Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 22STCV35885, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

This is a landlord-tenant dispute. Plaintiffs Beverly J. Anderson and Pauline Buchanan resided at the property at 720 S. Normandie Ave. Plaintiffs allege Defendant 720 S. Normandie Ave., LLC, owned the property, and that Defendant Statewide Enterprises, Inc., managed the property.

Plaintiffs allege the property flooded on two occasions and that Defendants failed to remedy or make repairs, resulting in damage to the property. They bring causes of action for (1) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (3) negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) private nuisance, (6) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, (7) violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances section 8.52.130(B), and (8) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code Article 5.3.

On August 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed Doe amendments adding Jamison Services Inc., 720 Normandie LP, and 720 Normandie Partners as Defendants. Defendants now demurrer to the Complaint and also move to strike portions therein. No opposition was filed. [FN 1]

The Declaration of Attorney Geoffrey P. Norton reflects that Defendants sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs did not respond. (CCP § 430.41.) While this demonstrates the absence of any substantive meet and confer, the court will proceed to address the demurrer on its merits. The parties are admonished to comply with any meet and confer obligations going forward.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51, quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) (internal citations omitted). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Bock v. Hansen (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 215, 233.) Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’” (Id.)

Although a claim for IIED will generally present multiple questions of fact, a court may sustain a demurrer to the claim when “the facts alleged do not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.) The process has been described as “more intuitive than analytical.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671–672.)

As tenants of the subject property, Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n or about May 15, 2021, the boiler at the Subject Property malfunctioned, leading to a flooding event within” their unit. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Defendants allegedly failed to assist Plaintiffs in the clean-up efforts. (Id. ¶ 11.) “[W]ithout professional help and the means to pay for said help out of their own pockets,” Plaintffs allege they “were only able to dry the standing water that was left as a result of the floods. Due to Defendants’ lack of response, water was able to seep into the floors, carpets, and walls.” (Id.)

On December 26, 2021, the boiler allegedly malfunctioned for a second time, causing another flooding event. (Id. ¶ 12.) Once again, Defendants failed to assist in the clean-up. (Id.) “As a result of the two water intrusion events, floors became soft and pliable, stains began developing on walls and ceilings, cracks began appearing on the floors and walls[,] black

Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to make repairs until September of 2022, sixteen months and nine months after the first and second flooding events. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege the repairs “were completed in a haphazard and incomplete fashion, as cabinet drawers were not fully installed, paint textures were not matched, and debris and cracks remained throughout the unit.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ knowingly and intentionally” failed to assist Plaintiffs with the repair of the Subject Property in the months following the flooding events, despite multiple requests for assistance and with knowledge of the uninhabitable conditions. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Nearly 16 months after the first flooding event, Defendant finally attempted to render repairs, but did so in “a haphazard and incomplete fashion.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to plead any specific facts meeting the required elements of IIED. The Complaint particularly lacks any allegation that Defendants acted with the intent of causing—or with a reckless disregard of the probability of causing—Plaintiffs’ emotional distress. Standing alone, Defendants’ failure to repair the defective conditions despite numerous requests does not amount to outrageous conduct, as a matter of law. (Bock, supra, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 235.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Consistent with this court’s prior ruling on co-Defendants’ demurrer to this same cause of action, no leave to amend is given. (See 06/09/2023 Ruling.)

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) permits an award of punitive damages “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” “When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)” (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.)

Here again, the court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts supporting an award of punitive damages against the moving Defendants. The pleading contains no legally sufficient allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud, beyond conclusory allegations. Moreover, there are no specific allegations of fraud, oppression, or malice by any of Defendants’ employees—much less that such malice was “perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent.” This is consistent with this Court’s 06/09/2023 Ruling on Co-Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED. When the court granted Co-Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages on 06/09/2023, it gave Plaintiffs 30-days leave to amend. Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint. The court construes this as an admission that Plaintiffs cannot plead facts to support punitive damages at this time, and therefore, no leave to amend is given.

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Defendants served the moving papers on Plaintiffs electronically on September 4, 2024. (See Proof of Service.)

FN 2 - On June 9, 2023, this court sustained the demurrer of Co-Defendants 720 S. Normandie Ave, LLC and Statewide Enterprises, Inc. to this same cause of action. (See 06/09/2023 Minute Order and Final Ruling.) The Court also granted the Co-Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages. (Id.)