Karen Harris v. Peter Gallanis, et al.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Peter Gallanis aka Pete Gallanis; 321 Los Feliz, LLC; and Andreas Gallanis and Mary A. Gallanis, Trustees of the Andreas and Mary A Gallanis Trust

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Karen Harris

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Karen Harris resided in a property owned or managed by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges she agreed to clean the property from February 2018 through July 2021 in exchange for a $200 reduction in her rent, but did not receive any other wages owed to her. Plaintiff further alleges that on January 12, 2022, a sprinkler system malfunction flooded her apartment. Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Pete Gallantis arrived on the property that day, he hurled a racial slur and ousted Plaintiff from the property. Plaintiff alleges Defendants did not give Plaintiff the opportunity to retrieve her belongings from the unit. Plaintiff now brings causes of action for (1) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, (3) violation of Civil Code section 789.3, (4) forcible entry and detainer, (5) wrongful eviction, (6) negligence, (7) failure to pay minimum wage, and (8) unfair business practices.

Defendants now move for summary adjudication of all causes of action except the sixth cause of action for negligence.  Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

I. Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Defendants’ request, the court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Exhibit 1.) 

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 through 3. 

II. Objections to Evidence

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court only rules upon objections asserted against evidence which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion, as follows:

Plaintiff’s objections numbered 1 through 6 are OVERRULED.

III. Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294).  Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.)  Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.  (§ 437c(o)(2).)

IV. Analysis

A. First Cause of Action for Violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act

First, the court must “identify the issues framed by the pleadings.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) 

Plaintiff, a resident of a property owned or managed by Defendants, alleges “[o]n January 12, 2022, a fire alarm triggered a sprinkler to go off in [her] Apartment, flooding the Apartment and the Property, including the Dollar King store underneath the Apartment.” (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Pete Gallanis, manager of the property, arrived at the property, and “[a]ssuming that Ms. Harris had caused the sprinkler to activate and flooded her own Apartment, he yelled at Ms. Harris, calling her a ‘fucking nigger,’ and hurling other insults at her.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 10, 11.) Defendant Gallanis then “forced Ms. Harris to leave the Apartment and took away her keys, ousting her from the Property.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

The burden begins with Defendant to show that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) Defendants argue the first cause of action must fail because there is no evidence that any Defendant acted violently or made threats of violence toward Plaintiff. Under the Bane Act, if a person interferes “by threat, intimidation, or coercion,” or attempts to do so, with any individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitutions or laws of the United States or California, the individual may bring a civil action for damages and other relief. (CCP § 52.1, subds. (b) & (c).)  The CACI civil jury instructions impose a “violence” element.  (See CACI 3066.) And the California Court of Appeal has stated on more than one occasion that a Bane Act violation requires violence or threats of violence.  (See Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111; see also Doe v. State of California (2017) 8 Cal. App. 5th 832, 842.) This court is aware of no published authority expressly holding to the contrary, and the parties apparently agree that violence or a threat of violence is a required element of the claim.

In his declaration, Defendant Pete Gallanis attests that he never threatened Plaintiff with violence or called her a racial slur. (Gallanis Decl. 32-35.) Fire Captain Steven Genovese—who was present at the scene—stated at his deposition that he did not hear Mr. Gallanis use a racial slur. (SSUMF 34.) 

This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists.  (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Addressing the scene at the property on the day of the flood, Plaintiff testified to the following:

Q: So Pete Gallanis shows up, and what happens?

A: He charged me, calling me a fucking nigger, and he told me he was going to throw all my fucking shit in the trash.

(Harris Depo. 101: 3-7.)

Plaintiff further testified that she felt “intimidated” by Defendant Gallanis’ “aggression, the way that he was approaching [her],” and that Gallanis’ words were the “words you use when you come at someone like that, that usually means you want to do something to them, where I come from. (Harris Depo. 113: 12-17; 116: 10-12.) 

On a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, courts must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Doing so here, Plaintiff has established triable issues as to whether Defendant Gallanis called Plaintiff a racial slur, and whether the alleged altercation involved violence or the threat of violence.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action is DENIED.

B. Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act

Plaintiff, who is black, 62 years of age, and suffers from bipolar disorder, alleges that her ouster from the property resulted in the “denial of full and equal accommodations,” and that her “race, age and/or disability, were substantial motivating reasons for Defendants’ conduct.” (Compl. ¶¶ 26-28.)

“The Unruh Act was enacted to ‘create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by “banishing” or “eradicating” arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments.’ ” (Flowers v. Prasad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 930, 937.) The Act states that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civil Code § 51(b).)

First, Defendants argue they are not a “business establishment” as that term is used in the Act. They assert that the “subject property in this case is not the Defendants’ primary source of income and consists of one single property containing 22 single room occupancies that serve as affordable housing for low-income individuals.” (Mtn. 13: 12-14.) 

This argument fails. “ ‘The Legislature used the words “all” and “of every kind whatsoever” in referring to business establishments covered by the Unruh Act, and the inclusion of these words without any exception and without specification of particular kinds of enterprises, leaves no doubt that the term “business establishments” was used in the broadest sense reasonably possible. The word “business” embraces everything about which one can be employed, and it is often synonymous with “calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain.” The word “establishment,” as broadly defined, includes not only a fixed location, such as the “place where one is permanently fixed for residence or business,” but also a permanent “commercial force or organization” or “a permanent settled position, (as in life or business).” ’ ” (O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 795, internal citations omitted.) 

Courts have consistently held that the provisions of the Unruh Act apply to rental housing accommodations.  (See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 721, 731.) Moreover, the size of Defendants’ operation has little bearing on this question, as even the owner of a triplex was deemed a “business establishment” under the Act. (See Swann v. Burkett (1962) 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 695.) Therefore, Defendants here operated a business establishment, which mandates their compliance with the Act.

Second, Defendants argue there is no evidence that the alleged actions taken against Plaintiff were substantially motivated by her gender, race or alleged disability. In fact, Defendants assert they “allowed Plaintiff to continue residing at the Subject Property despite the fact that she missed rent payments and repeatedly violated building rules.” (Opp. 13: 17-20; SSUMF 25.)

Even assuming Defendants’ have produced sufficient evidence to meet their initial burden, Plaintiff has produced evidence to establish a triable issue. As already discussed, Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendant Gallanis called her a racial slur and then ousted her from the property. (SSDMF 34.) This clearly suggests a discriminatory animus toward Plaintiff based on her race.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action is DENIED.

 

C. Third Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 789.3

Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 789.3 fails because Plaintiff voluntarily vacated the unit, and that Defendants never prevented Plaintiff from accessing the unit. 

In pertinent part, Civil Code section 789.3 provides that “a landlord shall not, with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his or her residence, willfully: (1) Prevent the tenant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks or using a bootlock or by any other similar method or device; (2) Remove outside doors or windows; or (3) Remove from the premises the tenant’s personal property, the furnishings, or any other items without the prior written consent of the tenant, except when done pursuant to the procedure set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1980) of Title 5 of Part 4 of Division 3.” (Civil Code § 789.3(b).)

Plaintiff has established a triable issue on whether Defendants violated this Code section. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Defendant Gallanis “told her to leave” the property and took her keys. (SSUMF 35.) When Plaintiff returned to the property two days later, the door to her unit was locked. (SSUMF 40.) Then, when she returned the following day, Plaintiff discovered Defendants had placed two metal guard plates on the rear door preventing her from accessing the building. (SSDMF 49.) 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of Third Cause of Action is DENIED.

D. Fourth Cause of Action for Forcible Entry and Detainer; Fifth Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction

Defendants again argue Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth causes of action fail because Plaintiff voluntarily vacated the unit, and Defendants did not use force, threats, or menacing conduct to force Plaintiff to vacate. 

As discussed, there exists triable issues on this point. Plaintiff presents evidence that Defendant Gallanis called her a racial slur, acted aggressively, and took her keys from her. In other words, Plaintiff did not voluntarily give up her unit. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action is DENIED.

E. Seventh Cause of Action for Failure to Pay Minimum Wage

Plaintiff alleges that she entered into an agreement with Defendants to clean the property in exchange for a $200 discount on rent each month. (Compl. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleges she worked “approximately five hours a day, seven days per week,” but was not paid for that work. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 53.) 

Defendants argue this claim fails, presenting evidence that they never hired Plaintiff to work, and that they never agreed to discount her rent by $200 in exchange for cleaning services. (SSUMF 45, 46; Gallanis Decl. ¶¶ 41-46.) They note that the rent receipts reflect payments from Plaintiff in the amount of $600, i.e. the full amount of Plaintiff’s monthly rent.

Plaintiff, however, presents evidence she entered into the agreement with Defendants’ agent, Robert Valenzuela. (SSUMF 46.) During the relevant period, Plaintiff’s rent was $600 per month. (SSUMF 47.) Plaintiff attested that she paid her monthly rent in cash for $400 and received a credit for the remaining $200. (SSUMF 47.) Considering this evidence, Plaintiff has established a triable issue as to whether Defendants’ employed her and whether she is owed wages for same. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Seventh Cause of Action is DENIED. 

F. Eighth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices

Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the UCL fails first because Plaintiff cannot establish that she was employed by Defendants, and second, because the evidence shows the Subject Property is certified for use with the City of Glendale.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the UCL when they “willfully and knowingly failed to pay Ms. Harris her earned wages for her work,” and rented “uncertified dwelling units.” (Compl. ¶¶ 57, 59.) 

As already discussed, Plaintiff has established a triable issue as to whether Defendants employed her and failed to pay her earned wages. Because a motion for summary adjudication may be granted “only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty,” the motion directed to the second part of the cause of action also fails. (CCP § 437c(f)(1).)

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Eighth Cause of Action is DENIED.

G. Request for Punitive Damages

Finally, Defendants move to summarily adjudicate Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. A party may move for summary adjudication of “one or more claims for damages” if “there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code.” (CCP 437c(f)(1).) Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) permits an award of punitive damages “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”

As discussed throughout this ruling, there are disputed material facts as to whether Defendant Gallanis called Plaintiff a racial slur and forced her to vacate the property. Assuming Plaintiff’s evidence is true, and viewed in the light most favorable to her, this could suggest that Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, and therefore could support an award of punitive damages. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   April 2, 2024 ___________________________________