Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 22STCV06461, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV06461 Hearing Date: April 6, 2023 Dept: 49
Guillermo Tinoco Alvarado v. Reuland Electric Co.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Reuland Electric Co.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Guillermo Tinoco Alvarado
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Guillermo Tinoco Alvardo, who is 70-years old, worked as a machinist for Defendant Reuland Electric Co. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Defendant laid off some employees, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Defendant told Plaintiff there was no room for him but retained younger workers. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s failure to call Plaintiff back for work was due to his age. Plaintiff now brings causes of action against Defendant for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (2) age discrimination, (3) failure to prevent discrimination, and (4) unfair competition.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiff opposed the motion.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication is also DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice, unless waived.
DISCUSSION:
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
I. Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294. Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.
As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389. A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858. Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto. § 437c(o)(2).
II. Analysis
A. Allegations in Complaint
In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)
The allegations in the Complaint are relatively straightforward and form the basis of all four causes of action: Plaintiff, who is 70-years old and worked for Defendant as a machinist, alleges Defendant laid him off with “many other” employees during the Covid-19 pandemic. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 12.) Eventually, Defendant “began to call employees back to work,” including “the younger worker trained by Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 12.) But Defendant “failed to call back Plaintiff,” instead telling him “they had no room for him.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s failure to call him back for work “was due to blatant age discrimination.”
B. Defendant’s Burden
When ruling on a motion for summary adjudication in the context of a discrimination claim, “the trial court will be called upon to decide if the plaintiff has met his or her burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff's prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to the defendant's showing. (Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California (2016) 248 Cal. App. 4th 216, 236 [emphasis in original].) “Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors. These include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case....[Citation.] However, ‘many employment cases present issues of intent, ... motive, and hostile working environment, issues not determinable on paper. Such cases ... are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment, however liberalized [summary judgment standards may] be.” (Id. [emphasis in original].)
This puts the initial burden on Defendant to demonstrate legitimate, non-discriminatory factors for the adverse employment action.
Plaintiff works as an operator in Defendant’s Computer Numerical Control (“CNC”) department, a “small group of employees” that operate CNC machines to make parts. (Yorba Decl. ¶ 5.) Due to the impacts of Covid-19, in June 2020, Reuland vice presidents Eli Yorba and Bill Kramer asked supervisors to identify potential candidates for lay-offs. Plaintiff’s supervisor at that time, Jaime Lopez, identified Plaintiff as “the least skilled and versatile” operator in the CNC department. (SSUMF 1; Yorba Decl. ¶ 6; Lopez Decl. ¶ 3.)
Lopez reported that Plaintiff could make “only fairly simple parts,” “had not followed up with the opportunity to train on or how to run more complex parts,” and “was not able to read and understand the programs for more complex parts.” (Yorba Decl. ¶ 6) Lopez confirmed this assessment via email to Yorba and Kramer on June 2, 2020. That email attachment stated:
Matthew Wilkerson is capable of setting up and running more complex parts on our Nigata Machining center (Gear cases to be exact), he is also able to read and understand G code programming. Guillermo Tinoco has not followed up with the opportunity to train to on how to run our more complex parts, he also is not able to read and understand the programs. Both of these gentlemen can also run the SL7 turning center.
(Yorba Decl., Exh. B.)
Another supervisor, Jon Jones, reiterates that Plaintiff’s abilities were limited to the “SL-7 lathe” and some parts on “Niigata mill,” “whereas the other four CNC lathe operators could make the more complex parts on any of the machines.” (Jones Decl. ¶ 6.)
Defendant has therefore met its burden by submitting evidence that Plaintiff’s adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.
C. Plaintiff’s Burden
This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to “offer substantial evidence that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.” (Foroudi v. Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal. App. 5th 992, 1007.) “Although an employee's evidence submitted in opposition to an employer's motion for summary judgment is construed liberally, it ‘remains subject to careful scrutiny.’” [Citation.] (Id. [emphasis added].) Moreover, the “stronger the employer's showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff's evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive.” (Id. at 1008.)
Plaintiff submits evidence that Lopez stated during his deposition that Plaintiff was the “most skilled operator” of the SL-7 during the evening shift, but unlike some other employees, was not skilled on the Nagata machine. (SSDMF 1; Lopez Depo, p. 28, 46.) Moreover, Mathew Wilkerson, a younger employee who Plaintiff had trained at one point, was not laid off. (SSDMF 1; Lopez Decl. ¶ 6.)
Despite Defendant’s contention that it generally gave yearly performance reviews, there is no evidence that Plaintiff ever received a performance review, be it positive or negative. Defendant ultimately submits little evidence to corroborate its assertion that Plaintiff was the least skilled employee in the department. The only apparent record suggesting this is the near contemporaneous email sent by supervisor Lopez on June 2, 2020—right around the time of the lay-off. This creates a potential inference that the rationale was pretextual. (See Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 479 [“Pretext may ... be inferred from the timing of the company's termination decision, by the identity of the person making the decision, and by the terminated employee's job performance before termination.”].)
Finally, Plaintiff’s age must also be considered in the context of the early stages of the pandemic. Indeed, Plaintiff submits evidence that he had complained about the lack of social distancing while undergoing training, as his age made him more susceptible to Covid-19. (SSDMF 11.)
Thus, by construing Plaintiff’s evidence liberally and resolving all evidentiary doubts in his favor, this court concludes that Plaintiff has carried his burden to demonstrate a dispute of triable fact. (Foroudi, 57 Cal. App. 5th at 1007.) Of course, it is not this court’s role to second-guess Defendants’ routine management of its employees, nor may it determine if Defendant’s decisions were “wrong, mistaken, or unwise.” (Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 [internal quotations omitted.].) But what it must do is identify “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reason able factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” (Id.) This court concludes that such factors exist here.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement is DENIED. Defendant’s Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication is also DENIED.
Moving party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 6, 2023 ___________________________________
Randolph M. Hammock
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.