increased, year by year in accordance with Proposition 13.” (Stoyla Decl. ¶ 9.) 

It is unclear what basis Stoyla relies on for this assertion. It is also in direct contradiction to the tax assessor’s testimony at deposition. (SSUMF 25, 26, 27.) The fact of the matter is that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence suggesting that they paid taxes on the portions of the pool area or driveway that rest on Defendants’ property. Therefore, they cannot establish the tax element of adverse possession.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fifth Cause of Action is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   March 26, 2025 ___________________________________

FN 1 - It is noted that the numbering of the causes of action in the header of the FAC do no align with the numbering in the body of the FAC. When referring to the numbered causes of action, the court is referring to them as they appear in the body of the FAC.