Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 22STCV08902, Date: 2025-05-14 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Hamilton Alvarenga brings this action against the City of Los Angeles alleging one cause of action for whistleblower retaliation. While working as a sworn peace officer, Plaintiff alleges his superiors retaliated against him once Plaintiff discovered they had ordered a sham investigation of a coworker.

The Pitchess procedure applies when “discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records.” (Evid. Code § 1043(a).) Obtaining discovery of peace officers’ personnel records is a two-step process. First, the party seeking discovery “must file a motion supported by affidavits showing ‘good cause for the discovery,’ first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by ‘stating upon reasonable belief’ that the police agency has the records or information at issue.” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019.) Second, if the Court finds good cause for the discovery, “it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance.” (Ibid.)

This initial burden is a “relatively relaxed standard[].” . . . Information is material if it “will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.” . . . “[A] declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the ‘materiality’ component of that section.” (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086, citations omitted, bold emphasis added.)

By this Pitchess motion, Plaintiff seeks a copy of the Internal Affairs Investigation File for CF No. 20-002118. [FN 1] This file reflects the “investigation that Plaintiff initiated when he generated a personnel complaint based on Captain Pratt reporting to him that Deputy Chief Chow and Commander Oreb had misappropriated MTA funds and also retaliated against Pratt for complaining about their misappropriation.” (Mtn. 14: 12-17.)

Plaintiff Alvarenga works for the City of Los Angeles as a sworn peace officer. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Relevant to this case are two separate investigations. First, at the instruction of his superiors Deputy Chief Blake Chow and Commander Michael Oreb, Plaintiff conducted an investigation into third-party Captain Brian Pratt for alleged discrepancies in Pratt’s time records. (Id. ¶ 13.) By his investigation, Plaintiff concluded that Pratt had not engaged in any wrongdoing. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Based on certain irregularities in the investigation, Plaintiff did conclude, however, that actually “Deputy Chief Chow, Commander Oreb, and their staff were misusing their positions in the LAPD to retaliate against Captain Pratt for the complaints Pratt had made about Chow’s and Oreb’s misappropriation of MTA resources.” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 30.)

At Captain Pratt’s request, Plaintiff provided Pratt with a copy of his completed investigation as well as other documents and materials related to the investigation. Plaintiff contends that as the accused employee in the investigation, Captain Pratt was entitled to these records. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.) The completed investigation report disclosed to Pratt what Plaintiff believed to be Chow and Oreb’s violation of applicable local, state, or federal laws. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 30.) This “upset” Chow and Oreb, who apparently opened a retaliatory investigation into Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 30.)

In response, the Department “used the occasion to retaliate against Plaintiff” by reassigning him to the Skid Row area, by downgrading him from Sergeant I to Sergeant II, assigning him to work the “graveyard shift,” and placing a reprimand in his personnel file. (Id. ¶¶ 35-39.) Accordingly, Plaintiff brings one cause of action against the City for Whistleblower Retaliation.

On May 1, 2025, Defendant filed a “Notice of Non-Opposition” indicating that it “does not oppose” the Pitchess motion because it produced file no. CF20-002118 to opposing counsel on May 1, 2025. (See Notice of Non-Opposition.) Accordingly, Defendant asks that the hearing be vacated. (Id.)

In Reply, Plaintiff maintains that the court still must grant the motion and engage in the Pitchess procedure. It contends that Defendant produced the file under a different matter, which limits the use of that investigation to the other matter only. (Reply 2: 4-7.) Plaintiff maintains that accessing the file without a court order would violate Penal Code section 832.7. This section generally provides that peace officer personnel records “are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code.” (Penal Code 832.7.) Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code set forth the procedures for the discovery of the records.

Section 1043(d) provides that “[n]o hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held without full compliance with the notice provisions of this section except upon a showing by the moving party of good cause for noncompliance, or upon a waiver of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the records.” This court reads this section to mean that the governmental agency can unilaterally waive the Pitchess procedure. That appears to be the case here, as the government has voluntarily given Plaintiff access to the file at issue.

The privilege over peace officer personnel files may be waived, but “waiver of the privilege must be express.” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Ct. (2015) 240 Cal. App. 4th 268, 294.) Here, Defendant has voluntarily and expressly waived any privilege in the file by voluntarily giving Plaintiff access to the file and by asking that the hearing on the Pitchess motion be vacated.

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - This court previously granted a similar Pitchess motion in this case for file No. 20-003284 and conducted an in camera review. (See 07/28/2023 Minute Order and Ruling; 09/21/2023 Minute Order.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.