Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV03233, Date: 2024-12-18 Tentative Ruling

This is an employment dispute. Plaintiff Jennie Villa, a Hispanic woman, worked for Defendant Lotte Global Logistics (North America), Inc., as a Senior Manager on the Operations Team. Plaintiff alleges she faced significant discriminatory treatment on account of her ethnicity and/or gender. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant terminated her employment after she protested her removal from the Operations position.

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) A motion to quash the production of documents or tangible things requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.13459(a)(5).) “[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.” (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)

Plaintiff moves to quash the deposition subpoena served on her former employer, Pacifica Trucks, LLC. Plaintiff worked for Pacifica Trucks immediately before her employment with Defendant. The subpoena seeks:

All employment records, including but not limited to, payroll records, W2’s and/or W9’s and 1099’s, all records reflecting the individual’s wages and date(s) of employment, the complete personnel file, applications, counseling reports, attendance records, performance evaluations, notes, correspondence, claims of any kind, including but not limited to, Workers Compensation, any accident or injury, work related or not, and insurance information and medical records/files regarding: Jennie Villa aka: Ruiz, Relgado, Verdesoto, DOB: August 27, 1972, with ID

Plaintiff argues the subpoena should be quashed based on her right of privacy and because “[t]here is no nexus between Plaintiff’s employment with Pacifica Trucks and Defendant’s wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment.” (Mtn. 2: 19-21.) Plaintiff also asserts Defendant must seek the documents through less intrusive means.

Defendant opposes the motion. Defendant contends it has a legitimate interest in Plaintiff’s prior employment records because they are relevant to “(1) her claims for loss of earnings and (2) her testimony that she had a great reputation in the industry before her employment with LGLNA.” (Opp. 2: 7-8.)

“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552.)

In this action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against her due to her gender and/or national origin and terminated her for pretextual reasons after she protested the discrimination. (See Compl., generally.) Plaintiff has a recognized expectation of privacy in her employment records, although to an extent, Plaintiff has reduced that privacy interest by bringing this case. It also appears there are no feasible alternatives to obtain the documents sought.

When balancing Plaintiff’s privacy interests against Defendant’s interest in discovering documents that are particularly relevant to Defendant’s defense of the action, this court finds the balance shifts in favor of disclosure. The court agrees with Defendant that the categories are relevant and not overbroad. In addition to addressing Plaintiff’s prior earnings, the documents sought are relevant to Plaintiff’s performance as an employee—questions Plaintiff has put in issue by bringing this action.

Moreover, Plaintiff mistakes admissibility at trial with discoverability. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [“discovery is not limited to admissible evidence”].) Evidence is relevant if it “ha[s] any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code § 210.) The discovery sought here is relevant, even if it is ultimately not admissible at trial—a question this court expresses no opinion on now.

This conclusion is consistent with the legislature’s “very liberal and flexible standard of relevancy,” such that any “doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at 542.)

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)