Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV06365, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Zaftig, LLC, as the owner of various state and federal trademarks based on the “Doja” cannabis brand, brings this action against Defendant Ryan Bartholomew for trademark infringement and related causes of action. Plaintiff alleges Defendant has used and continues to use the Doja trademark to sell products in the marketplace. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1) trademark infringement, (2) palming off, (3) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, (4) violation of California’s False Advertising Law, and (5) declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendant Bartholomew has filed a Cross-Complaint against Zaftig and its owner, Brett Olson. Bartholomew alleges he, and not Zaftig, created the Doja trademark. Bartholomew alleges that Zaftig had a non-exclusive licensing agreement with Bartholomew to sell Doja products. Cross-Complainant asserts thirteen causes of action against Zaftig and Olson seeking to, among other things, cancel the trademarks.

A stand-alone SAC must be filed and served to all current parties within 10 days. Any new parties must be served in a timely manner as provided by law.

If a plaintiff wishes to amend a complaint after the answer has been filed or after the demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the complaint “of course,” permission of the court must be obtained before the amendment will be allowed. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].)

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.

Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature. The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 (overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390).)

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend to file a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff contends that new agreements have been discovered between Olson and Bartholomew, and that these agreements were breached by Bartholomew. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks to add breach of contract claims asserted by Olson as a Plaintiff, who has already been named as a Cross-Defendant in this action. Additionally, Plaintiff took the position in the Complaint and FAC that Defendant was a third-party infringer. Plaintiff now contends that the SAC will “appropriately reframe[] the dispute as a partnership dispute” as to “reflect the nature and entire scope of the dispute between the parties.” (Mtn. 4: 15-18.)

Plaintiffs’ motion complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(a) as it generally provides (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b); Dhillon Decl., generally.)

Defendant opposes leave to amend. While Defendant appreciates “the Court’s broad discretion and the strong policy favoring amendment,” it says this “is one of the rare cases where amendment should be denied.” (Opp. 1: 3-5.) Defendant contends that the amendment is “dilatory, unjustified, and prejudicial,” “abandons and contradicts the core allegations plaintiff has relied on for over two years, and attempts to start an entirely new case with barely a year left to litigate.” (Opp. 1: 5-7.) Defendant also asserts that the Second Amended Complaint is a “sham-pleading” and that the claims fail as a matter of law on the merits.

The Complaint and FAC were filed by Plaintiff’s former counsel. On March 25, 2025, this court granted Plaintiff’s former counsel’s motion to be relieved. (See 03/25/2024 Order.) Plaintiff retained its new counsel in May 2024, and in June 2024, Plaintiff initiated conversation about amending the FAC. (Dhillon Decl. ¶ 3.) However, the parties tabled those discussions in order to engage in mediation. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) The parties mediated in January of 2025 but did not resolve the dispute. (Id. ¶ 6.) In February and March, the parties discussed the amendment but were unable to reach a stipulation. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) This motion for leave followed.

Here, under the totality of the circumstances, the court concludes that leave to amend is appropriate. Defendant overstates the effect of the amendments. While the theories might have changed, the core underlying facts remain largely the same. Courts have explained that “it is irrelevant that new legal theories are introduced as long as the proposed amendments ‘relate to the same general set of facts.’ [Citation.]” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp., (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 761.) In addition, the fact that the amendment may necessitate further discovery is not reason to deny the motion.

Moreover, while it appears that Plaintiff could have arguably brought this motion sooner, delay alone is not grounds to deny the motion. Rather, Defendants must have suffered undue prejudice from this delay. (See Morgan, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at 530; see also Hirsa, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at 490). Any prejudice to Defendant here is minimal, given there exists ample time to prepare for these new claims before the August 2026 trial date. Importantly, the new Plaintiff Olson is already a Cross-Defendant in this action.

Finally, the court need not address the merits of the new claims or whether it represents a sham pleading. Rather, the “better course of action” is to permit the amendment, “and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.)

Therefore, leave to amend is appropriate. This conclusion is consistent with the “policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits.” (Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Ct. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1163.)

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.