Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 22STCV34315, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 22STCV34315, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Cynthia Gallegos brings this action against Defendant County of Los Angeles and Sheriff Alex Villaneuva. Plaintiff alleges she worked for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department as a Secretary. Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Alex Villanueva retaliated against her because of her perceived support for Eli Vera, who ran against Villanueva in the Sheriff’s election race. As part of that retaliation, Plaintiff alleges Villanueva blocked her promotion for which she was qualified. Plaintiff alleges the Sheriff’s Department has a practice of retaliating against LASD employees for exercising their first amendment rights. Plaintiff asserts a single cause of action for Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

This is Defendant’s second demurrer to the operative pleading. In her first Complaint, Plaintiff asserted her first cause of action for deprivation of civil rights against the County and Sheriff Villanueva individually. (See Complaint, generally.) Plaintiff also asserted a second cause of action for violation of the Bane Act against the County only.

Both Defendants demurred to the Complaint and moved to strike portions therein. (See 04/11/2023 Demurrer and MTS.) This court sustained Defendant County’s demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action with leave to amend. (See 05/05/23 Ruling and Minute Order.) It overruled Defendant Villanueva’s demurrer to the First Cause of Action, and Sustained Villanueva’s demurrer to the Second Cause of Action with leave to amend.

On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint asserting only a single cause of action for deprivation of civil rights against the County and Villanueva. Defendant County again demurrers to the First Cause of Action.

Defendant County demurrers to the first cause of action for deprivation of civil rights, 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to support a “policy or custom” by the County to violate constitutional rights.

To find a local government liable under section 1983, “a plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury.” (Harman v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1295.) “A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694.)

“The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled city policy.’” (Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) [citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)].) “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” (Trevino, supra, 99 F.3d 911, 918.)

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) is notorious for corruption,” as “firmly established as a custom at LASD during the [Sheriff Lee] Baca era.” (FAC ¶¶ 1, 2, 52.) In support, she alleges that “Previous Sheriff Lee Baca and Undersheriff Paul Tanaka were both sentenced to federal prison for their crimes,” and were “infamous for retaliating against LASD employees who they believed were expressing their First Amendment, Free Speech rights, supporting and voting for candidates who ran against the sheriff or who were running against the sheriff for re-election.” (Id.) Baca and Tanaka allegedly “blackballed” employees, “denied earned promotions and gave unwarranted demotions, and rigged false investigations, based on employees’ political affiliations.” (Id.)

This practice allegedly “continued on through successive sheriffs and continues today.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges “[e]ven after Villanueva was voted out of office in November 2022, the practice and custom of retaliation continues on at LASD. LASD has not reversed the blocked promotions of Plaintiff and other employees, and therefore perpetuate the retaliation.” (Id. ¶ 7.)

Sheriff Alex Villanueva “took this practice and custom to an extreme level.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Villanueva was “[n]otorious for holding grudges” and “obsessed with retaliating against employees he believed” supported his election competitors. (Id. ¶ 11.) Villanueva allegedly “went after whomever he felt opposed his election and was supporting candidates, against him for re-election,” and was “especially vindictive towards employees who he perceived were donating money and voting for candidate Eli Vera,” Villanueva’s “strongest challenger to his re-election campaign.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges she was one such victim of Villanueva’s retaliation. Plaintiff alleges she was in the running for the position of “Senior Secretary V.” (Id. ¶ 29.) However, once Villanueva learned of Plaintiff’s support for his election competitor Eli Vera, “Villanueva and LASD reversed Plaintiff’s earned promotion and forced transferred her to a less coveted unit.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 35.) “Plaintiff was retaliated against simply because she associated with and had a friendship with Vera and his family.” (Id. ¶ 51.) “In planning to donate money to the Vera campaign and intending to vote for Vera, Plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity.” (Id. ¶ 6.) “County officials and attorneys stood idly by and did nothing to stop the Sheriff’s abuse of power and protect its employees and residents from his 4-year wrath, just as County leadership did nothing to protect to protect employees and residents from the corrupt Baca and other sheriffs.” (Id. ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff alleges she is not the only victim of Villanueva’s retaliation. Villanueva allegedly demoted his challenger, Eli Vera, blocked Vera’s son from being hired at the sheriff’s department, and sent investigators to Vera’s house to “harass” Vera’s wife. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) Villanueva also allegedly demoted Lt. Joseph Garrido and initiated a fake criminal investigation against him, “partly based on his donation to the Vera campaign.” (Id. ¶ 16.) As another example, Villanueva reversed the promotion of “sergeant, initials J.R.” “because of his friendship with Eli Vera, and perceived support for his campaign.” (Id. ¶ 17.) When Major Crimes Bureau Captain, initials E.H., refused to initiate a “rigged” investigation into a detective, “Villanueva ‘overnighted’ him out of his assignment and sent him to the Court Transportation Bureau.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges her brother-in-law “was also retaliated against for supporting Vera and speaking out against illegal conduct and was forced transferred to a less favorable position.” (Id. ¶ 19, 36.)

Plaintiff therefore alleges Defendant County “is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the conduct of Villanueva and other employees at LASD because it is an LASD practice and custom that caused the constitutional injury.” (Id. ¶ 7.)

For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law). (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.) The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pleaded state a valid cause of action—not whether they are true. Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App. 5th 270, 280.) “The question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern” the court when ruling on a demurrer. (Comm. On Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 214.)

With these settled principles in mind, this court concludes Plaintiff has stated her claim for pleading purposes. “Normally, the question of whether a policy or custom exists would be a jury question.” (See Trevino, supra, 99 F.3d at 920 [granting summary judgment based on no official policy or custom existing where there was no genuine issues of material fact].)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged a “persistent and widespread” practice such that it constitutes “permanent and well settled” County policy to retaliate against employees based on their political affiliations. Plaintiff alleges this practice goes back to the Sheriff Lee Baca era starting in 1998. Such a policy allegedly continued within the Sheriff’s apartment through Sheriff Villanueva’s tenure and continues today.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.