Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 22STCV05516 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 22STCV05516, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc., brought this action against Defendant County of Los Angeles, alleging various torts, and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. This case stems from the related case (LASC Case no. 20STCV40645, County of Los Angeles v. Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc., et al.), in which the County sought and obtained a preliminary injunction preventing Defendant Ben and Reef and the other entity Defendants from hosting large gatherings at their event space. Defendants in the related case Cross-Complained against the County. Defendant Ben and Reef defaulted in the related case and was not a Cross-Complainant there; it filed the instant action instead. The County here successfully moved to strike the entirety of the Complaint pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute.

The County now moves for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to its anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff opposed.

Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED, as modified herein.

Defendant is awarded a total of $27,000.00 as its reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with its successful special motion to strike.

A prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike “shall” be entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs. (CCP 425.16(c)(1).) A party may file a noticed motion for attorney's fees after receiving a successful ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. (Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 611, 631.)

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94. The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

Plaintiff informally moves to strike the fee motion, arguing the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion itself was untimely. (See CCP § 425.16(f) [“The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing”].)

Plaintiff, however, never raised this argument when the court heard the special motion to strike. Second, even an untimely hearing “does not justify the denial of a special motion to strike.” (Hall v. Time Warner, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1349.) Finally, Plaintiff cites no authority permitting the Court to deny fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion after an “untimely” hearing.

The County successfully struck the entirety of Ben and Reef’s Complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. As the prevailing party, the County is entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees. The County seeks a total lodestar award of $88,800.00, reflecting 148 hours at a blended rate of $600 per hour.

Consistent with this court’s ruling on the fee motion in the related case, Defendant now seeks an hourly rate of $600.00. (See Reply.) It is well settled that the law firm is entitled to recover the full value of its reasonable hourly rate, even if that rate is more than what the firm actually charges the County. (See, e.g., Nemecek & Cole v. Horn, 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 651–52 (2012) (prevailing party is entitled to fees based on reasonable hourly rates, even if the client was charged a lower discounted rate; see also, Pasternack v. Mccullogh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1054-1055 [There is no “paid in full” or “made whole” rule in awarding attorney’s fees. A court may award reasonable fees greater than was actually paid by the client as part of a discounted rate or package deal].)

Under the totality of the circumstances and based upon general prevailing rates in the Los Angeles area for this type of litigation, this court will again award an average rate for all services in this case at $600 per hour. This is a reasonable rate based on the complexity of the case, the quality of services provided, and the attorneys’ experience.

The County seeks to recover for 148 hours of work. The fee award “should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1133 [emphasis in the original].) A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to seek fees and costs incurred in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion itself but is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred for the entire action. (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 15, 21.)

Here, the total amount of hours claimed are excessive and unreasonable, especially when considering that the anti-SLAPP motion in this case involved issues substantially similar to those of the successful Anti-SLAPP in the related case. In the County’s own words, this was “essentially the same lawsuit with a new coat of paint.” (Mtn. 11: 21-22.) This frankness, though, does not support the County’s current requests for almost $90,000 in attorney’s fees. There was undoubtedly considerable overlap in the research and drafting of the two Anti-SLAPP motions. Based on economies of scale, the second attempt “should not have been such a monumental undertaking.” (Maughan v. Google Tech., Inc. (2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1251.) As was this court’s opinion when addressing the anti-SLAPP fee motion in the related case, nearly every task shown in the billing records appears grossly inflated. (See, e.g., Siegel Decl., 31.) As an example, Defendant quotes 36 hours to prepare the instant fee motion, a document which substantively mirrors the fee motion the County filed in the related case.

Accordingly, taking into account the complexity of the motion, the quality of the work, the overlap between the two related cases, and the motion’s complete success in striking the Complaint, this court finds 45 hours were reasonably expended. This includes time for preparing the anti-SLAPP motion, the reply, and instant fee motion, and attending the hearings on the same. This, however, does not include the time incurred in preparing the demurrer filed concurrently with the Anti-SLAPP motion, which this court concludes is not recoverable.[1]

Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, this court finds and awards a total amount of $27,000.00 in attorney’s fees, calculated by multiplying $600/h x 45 hours.[2]

If appropriate and allowed by law, the County may file and serve a proposed judgment consistent with this and the prior rulings of this court in connection with the special motion to strike.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

[1] The County’s only authority hinting otherwise is the federal Ninth Circuit case Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2014), which is not binding on this court.

[2] As in the most recent motion for fees, the current request once again approaches Chavez territory. The pending requests for fees was quite troubling in that the vast amount of the legal research and writing was duplicative to the prior special motion to strike. A word of caution: Be careful for what you ask.