Andrew Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et al.

(1) DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(2) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Public Transportation Services Corporation

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Andrew Black

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Andrew Black alleges Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) and Public Transportation Services Corporation (“PTSC”) hired him as Deputy Chief System Security and Law Enforcement Officer. Plaintiff alleges Defendants terminated him after he made complaints to his superiors about bus driver safety, and for informing the bus drivers of solutions Plaintiff would move to implement to protect them. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants, or its agents, made false assurances to Plaintiff regarding his ability to be fired, which persuaded him to leave Hawaii and take the position in Los Angeles. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and (3) violation of Labor Code section 970.

Defendants now demurrer to the First Amended Complaint and move to strike portions therein. Plaintiff opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Demurrer to the FAC is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike is MOOT.

Defendants are ordered to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint

I. Meet and Confer

II. Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Defendants’ request, the court takes judicial notice of Defendants’ Exhibits A (the court’s October 11, 2023 Minute Order and Tentative Ruling) and B (the selected portion of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Administrative Code).

Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Exhibits A, B, and C (various documents filed with the Secretary of State). 

III. Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

IV. Analysis

On October 11, 2023, this court granted Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the pleadings as to the Complaint. In that Ruling, this court held that both Defendants Metro and PTSC were public entities, and as such, Plaintiff needed to plead compliance with the Government Claims Act as to each. Because it was undisputed that Plaintiff did not, Plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law. (See State of California v. Superior Ct. (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243.) “[A] plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, his complaint is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”].) 

In granting the MJOP, the court gave Plaintiff leave to amend to plead facts relieving him of the claim presentation requirements, or, demonstrating substantial compliance with same. (See 10/11/2023 Final Ruling and Minute Order.)

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on December 08, 2023. Defendants now demurrer to the FAC on grounds mostly identical to their previous MJOP. For the same reasons discussed in the last Ruling, the Demurrer is well taken. 

Plaintiff again concedes that MTA is a public entity. (See Opp. 2: 2-4.) However, he maintains that PTSC, as a “non-profit public benefit corporation,” is not a public entity and therefore not subject to the claim filing requirements. Plaintiff alleges in the FAC:

Defendant PTSC is not a "public entity" within in the meaning of Gov. Code §§ 810.16 811.2. 945.4 that requires the filing of claim prior to filing of a lawsuit for violation of the Government Claims Act. Defendant PTSC is a non-profit public benefit corporation and is not a "public entity" as that term is used in the Government Claims Act. Public benefit corporations are not public corporations within the meaning of the Government Claims Act. Therefore, there is no claim filing requirement prior to filing suit against Defendant PTSC.

(FAC ¶ 32.)

Though a demurrer accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint, it does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court therefore disregards Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that PTSC is a public entity. 

Moreover, for the reasons explained in the Court’s October 11, 2023, Ruling, this court again concludes that each Defendant is a public entity subject to the claim presentation requirements.  The FAC contains no additional allegations demonstrating relief from, or substantial compliance with, the claim presentation requirements. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims again fail as a matter of law. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff relies on Knapp v. Palisades Charter High Sch. (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 708, to argue PTSC is not a public entity. There, the Court of Appeal held that a charter school—alleged to be a “nonprofit public benefit corporation”— was not a “public entity” under the TCA. The Court came to this conclusion following an analysis of the structure and management of the school. (Id. at 717 [explaining the school was “deemed…an independent legal entity from its chartering authority…has its own board of directors and budget, hires its own administrators and teachers…has identified its own authorized agent for service of process… [is] given substantial freedom to achieve academic results free of interference by the LAUSD…[and] must also engage its own independent public accountant and be responsible for its own financial services,” among other factors].) But contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Knapp does not stand for the blanket rule that a nonprofit public benefit corporation cannot be a public entity. Rather, it holds only that the particular charter school was not a public entity under the specific facts of that case. 

Plaintiff goes on to argue that even if PTSC is a public entity, it forfeited the right to demand compliance with the claims requirements because it was not registered with Secretary of State. 

But as discussed in the previous ruling, although PTSC has legal status distinct from the MTA, it functions “solely as an organizational unit of the MTA. When serving as an organizational unit of the MTA, the PTSC is subject to all governmental privileges and immunities enjoyed by the MTA…” (See RJN Exh. B, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Administrative Code, Title 2 Administration, Chapter 2- 30 Public Transportation Services Corporation, Subsection 2-30-030 Relationship of PTSC and MTA, emphasis added.) In other words, Plaintiff has provided no authority requiring PTSC to register separately with the Secretary of State. 

Finally, even if this argument was correct, Plaintiff did not allege facts to support this contention in his FAC, and instead, only raised it for the first time in his opposition. But “a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, his complaint is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (State of California v. Superior Ct. (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243.) 

In summary, the FAC and the pleadings filed in connection with this pending demurrer is essentially an improper attempt by the Plaintiff to conduct a de facto motion for reconsideration.  Apparently, Plaintiff believes that this Court was in error by granting the MJOP.  Of course, that may be possible.   However, there are no new material facts alleged in the FAC which would allow Plaintiff from being excused from the claim requirement.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the FAC is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  [FN 1] 

Motion to Strike

Defendants also move to strike the First Cause of Action from the FAC. Because Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action (and the FAC as a whole) is SUSTAINED, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is MOOT.

Defendants are ordered to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   April 08, 2024 ___________________________________

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.