Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV07274, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Hawkins Real Property Management, LLC, erroneously sued as Hawkins Real Property Management, Inc.; and Todd Hawkins, an individual and trustee of the Todd Tr & Taylor Hawkins Trusts

Plaintiff Brittany Jackson alleges she moved into the property at 1426 W 25th Street in Los Angeles, CA, to care for her ailing grandmother, Katie Mae Hawkins. On November 9, 2022, Hawkins passed away. Plaintiff Sylvia Sheridan is the daughter and successor in interest to decedent Hawkins. Plaintiff Jackson alleges she continued to pay rent after her grandmother’s death. On December 1, 2022, Defendant(s) Hawkins Real Property Management, LLC and/or Todd Hawkins allegedly changed the locks on the unit and removed Plaintiff’s belongings. Plaintiffs now bring causes of action for (1) Wrongful Eviction, (2) Tenant Harassment, (3) Nuisance, (4) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (6) Conversion, (7) Trespass to Chattels, (8) Breach of Implied in Fact Contract, (9) Breach of Duty of Good Faith, and (10) Unjust Enrichment.

Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiffs have not attached a lease agreement to the First Amended Complaint. (See D’s RJN, numbers 1, 2, 3.) The court declines to take judicial notice of this fact as it is not the proper subject of judicial notice. Be that as it may, the court has considered this fact when addressing the demurrer, as discussed below.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Defendants demurrer to all causes of action asserted by Plaintiff Sylvia Sheridan, arguing that each is uncertain or fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The First Amended Complaint does not label which Plaintiffs are asserting each cause of action. This alone arguably renders the FAC uncertain. Based on the opposition, the Court gathers that Plaintiff Sheridan intends to assert the following causes of action: intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and trespass to chattels. (Opp. 4: 17-19.) Nonetheless, given the ambiguity, the court treats the demurrer as addressing each cause of action.

Plaintiffs’ opposition largely fails to address the arguments raised in Defendants’ demurrer. Instead, Plaintiffs’ focus on how the filing of their proposed Seconded Amended Complaint will address the deficiencies of the FAC. Plaintiffs have included the proposed SAC with their opposition papers. (See Young Decl. Exh. A.)

Before determining if the filing of a Second Amended Complaint is appropriate, this court must address the demurrer on its merits. The grounds raised in the demurrer will necessarily determine if there is a reasonable probability of successful amendment, and the extent thereof. Based on the opposition, the demurrer is substantively unopposed.

First, Defendants argue the Complaint is uncertain as to Plaintiff Sheridan “since it fails to specify the acts that allegedly harmed” her. (Dem. 9: 25-26.) Generally, “demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored,” and are strictly construed “because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery.” (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1135.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Sheridan is the daughter and successor-in-interest of decedent Katie Mae Hawkins. (FAC ¶ 2.) Hawkins resided at the subject property before her death, and allegedly had her personal property destroyed by Defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff Sheridan arrived at the property to find her mother’s “personal property had been recklessly abandoned and strewn in front of the Subject Property.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Therefore, Plaintiffs have alleged a factual basis for claims asserted by Plaintiff Sheridan. The demurrer for uncertainty therefore fails on this ground.

Second, Defendants argue that all causes of action asserted by Plaintiff Sheridan fail because Plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of a lease that governed her mother’s tenancy, and therefore, Civil Code section 1934 applies. Section 1934 provides: “If the hiring of a thing is terminable at the pleasure of one of the parties, it is terminated by notice to the other of his death or incapacity to contract. In other cases it is not terminated thereby.” (Civ. Code § 1943.)

This argument is based on the assumption that there was no existing lease(s) for the property, such that the Decedent Ms. Hawkins was a month-to-month tenant. The failure to allege the existence of a lease supports the conclusion that there was none. Nonetheless, the ambiguity regarding the existence or absence of a lease agreement may and should be resolved by an amended pleading. Plaintiffs do not address section 1934 in their opposition papers, and have asked for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.

Finally, it is noted that Defendants have raised a series of new arguments in their Reply directed at individual causes of action. Trial courts have discretion to decline to “consider arguments first raised in a reply brief because of the potential unfairness to the opposing party, who is deprived of the opportunity to respond to the new argument.” (Contractors’ State License Bd. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 125, 131; see also St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783 [trial court will not consider “ ‘points raised in a reply brief for the first time ... unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before ’ ”].)

Because Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended pleading, the court declines to address any new arguments. Be that as it may, Plaintiffs are urged to give consideration to the points raised when amending the complaint to avoid further unnecessary motion practice.

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint has clarified which Plaintiffs are asserting each cause of action. However, it still fails to allege whether any written lease existed. Plaintiffs can reasonably clarify this ambiguity by amendment. When amending, Plaintiff should allege the nature of the tenancy, including whether any written lease existed. Of course, this allegation may lend the SAC to challenge by another demurrer.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.