Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case 22STCV11748 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 22STCV11748, Date: 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling

This action is the third in a series of cases between the parties. The first was LASC Case No. 20STCV40645, County of Los Angeles v. Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc., et al. (“Gardens 1”) in which the County sought and obtained a preliminary injunction preventing Defendant Ben and Reef and the other entity Defendants from hosting large gatherings at their event space. Defendants in the related case Cross-Complained against the County. The County successfully moved to strike the Cross-Complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court awarded attorney’s fees on the successful anti-SLAPP motion.

Defendant Ben and Reef defaulted in the related case and was not a Cross-Complainant there; it filed two nearly identical actions instead. The first was Ben and Reef Gardens, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. 22STCV05516 (“Gardens 2”). That action was dismissed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also awarded attorney fees on that motion.

In the instant case (“Gardens 3”), Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action—but not before the County filed another special motion to strike the Complaint. Because the action had been dismissed, the court ruled on the special motion to strike only for purposes of an attorney’s fee award.

A prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike “shall” be entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs. (CCP 425.16(c)(1).) A party may file a noticed motion for attorney's fees after receiving a successful ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. (Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 611, 631.)

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94. The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

Like it did in Gardens 2, Plaintiff informally moves to strike the fee motion, arguing the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion itself was untimely. (See CCP § 425.16(f) [“The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing”].)

Plaintiff, however, never raised this argument when the court heard the special motion to strike. Second, even an untimely hearing “does not justify the denial of a special motion to strike.” (Hall v. Time Warner, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1349.) Finally, Plaintiff cites no authority permitting the Court to deny fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion after an “untimely” hearing.

After the County filed its special motion to strike the Complaint, Plaintiff dismissed the action. Although Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this suit, Defendant was still entitled to a hearing on the merits for purposes of an award of attorney’s fees. (See, e.g, Moore v. Liu (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 811 [“We hold that a defendant who is voluntarily dismissed, with or without prejudice after filing a section 425.16 motion to strike, is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as a predicate to a determination of the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs under subdivision (c) of that section.”].)

Consistent with this court’s rulings on the fee motions in Gardens 1 and Gardens 2, Defendant now seeks an hourly rate of $600.00. (See Reply.) It is well settled that the law firm is entitled to recover the full value of its reasonable hourly rate, even if that rate is more than what the firm actually charges the County. (See, e.g., Nemecek & Cole v. Horn, 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 651–52 (2012) (prevailing party is entitled to fees based on reasonable hourly rates, even if the client was charged a lower discounted rate; see also, Pasternack v. Mccullogh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1054-1055 [There is no “paid in full” or “made whole” rule in awarding attorney’s fees. A court may award reasonable fees greater than was actually paid by the client as part of a discounted rate or package deal].)

Like it did in Gardens 1 and Gardens 2, the court will again award an average rate for all services in this case at $600 per hour. This is a reasonable rate based on the complexity of the case, the quality of services provided, the attorneys’ experience, and the prevailing rates in the Los Angeles area.

The County seeks to recover for 45 hours of work. The fee award “should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1133 [emphasis in the original].) A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to seek fees and costs incurred in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion itself, but is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred for the entire action. (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 15, 21.)

When ruling on the fee motion in Gardens 1, this court found the County reasonably incurred 70 hours on its successful special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint. When ruling on the fee motion in Gardens 2, this court found that 55 hours were reasonably incurred in bringing the special motion to strike. It considered the fact that the motion in Gardens II was substantively similar, though not identical, to the special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint in Gardens I.

Whereas Gardens 1 and Gardens 2 were similar, Gardens 2 and Gardens 3 were almost mirror images. The County concedes the latest iteration was a “carbon-copy” and that “much of the material from the Gardens 2 anti-SLAPP could be adapted for an anti-SLAPP motion in Gardens 3.” (Siegel Decl. ¶ 9.)

This court has compared and considered the filings made in the Gardens 2 against those made in Gardens 3, and more generally, the peculiar procedural history of the three related actions. As would be expected, the Declarations filed in support of the most recent fee motion were largely unmodified from those previously filed. Likewise, the memorandums filed in support of the motions are substantively identical in most places. The same is true of the attorney’s fee motions in each case.

This fact is not to be mistaken as criticism of the County. It is exactly as expected given the nature of the cases. Nonetheless, the court recognizes that Defense counsel’s efforts to be thorough and diligent come with attorney time—there are some tasks that cannot be streamlined. The court also accepts that given Plaintiff’s “highly unusual” decision to file a “nearly identical complaint in the same court as another pending action,” the County undertook additional research to evaluate its defense options. (Id.) The county also looked into “other potential defenses that had not been asserted in the prior anti-SLAPP motion.” (Id.)

Based on the above—and taking into account the complexity of the motion, the quality of the work, and the important fact that the motion was nearly identical to the prior—the court finds 25 hours were reasonably expended. This includes time for preparing the motion and supporting documents, the reply, the instant fee motion, and attending the hearings on the same.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.