Cynthia Rios, et al. v. General Motors, LLC

DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Cynthia Rios and Brittney Rios

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a lemon law action. Plaintiffs Cynthia Rios and Brittney Rios allege they purchased a vehicle with a defective transmission from Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”). Plaintiff brings causes of action for (1) breach of implied warranty and (2) breach of express warranty.  

Defendant GM now moves for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Plaintiffs opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendant’s Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication is also DENIED.

Plaintiffs to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

I. Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294).  Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.)  Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.  (§ 437c(o)(2).)

II. Objections to Evidence

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court only rules upon objections asserted against evidence which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion, as follows:

Plaintiffs’ objections to the Declaration of Ryan Kay, numbered 1 through 5, are OVERRULED.

III. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Was Timely

Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ opposition as untimely. Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ opposition was due 14 court days before the hearing. Not so. (See CCP § 437c(b)(2) [“An opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not less than 14 days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.”].)

Plaintiffs filed their opposition on February 8, 2024, exactly 14 days before the hearing date. Because the statute only requires an opposition to be filed 14-days—and not 14 “court days”—before the hearing date, Plaintiffs’ opposition was timely filed.

IV. Analysis

A. First Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

Plaintiffs bring their First Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act based on the vehicle’s alleged transmission defects. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 96.) “As defined in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, ‘an implied warranty of merchantability guarantees that ‘consumer goods meet each of the following: [¶] (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. [¶] (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. [¶] (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. [¶] (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.’ Unlike an express warranty, ‘the implied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of law’ and ‘provides for a minimum level of quality.’ ‘The California Uniform Commercial Code separates implied warranties into two categories. An implied warranty that the goods “shall be merchantable” and “fit for the ordinary purposes” is contained in California Uniform Commercial Code section 2314. Whereas an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for a particular purpose is contained in section 2315. [¶] Thus, there exists in every contract for the sale of goods by a merchant a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable. The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. (§ 2314.)’ ” (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26–27, internal citations omitted.)

“A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing, with respect to each cause of action set forth in the complaint, the cause of action is without merit. A defendant meets that burden by showing one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or there is a complete defense thereto.” (Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 1095, 1101.)

On August 21, 2015, Plaintiffs Cynthia and Brittany Rios (mother-daughter) leased a 2015 Cadillac Escalade for 48-months. (Kay Decl., Exh. A.) In connection with lease, General Motors issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty for the vehicle. (Kay Decl., Exh. D.) The lease agreement provided that Plaintiffs would be charged for all mileage in excess of 12,000 miles per year at the rate of $0.25 per mile. (Id., ¶ 8.) 

During the first year of the lease, Plaintiffs took the Escalade to GM-authorized dealership Mark Christopher Auto Center in Ontario, CA, on three occasions: (1) in December 2015, for maintenance and a recall at 6,806 miles; (2) in March 2016, for maintenance and a recall at 10,921 miles; and (3) in June 2016, for maintenance at 16,562 miles. (SSUMF ¶ 6.)

On August 30, 2019, Plaintiff Cynthia Rios purchased the vehicle pursuant to a new purchase contract. (Kay Decl., Exh. C.)  Given that the Escalade had 10 miles when Plaintiffs leased it August 2015 and 72,130 miles when Cynthia bought it in August 2019, Plaintiffs exceeded the 48,000-mile cap to which they agreed in Paragraph 8 of their lease by 24,120 miles. (SSUMF 11.)

In support of its motion, Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot produce evidence to establish a breach of implied warranty. Defendants contend that five maintenance visits in the first year of the warranty—two of which involved recalls—does not demonstrate that the vehicle was “unfit” for driving. (Mtn. 11: 26.) Defendant also suggests the fact that Plaintiffs put 16,500 miles on the vehicle at the time of the first maintenance visit shows the vehicle was, in fact, perfectly fit for driving. Defendant further argues Plaintiffs cannot establish that Plaintiffs experienced substantial impairment to use, value or safety during the lease, as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiffs drove the vehicle in excess of the 48,000 mile “cap” under the lease. Finally, Defendant suggests that Plaintiff’s decision to purchase the vehicle at the conclusion of the lease goes against any contention that Plaintiffs felt the vehicle was unsafe. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have no damages. 

Plaintiffs, as the parties opposing the motion, have the burden to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists. (§ 437c(o)(2).) Plaintiffs present evidence they took the vehicle to GM repair shops five times during the lease-period for transmission issues. (SSDMF 20-27.) The issue was not fixed, as the vehicle still displays transmission issues through 2024. (SSDMF 22, 29; 30, 32.) 

Plaintiff Cynthia Rios states in her declaration that she “rarely drove the car more than 20 miles per trip because [she] did not feel safe in the car and did not trust it because of the engine and transmission issues.” (Rios Decl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff ultimately decided to purchase the vehicle at the end of the lease term “because it was a nice car and [Plaintiffs] had already paid so much money for it during the lease period and had paid for upgrades to the car.” (Id. ¶¶ 10.) Notably, Rios attests she had always intended to purchase the vehicle, “which is one of the reasons [Plaintiffs] put down a significantly large deposit of $40,000 at the time of lease signing.” (Id. ¶ 3.)

Plaintiffs also submit a declaration from expert Jeff Richards. Richards attests that GM did not repair the vehicle during the repair attempts, and “that five presentations of the Vehicle to GM repair facilities for problems involving the engine and/or transmission was a reasonable number of repair opportunities given to GM.” (Richards Decl. ¶¶ 13, 14.) During the repair periods, the vehicle was out of service for a total of at least 36 days. (Id. ¶ 15.) In Richards’ opinion, this “equates to substantial impairment of the use of the Vehicle.” (Id.)

Here, this court cannot determine as a matter of law, based on the disputed evidence presented, that the vehicle was fit for its ordinary purpose. Plaintiffs have therefore established a triable issue on this point. While there can be no doubt that the vehicle was “drivable” based on the sheer number of miles Plaintiffs drove it, “a merchantable vehicle under the statute requires more than the mere capability of ‘just getting from point “A” to point “B.” ’ ” (Brand, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546.) Plaintiffs have therefore established a triable question of damages based on the amounts paid under the lease, and any incidental or consequential damages, to the extent allowed by law.

In coming to this conclusion, this court notes that it must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve any doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Medina v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2021) 68 Cal. App. 5th 868, 874.) Doing so here, Plaintiffs have established a triable issue.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action is DENIED.

B. Second Cause of Action for Breach of Express Warranty 

Defendants also move to summarily adjudicate the second cause of action for breach of express warranty. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action based on the same transmission defects. (FAC ¶¶ 15, 115, 116.) 

A plaintiff pursuing breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act must prove: “(1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).” (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal. App. 4th 138, 152.)

As relevant here, the Warranty provided (i) bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 48 months or 50,000 miles and (ii) powertrain coverage for the earlier of 72 months or 70,000 miles. (Id. at p. 2.)

Moreover, Defendants’ contention that driving the vehicle in excess of 12,000 miles per year voids the express warranty is not found in the lease or warranty. Instead, the lease agreement merely provides that Plaintiffs must pay a penalty for every mile driven in excess of 12,000. But doing so does not negate the express warranty. Had the parties intended as much, they could have included that language in the lease or warranty. The court declines to read this lease provision as anything more than it is—a monetary penalty for excess mileage.   

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   February 22, 2024 ___________________________________

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - This court recognizes that Plaintiff Cynthia Rios purchased the vehicle at the conclusion of the four-year lease. However, because Plaintiffs’ have not brought their Song-Beverly claims under that post-lease purchase contract, the court focuses its analysis only on the 2015 lease agreement. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381 [the complaint “delimit[s] the scope of the issues” and “frame[s] the outer measure of materiality”]; Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250 [the pleadings “set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment].”)

FN 2 - Of course, Plaintiffs’ “excessive” mileage may be a factor for the jury to consider when determining if there was, in fact, any impairment to the vehicle.