Greg Johnson v. Philips Healthcare Informatics, Inc.

PHILIPS HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Philips Healthcare Informatics, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Greg Johnson

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Greg Johnson brings this action against Defendants Philips Healthcare Informatics, Inc., and Philips North America, LLC.  Plaintiff alleges he worked for Defendants as an account manager. On June 6, 2021, Plaintiff broke his femur.  The injury prevented him from performing duties as a salesman such as driving, standing for prolonged periods, and sitting.  This forced Plaintiff to take a leave of absence.  Plaintiff also alleges that he raised safety concerns regarding Defendants’ equipment, and concerns that Defendants’ were making misrepresentations about the equipment to customers.  Plaintiff alleges these factors resulted in him being discriminated and retaliated against, which resulted in his forced resignation.  

Defendant Philips Healthcare Informatics, Inc., now moves for summary judgment.  Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Plaintiff to give notice, unless waived.  

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Summary Judgment

I. Evidentiary Objections

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court only rules upon objections asserted against evidence which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion, as follows:

Defendant’s Objections to the Declarations of Plaintiff Greg Johnson and Tamara Freeze are OVERRULED.  

Plaintiff’s Objections to the Declarations of James Durchak, Jon Escola, and Ann Morrow are OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Objections to the new evidence submitted in Reply are OVERRULED. As a general rule, new evidence may not be submitted in reply. But “a trial court may properly consider new evidence submitted with a reply brief ‘so long as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment has notice and an opportunity to respond to the new material.’” (Wall St. Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal. App. 4th 1171, 1183.) Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to address the new evidence at the hearing.  

Be that as it may, this court’s tentative is to DENY the motion even with the new evidence. 

(See Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-49.)

II. Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibit A.

III. Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.  Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741. 

IV. Analysis

A. Background

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

Plaintiff alleges that moving Defendant Philips Healthcare Informatics, Inc.—who is alleged to be one of Plaintiff’s employers—discriminated against him based on his disability, and retaliated against him for making whistleblower complaints, among other things.  The only material issue for purposes of this motion is whether Defendant Philips Healthcare Informatics, Inc., was Plaintiff’s employer.  

The parties agree the existence of an employment relationship is necessary to support Plaintiff’s claims. (See Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 114 [“FEHA predicates potential liability on the status of the defendants as an ‘employer.’”]; Weinbaum v. Goldfarb, Whitman & Cohen (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1314-15 [“[T]he duty on which the tort [of wrongful termination in violation of public policy] is based is a creature of the employer-employee relationship….”].)

“The various designated tests adopted by the courts to determine the existence of an employer/employee relationship have articulated many of the same or similar governing standards, and have ‘little discernible difference’ between them. [Citations.] The common and prevailing principle espoused in all of the tests directs us to consider the ‘totality of circumstances’ that reflect upon the nature of the work relationship of the parties, with emphasis upon the extent to which the defendant controls the plaintiff's performance of employment duties. [Citations.] ‘There is no magic formula for determining whether an organization is a joint employer. Rather, the court must analyze ‘myriad facts surrounding the employment relationship in question.’ [Citation.] No one factor is decisive. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he precise contours of an employment relationship can only be established by a careful factual inquiry.’ [Citation.]” (St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal. App. 5th 301, 311–12.)

“Factors to be taken into account in assessing the relationship of the parties include payment of salary or other employment benefits and Social Security taxes, the ownership of the equipment necessary to performance of the job, the location where the work is performed, the obligation of the defendant to train the employee, the authority of the defendant to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge the employee, the authority to establish work schedules and assignments, the defendant's discretion to determine the amount of compensation earned by the employee, the skill required of the work performed and the extent to which it is done under the direction of a supervisor, whether the work is part of the defendant's regular business operations, the skill required in the particular occupation, the duration of the relationship of the parties, and the duration of the plaintiff's employment. [Citations.]” (Id.) These factors “cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations.” (Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 124-125). The most important factor is “the defendant's right to control the means and manner of the workers’ performance.” (Id. at 126.) 

B. Defendant’s Burden

The burden begins with Defendant to show that “one or more elements of a cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.

Defendant Philips Healthcare Informatics contends it was not Plaintiff’s employer.  Instead, it argues the undisputed evidence firmly establishes that Philips North America, LLC—an unrelated entity—was Plaintiff’s true employer.  Plaintiff added Philips North America as a doe Defendant on June 2, 2022.  (See Amendment to Complaint, 06/02/2022.)

Defendant presents evidence that Philips North America and Philips Healthcare Informatics are subsidiaries of Philips Holding USA, Inc. Philips North America is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware, with its own articles of organization. (SSUMF 28) Philips Healthcare Informatics is a separate California corporation, with its own articles of incorporations, corporate entity number, and stock. (SSUMF 39,40.) 

Plaintiff presents evidence that Philips Healthcare Informatics never had the authority or ability to hire, fire, discipline or promote Plaintiff and/or any Philips North America employee, nor has it ever controlled Philips North America’s day-to-day employment decisions. (SSUMF 41-42). Philips Healthcare Informatics never exercised any level of control over Plaintiff’s hours, wages or working conditions. (SSUMF 6, 8, 11.) Plaintiff sold only Philips North America equipment.  (SSUMF 4-7.) 

Considering the above, Defendant has met its initial burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that Philips Healthcare Informatics was his employer or joint employer.

C. Plaintiff’s Burden

This switches the burden to Plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists. (§ 437c(o)(2).)

Plaintiff presents evidence that he sold Philips Healthcare Informatics software and would report to Philips Healthcare Informatics specialists Brannen Henn and Curt Plathe regarding his sales of the company’s software, Intellispace and PerformanceBridge. (SSDMF 2, 5.) Plaintiff also presents evidence that he reported to Vice President of Philips Healthcare Melissa Roy and her executive assistant Dana Parsons, who Plaintiff asserts are Philips Healthcare Informatics employees. (SSDMF 6.) 

Plaintiff presents evidence that Philips Health Informatics and Philips North America share some directors and officers, some who hold the same position in each entity.  (SSDMF 36.) Plaintiff presents evidence that Philips North America employees and Philips Healthcare Informatics employees had joint trainings and joint meetings. (SSAMF 13, 14.) 

Plaintiff notes that his hiring documents refer to a “Philips Healthcare.”  It is unclear and apparently disputed if this was meant to refer to Defendant “Philips Healthcare Informatics,” or to some other Philips entity—such as a dba of Philips North America. Finally, Plaintiff submits evidence that he received benefits from Philips Healthcare Informatics through a third-party administrator, Reed Group. (SSDMF 46.)

Considering the “totality of circumstances,” there is a triable issue regarding the extent to which Philips Healthcare Informatics “controls the plaintiff's performance of employment duties.” (St. Myers, supra, 44 Cal. App. 5th at 311–12.)   In making this conclusion, this court emphasizes that it must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve any doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Medina v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2021) 68 Cal. App. 5th 868, 874.) Doing so here, this court finds a triable issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.

For these reasons, this court need not go further to address whether a triable issue exists as to the alleged alter ego or integrated enterprise relationship between Philips Healthcare Informatics and Philips North America.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   April 14, 2023 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.