G.R. an individual vs. Doe 1, et al.

PLAINTIFF G.R.’S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR THE PRODUCTION OF BUSINESS RECORDS

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff G.R.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants California-Pacific Annual Conference of The United Methodist Church (“CalPac”) and Immanuel United Methodist Church

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff G.R. brings this action to recover damages as an alleged victim of childhood sexual assault, alleging he suffered sexual abuse from a religious leader where Plaintiff attended church in approximately 1978. 

Plaintiff now moves to quash Defendants’ deposition subpoena for production of business records served on third-party Justice for Abuse. Defendants opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash is DENIED. The third-party is ordered to turn over all records in its possession, custody or reasonable control, consistent with the Subpoena.

Defendants are ordered to give notice, and may lodge a proposed Order, as may be needed.

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena

I. Legal Standard

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) 

II. Analysis

Plaintiff G.R. moves to quash the deposition subpoena served on third-party Justice for Abuse. Justice for Abuse is a California Corporation that operates Justice4Abuse.com, an “attorney group advertising website” that connects people to legal service providers. (Mtn. 1: 26; 2: 16.) Plaintiff apparently submitted an inquiry on Justice4Abuse.com sometime before filing this lawsuit. 

On or about March 25, 2025, Defendants issued a subpoena to the agent for service of process for Justice for Abuse. (Caigoy Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.) The subpoena seeks:

1. All DOCUMENTS and Writings (per Evidence Code § 250) received by YOU from any PERSON regarding [Plaintiff].

2. All DOCUMENTS and Writings (per Evidence Code § 250) sent by YOU to any PERSON regarding [Plaintiff].

3. All non-privileged COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and [Plaintiff].

4. All non-privileged COMMUNICATIONS with YOU RELATING to [Plaintiff].

5. All non-privileged COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and SLATER SLATER SCHULMAN, LLP RELATING to [Plaintiff].

6. All non-privileged COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and SLATER SLATER SCHULMAN, LLP RELATING to any discussions involving referral fees, commissions or payments for legal representation in connection with the alleged tort claims brought by [Plaintiff] against Defendants in this case.

(Id.)

In support of the motion, Plaintiff argues his “submissions [to Justice4Abuse.com] about his lawsuit were intended as potential-client communications in order for him to be placed with an attorney to represent him for his childhood sexual abuse lawsuit.” (Mtn. 4: 7-9.) Plaintiff was, in fact, “placed with his current counsel following the submission of his information to…Justice4Abuse.com.” (Id. 4: 9-10.) Thus, Plaintiff argues these communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

Plaintiff’s initial memorandum of points and authorities does not cite any case authorities applying the attorney-client privilege. But as noted by Plaintiff in Reply, the attorney-client privilege will generally apply to communications between attorney and client exchanged through an agent. “It is no less the client's communication to the attorney when it is given by the client to an agent for transmission to the attorney, and it is immaterial whether the agent is the agent of the attorney, the client, or both.” (State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Ct. (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 625, 639.) “Agency exists when a principal engages an agent to act on the principal's behalf and subject to its control. [Citation]. The essential elements necessary to establish an agency relationship are manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his [or her] behalf and subject to his [or her] control, and consent by the other so to act.” (Church Mut. Ins. Co., S.I. v. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 1042, 1061–62 [cleaned up].)

In opposition, Defendants argue that attorney group advertising websites like Justice4Abuse.com are not protected by the attorney-client privilege nor the lawyer referral service-client privilege. Defendants further state they “believe that the totality of the documents that are the subject of this Motion includes an intake form submitted by Plaintiff to Justice for Abuse and the transmittal of that intake form to various law firms.” (Opp. 2: 10-13.) Defendants do concede, however, that “there are no cases directly on point.” (Opp. 5: 11.)

Defendants note that Plaintiff has not provided a declaration from Plaintiff or anyone at Justice for Abuse. The only evidence comes from the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, Crystle Caigoy, which offers little in the form of substance on the communications at issue. (See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Ct. (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 625, 639 [“When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege it is incumbent upon that party to prove the preliminary fact that a privilege exists.”]) 

The attorney-client privilege is codified in Evidence Code section 954, which provides in part: “[T]he client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer.” “[T]he fundamental purpose behind the privilege is to safeguard the confidential relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters. [Citation.]” (2,022 Ranch v. Superior Ct. (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 1377, 1387–88.) “The attorney-client privilege only protects confidential communications between a client and his or her attorney during the course of an attorney-client relationship.” (Id. at 1388.)

There is a separate privilege for lawyer referral services. The lawyer referral service-client privilege, codified in Evidence Code section 966, provides in relevant part that “the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer referral service.” (Evid. Code § 966(a).) A “lawyer referral service” is “a lawyer referral service certified under, and operating in compliance with, Section 6155 of the Business and Professions Code or an enterprise reasonably believed by the client to be a lawyer referral service certified under, and operating in compliance with, Section 6155 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Evid. Code 965(d).) “A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by [the lawyer-client privilege or lawyer referral service-client privilege]…when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer [or] lawyer referral service…was consulted, is not a waiver of the privilege.” (Evid. Code 912(d).) 

Here, Justice4Abuse.com states that it is “a group advertisement” that “connect[s] people to legal service providers.” (Caigoy Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. B.) It is “not a lawyer referral service” and is “not a law firm.” (Id.) While there exists a privilege for a “lawyer referral services,” Justice4Abuse.com is expressly not a lawyer referral service, and therefore, the privilege for same does not apply.  [FN 1]

Thus, the question is whether the communications here invoke the attorney-client privilege. “[T]he fundamental purpose behind the privilege is to safeguard the confidential relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters.” (Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 1485, 1494.) This court must also be mindful, however, that it is “powerless to judicially carve out exceptions” to the privileges created by statute. (Titmas v. Superior Ct. (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 738, 745.)

The general circumstances make a strong case for the privilege. On one hand, it is unreasonable to expect an individual like Plaintiff submitting information to an attorney group advertising website to be familiar with the intricacies of the attorney-client privilege. The website appears to include a submission form for a prospective plaintiff to insert general identity and contact information, as well as a field to explain “as much as you can” about the abuse. (Caigoy Decl. 3, Exh. B.)  A person submitting this form might reasonably believe that information is privileged, especially considering that Justice4Abuse.com states that case evaluations are “100% confidential.” (Caigoy Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. B.)  [FN 2]

This court therefore agrees with Plaintiff, to an extent, that the failure to recognize any privilege whatsoever in such a case could lead to a chilling effect that prevents individuals from seeking legal services. 

But on the other hand, unprivileged communications cannot be made privileged simply by designating them “confidential.” With the modern and sometimes convoluted arrangements that exist in the business of attorney referrals, it would seem unworkable to apply the privilege at every step. One way or another, Justice4Abuse.com apparently connects prospective plaintiffs with attorneys. But based on the limited information provided by the motion, this court cannot conclude that Justice4Abuse.com is an agent of the law firm. (See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., supra, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 639 [“When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege it is incumbent upon that party to prove the preliminary fact that a privilege exists.”]) 

Instead, it is left to conclude that no attorney-client relationship exists. Considering the case and totality of the circumstances, the court concludes that denial of the discovery would deny Defendants the opportunity to discover documents potentially relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. Because these documents are not protected by any recognized privilege, they are subject to disclosure.

In the event the court does not quash the subpoena, Plaintiff’s motion offered various alternatives to granting the motion, including “limit[ing] the scope of the subpoenas to information directly related to Plaintiff’s claims,” or a “first look” agreement and privilege log. (Mtn. 5: 16-17.)  [FN 3]    It should be noted that on May 13, 2025—after the matter was fully briefed—the parties submitted a Stipulation and Protective Order for the exchange of “confidential” information. This would seem to eliminate some of the potential harm of disclosure of the documents sought by the subpoena. Thus, the court does not adopt any of these alternatives at this time.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash is DENIED. The third-party is ordered to turn over all records consistent with the Subpoena.

III. Sanctions

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

The Court declines to award expenses as the motion was not made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   May 15, 2025 ___________________________________

Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - The court is candidly left to wonder what differences exist between a “lawyer referral service” and a group advertising website. 

FN 2 - It should be noted that there is no declaration from Plaintiff actually attesting to the facts surrounding his submission of the form on Justice4Abuse.com.

FN 3 - Interesting to note, the mere fact that Plaintiff’s counsel is requesting a “first look” at any produced documents suggests that there was, in fact, no actual legal relationship between Plaintiff’s lawyers and this third-party entity. If there had been, it would seem that the lawyers would have had immediate and direct access to same.