Patrick Keys v. Hollywood Tow Service, Inc.

DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES’ DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Department of Motor Vehicles

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Patrick Keys (unopposed)

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

 

Plaintiff Patrick Keys alleges that the LAPD had his vehicle unlawfully towed on December 21, 2021, while parked on private property at the intersection of Fairfax Avenue and Sunset Boulevard.  Plaintiff’s vehicle has been held at Hollywood Tow Service, Inc., since that date, based on a balance allegedly due for the towing and storage of the vehicle. Plaintiff alleges that the Department of Motor Vehicles has informed him that there are no liens on the vehicle.  Plaintiff now brings this action for (1) injunctive relief, (2) tortious interference, and (3) fraud against Defendants Hollywood Tow Service, Inc., Gary Minzer, Santiago Tejeda, State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, Steve Gordon, as Director of State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, The City of Los Angeles, and The City of Los Angeles Police Department.

Defendant Department of Motor Vehicles now demurs to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action. Plaintiff did not oppose. 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED IN ITS ENTIRETY.  Whether any leave to amend is granted or not shall be determined at the hearing, based upon any offer of proof by Plaintiff as to how he could successfully amend his Complaint against the DMV, consistent with this ruling.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.  

DISCUSSION:

Demurrer

I. Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Attorney Lorinda D. Franco reflects that the meet and confer requirement was satisfied.

II. Request for Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Defendant’s Request, the court takes judicial notice of Defendant’s Exh. 1.

III. Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)  

IV. Analysis

Defendant Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) demurs to the Complaint on various grounds.  Each is addressed in turn.

A. Demurrer to All Claims Based on Failure to Comply with Government Code

Defendant first argues that each cause of action fails because Plaintiff has failed to specify any statutory basis for liability against the DMV.  

The California Tort Claims Act provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” (Gov.Code, § 815, subd. (a).) “As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.” (Eastburn v. Reg'l Fire Prot. Auth. (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1179.) “If the Legislature has not created a statutory basis for it, there is no government tort liability.” (State ex rel. Dep't of California Highway Patrol v. Superior Ct. (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 1002, 1009.) Statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity. (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify any statutory bases for his claims against the DMV.  By failing to file an opposition, Plaintiff has likewise failed to raise any statutory bases for liability. This fact precludes Plaintiff’s causes of action for tortious interference (Second Cause of Action) and fraud (Third Cause of Action).  

Notably, however, “[n]othing in this part affects liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than money or damages against a public entity or public employee.” (Gov. Code 814.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief need not identify a statutory basis, and that cause of action is not barred (but see further discussion on injunctive relief, infra). 

Defendant also contends all causes of action fail because Plaintiff has failed to file a pre-litigation claim.  In general, the Government Tort Claims Act provides that “... no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... until a written claim therefor has been presented to” and rejected by the public entity. (Gov.Code, § 945.4.)

Failure to allege facts in the complaint demonstrating compliance with the prelitigation governmental claims presentation requirements subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Calif. v. Sup.Ct. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) The statutory requirements for presentation of a claim apply to claims for “money or damages.” (Gov. Code § 905; see City of Los Angeles v. Sup.Ct. (Collins) (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 422, 430.) 

Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the claims act.  Based on the declaration from the California Department of General Services submitted in support of the demurrer, it appears Plaintiff did not do so.  (See RJN, Exh. 1.) Thus, the causes of action for tortious interference and fraud also fail on this ground.  

Moreover, the only allegations in the complaint involving the DMV are based on the DMV providing Plaintiff with documents on March 4, 2022, and again on May 24, 2022, “stating plainly and unambiguously that there were no liens on the vehicle whatsoever.” (Compl. ¶ 11.) “A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury…to personal…shall be presented as provided…not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code § 911.2.) The “date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon.” (Gov. Code § 901.) As Plaintiff’s causes of action would appear to have accrued at the latest by May 24, 2022, the six-month deadline to file a claim has expired. Therefore, these causes of action are incapable of successful amendment.

However, once again, the statutes do not apply to nonpecuniary actions, “such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrig. Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1493.) Thus, the cause of action for injunctive relief—subject to further discussion below—is not barred by failure to make a prelitigation claim.

B. Demurrer to Injunctive Relief Cause of Action

As discussed above, because Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is not a request for money or damages, it is not barred by the Government Code sections raised by Defendant.  

However, Defendant also contends that injunctive relief—which would be the sole remaining cause of action against the DMV—is not a standalone cause of action.  “Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action,” and generally must be predicated on a separate cause of action. (Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC, 179 Cal. App. 4th 1177, 1187.) 

As the demurrer to the other causes of action is sustained, Plaintiff has nothing to premise his injunctive relief claim on, and it therefore fails.  

C. Leave to Amend

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.  Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.   Plaintiff must demonstrate this possibility at the hearing consistent with this ruling.  If Plaintiff doesn’t, no leave to amend will be given.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   March 27, 2023 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.