John Doe, an individual, v. Doe 1, a public entity, et al.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles Fire Department

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff John Doe

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff John Doe alleges he was sexually abused in 1989 by Defendant Doe #2, Louis Thomas, a former firefighter with the Los Angeles County Fire Department. Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Thomas for (1) childhood sexual assault and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff also asserts causes of action against the Fire Department for (3) negligence, (4) failure to report suspected child abuse, and (5) negligent supervision of a minor.

Defendant Fire Department now moves for summary judgment of the Complaint against it. Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to file a [Proposed] Judgment consistent with this ruling.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Summary Judgment

I. Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Defendant’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A, B, and C. 

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibit 1.

II. Evidentiary Objections

There are no objections to evidence.

III. Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.  Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741. 

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389. A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action.  Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.  Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.  § 437c(o)(2). 

IV. Analysis

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

Plaintiff alleges that in 1989 when he was approximately 15-years old, he suffered “sexual assaults and abuse” from Defendant Louis Thomas. (Compl. ¶¶ 10.) At the time, Thomas was a firefighter with Defendant Los Angeles County Fire Department. (Id.) Plaintiff met Thomas through “his community-based outreach as an employee of” Defendant Fire. (Id. ¶ 18.) Thomas “held himself out to plaintiff as a paramedic/firefighter.” (Id.) Thomas recruited Plaintiff for a “ride along,” prior to and during which he sexually assaulted Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 19-24.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Fire “knew that Defendant [Thomas] was frequently alone with minor males as part of [his] community outreach as an employee of [the fire department].” (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges there were “rumors circulating” among the Department that Thomas “was a child molester that sexually assaulted male minors.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Despite knowledge to Thomas’s “misconduct towards male minors and receiving complaints about the same,” Defendant Fire “failed to take disciplinary action of any kind against” Thomas. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

The burden begins with Defendant to show that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.)

Defendant first contends this action is time-barred. Assembly Bill 218, among other things, increased the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault and revived time-lapsed claims in certain circumstances. As it existed when Plaintiff filed this action, the statute allowed an action not only against the perpetrator of sexual assault, but also “any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.” (§ 340.1(a)(2).) 

However, the action against the third-partly could only be commenced after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday if “the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.” (Id. § 340.1(c).)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff was over 40-years old when he filed his Complaint. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Thus, for this action to be timely, Defendant Fire Department must have “know[n] or [had] reason to know” of any misconduct by Defendant Thomas that created a risk of childhood sexual assault, or “fail[ed] to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards” to prevent it. 

For its burden, Defendant submits declarations from nine former colleagues of Defendant Thomas, all of whom attest that they never saw or heard of Thomas acting inappropriately toward a minor or anyone else. (SSUMF 15-19; Compendium of Evidence, Exhs. N-W.) Additionally, Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff’s discovery responses have not identified any witnesses of the sexual abuse nor identified anyone who otherwise had knowledge or suspicions of the abuse during the relevant period. 

Plaintiff argues that “CoLAFD’s arguments concerning CoLAFD’s lack of knowledge of the abuse is immaterial in the context of summary judgment.” (Opp. 6: 21-22.) Plaintiff cites cases for the general proposition that entities might owe certain duties to protect against sexual abuse, and it is irrelevant whether the entity knew (or had reason to know) the perpetrator had a propensity for sexual abuse. (See, e.g. Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 899; Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School District (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113.) 

But that argument of knowledge goes to the existence and breach of a duty. Here, we are concerned only with knowledge as it pertains to the statute of limitations. Therefore, based on the evidence presented, this court concludes Defendant has met its initial burden to establish that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. 

This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show via admissible evidence that a triable issue of material facts exists as to this specific statute of limitations issue. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) 

Plaintiff contends there “are ample facts to prove CoLAFD had notice that Thomas’ misconduct created a risk of childhood sexual assault.” (Opp. 11: 12-13.) For this, Plaintiff points only to facts suggesting that Thomas and CoLAFD violated Department policies by taking Plaintiff on the “ride-along.” (See PSSAMF, 16-18.)

This court is aware of its duty to “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) But a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment “must produce substantial responsive evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact on the merits of the defendant's showing…For this purpose, responsive evidence that gives rise to no more than mere speculation cannot be regarded as substantial and is insufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App. 4th 151, 163

Here, Plaintiff has failed to produce “substantial” evidence to establish a triable issue. The mere fact that the ride-along might not have complied with Department policies does not, by itself, create a risk of childhood sexual assault. Plaintiff simply has not produced any “substantial” evidence to support the allegations in his complaint that Defendant knew or should have known of Thomas’s sexual abuse toward minors. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   February 6, 2025 ___________________________________