Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 22STCV07592, Date: 2025-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Linda Morgenstern alleges FEHA violations and various torts against Defendant Southern California Medical Group, Inc. and its employees. Plaintiff alleges Defendants retaliated against her for complaining of patient safety issues, requesting a reasonable accommodation, complaining of a hostile work environment, applying for Worker’s Compensation, reporting Defendants Mara Ridane and Fanny Noya for falsifying compliance competency paperwork, and complaining of assault, battery, and defamation.

1. A stand-alone proposed FAC must be filed and served to all current parties within 5 days. Defendants must file an Answer within 21 days thereafter, or allow their previous Answer to stand as the viable Answer to the FAC.

2. If desired, Defendants are allowed to file a supplemental MSJ/MSA, in attempt to summarily adjudicate the new cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5. If Defendants choose not to, then the pending MSJ/MSA for July 30, 2025, will simply become an MSA with the causes at action at issue in the initial filing.

3. If Defendants choose to file a supplemental MSJ/MSA involving the new causes of action, it must be filed and served by email on or before May 15, 2025, with the required supplemental separate statement.

If a plaintiff wishes to amend a complaint after the answer has been filed or after the demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the complaint “of course,” permission of the court must be obtained before the amendment will be allowed. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].)

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.

Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature. The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 (overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390).)

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend to file a First Amended Complaint. By the proposed amendments, Plaintiff will add one additional cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5. (See Finkelberg Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff will also delete the causes of action for assault and battery.

Plaintiff’s counsel, Matt E.O. Finkelberg, represents that he took over the case around August of 2024 after the departure of the previous handling attorney from the firm. (Finkelberg Decl. ¶ 2.) “After familiarizing [himself] with the case and reviewing all discovery that has taken place, [he] discovered the need to amend to add the violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 around October of 2024.” (Id. ¶ 8.) However, Plaintiff did not immediately move for leave to amend. Instead, it “held off on filing this motion to amend to focus time and expense on the mediation.” (Id.) The parties mediated the dispute on January 10, 2025. (Id.) The mediation was not successful. One week later, on January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion.

Defendant opposes leave to amend. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was dilatory in seeking leave to amend, and that Defendant will suffer prejudice if the amendment is permitted. Defendant notes that it has filed a motion for summary judgment of the underlying complaint.

Here, the court concludes that leave to amend is appropriate. Plaintiff has satisfactorily demonstrated (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324.)

Further, although Plaintiff was arguably somewhat dilatory in seeking leave to amend, there is no evidence that Defendant will be unduly prejudiced. The parties agree that the facts underlying the new cause of action under section 1102.5 are the same as those underlying the other claims. Indeed, Defendant even contends the cause of action is duplicative of other causes of action in the Complaint.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the amendment will substantially expand the scope of the discovery, if it all.

In addition, on February 26, 2025, this court granted in part Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to continue the pending motion for summary judgment, trial date, and all related deadlines. (See 02/26/2025 Minute Order.) The summary judgment hearing is now set for July 30, 2025. (Id.) The FSC and trial date have been vacated. (Id.) Therefore, there exists ample time to defend the new cause of action and prepare any new dispositive motions, as may be necessary.

The court makes no conclusion on the merits of the new claims. Rather, the “better course of action” is to permit the amendment, “and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.) Therefore, leave to amend is appropriate. This conclusion is consistent with the “policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits.” (Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Ct. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1163.)