Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 22STCV41127, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 22STCV41127, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs David Chavez, Danae Tapia, Jessenia Mancia, Carla Ponce, Belen Cid-Garcia, Luz Becerra, Jose Flores, M.Q.C.T., a minor, by and through David Chavez, guardian ad litem, I.M., a minor, by and through Jessenia Mancia, guardian ad litem, E.M., a minor, by and through Jessenia Mancia, guardian ad litem, R.P., a minor, by and through Carla Ponce, guardian ad litem, D.P., a minor, by and through Carla Ponce, guardian ad litem, E.C.G., a minor, by and through Belen Cid-Garcia, guardian ad litem, and A.F.F.B., a minor, by and through Luz Becerra, guardian ad litem

Plaintiffs individually and as guardians ad litem for their minor children bring this action against the Pasadena Unified School District (the “District”). Plaintiffs are Latino students and parents in the District. Plaintiffs allege the District closed three predominately Latino elementary schools—Roosevelt, Jefferson, and Franklin. The closings forced students attending those schools to be absorbed into other schools. Because the schools had higher Latino student rates than the District’s overall elementary school population, Plaintiffs allege the closures disproportionately affect Latino students. Plaintiffs allege they now face further commutes to school, decreased educational opportunities, and decreased learning outcomes, among other things. Plaintiffs bring causes of action for (1) violations of Cal. Gov. Code section 11135, (2) violation of the Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7(a) & Art. IV, § 16(a), and (3) violations of California Education Code section 220. Plaintiffs seek only declaratory and injunctive relief.

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP § 436.) As with demurrers, the grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matter which the court may judicially notice (e.g., the court's own files or records). (CCP § 437; CPF Agency Corp. v. R&S Towing Service (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1032.)

Plaintiffs move to strike the entirety of Defendant PUSD’s July 17, 2023 Answer, or in the alternative, strike the majority of PUSD’s first, second and seventh affirmative defenses and the entirety of PUSD’s fifth, ninth, sixteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first affirmative defenses as reflected in Plaintiffs’ notice of motion.

First, Plaintiffs contend Defendant’s Answer should be stricken in its entirety because it was not filed in conformity with this Court’s June 26, 2023, Ruling on Defendant’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant “asserts numerous affirmative defenses that touch on damages, speech, and the Government Tort Claims Act claim presentation requirements,” which this court already determined to be inapplicable when ruling on the previous Demurrer. (Dem. 6: 17.)

Section 436(b) authorizes “the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 509 [emphasis in original].) When ruling on the last demurrer to the Complaint, this court did not address, much less consider, Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint. Therefore, it cannot be reasonably said that Defendant’s answer fails to conform with the prior court order.

This court has already determined based on the Complaint that Plaintiffs are not seeking money damages, and therefore, that the Government Claims Act is irrelevant. (See 06/26/23 Ruling on Demurrer, p. 4.) The court also ruled that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant was not based on communicative conduct or speech. (Id. at p. 7.) Therefore, Plaintiffs suggest affirmative defenses relating to damages, speech, and the Government Claims Act should be stricken as irrelevant.

Here, the court agrees that the affirmative defenses at issue raised by the moving parties are irrelevant to this action. (See CCP § 436 [courts may strike “irrelevant” matters].) It is beyond dispute that Plaintiffs are not seeking money damages, that no Government Code Claim was required, and that the action does not implicate speech.

Therefore, the following portions of Defendant’s Second (Paragraph 4, pages 2 through 3, lines 27 through 9) and Seventh (Paragraph 9, page 4, lines 8 through 12 and lines 17 through 20) affirmative defenses are ordered STRICKEN. The entirety of Defendant’s Fifth, Ninth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-First affirmative defenses are likewise ordered STRICKEN.

Finally, Plaintiffs also argue Defendant’s affirmative defenses based on negligence principles should be stricken as irrelevant, because Plaintiffs do not assert any negligence claims. Again, the court agrees that negligence-based affirmative defenses are irrelevant and are therefore subject to be stricken.