Melani Cargle M.D., M.B.A. v. The County of Los Angeles, et al.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH DEFENDANTS’ UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S AND KECK MEDICAL CENTER OF USC’S DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF BUSINESS RECORDS OF MOHAWK VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM (EMPLOYMENT RECORDS)

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Melani Cargle, M.D.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants University of Southern California and Keck Medical Center of USC

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Melani Cargle, M.D., obtained her medical degree from UCLA. Plaintiff alleges she is “African American, female, and queer,” and suffers from ADHD. While attending medical school, Plaintiff alleges a supervising physician, Dr. Louis Kwong, M.D., carried a concealed firearm in the hospital and frequently made racist, sexist, and homophobic remarks. Plaintiff complained to medical school leadership, but the issues were never resolved. Plaintiff alleges that in November or December of 2019, she published a detailed complaint of Dr. Kwong in the Orthopedic-Match Document, which resulted in an investigation of Dr. Kwong. Plaintiff alleges she was later passed for a residency at UCLA based on her complaints. 

In March 2020, Plaintiff started her residency at USC/Keck. As part of her residency, Plaintiff was required to obtain employment with the County. Plaintiff alleges she faced abuse and racism at the hands of supervising physicians, and that the program failed to offer her accommodations for her ADHD. On May 19, 2022, the County provided Plaintiff with a Notice of Intent to Discharge. The County cited alleged “discourteous, unprofessional, and unethical conduct

towards co-workers and patients” and “failure to perform duties as required” as reasons for Plaintiff’s intended discharge.

After her discharge, Plaintiff made posts on Twitter about the program and started a GoFundMe. In or about June of 2022, Plaintiff alleges the County sent out a county-wide email, also posted on twitter, personally attacking Plaintiff by name.

Plaintiff now brings causes of action for (1) discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation, (2) harassment on the basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation, (3) discrimination on the basis of disability, (4) retaliation, (5) Violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, (6) wrongful termination, (7) failure to reasonably accommodate, (8) failure to engage in the interactive process, (9) aiding and abetting, and (10) defamation.

Plaintiff now moves to quash the deposition subpoena for production of business records issued to her subsequent employer, Mohawk Valley Health Systems. Defendants opposed. 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash is DENIED. The third party is ordered to turn over all documents consistent with the Subpoena.

Defendants are ordered to give notice, unless waived.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash

A. Legal Standard

A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) A motion to quash the production of documents or tangible things requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.13459(a)(5).)  “[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.”  (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)

B. Analysis

Plaintiff moves to quash the deposition subpoena served on Plaintiff’s subsequent employer, Mohawk Valley Health Systems. 

The Subpoena at issue seeks fourteen categories of documents, including but not limited to “[a]ny and all reports, performance reviews and/or evaluations…that reference or RELATE TO CARGLE,” “[a]ny discrimination, retaliation or harassment complaints by CARGLE,” and “[t]he complete contents of CARGLE’s personnel or employment file…” (Schneider Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. B.)

Plaintiff contends the documents sought are irrelevant as they “have no bearing on the discriminatory, harassing, or retaliatory acts of Defendants, which is the subject of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.” (Mtn. 7: 1-3.) She further contends the discovery is overbroad and harassing. In reply, Plaintiff contends the privacy concerns are amplified because she recently began searching for new employment in light of the closure of her current program. (Reply Cargill Decl. ¶ 2.) 

In opposition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has placed her subsequent employment history at issue by bringing this lawsuit. Defendants argue the discovery is relevant to mitigation of damages, Defendants’ unclean hands defense, and as admissible character evidence, among other things. 

“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552.)

Here, Plaintiff has a recognized expectation of privacy in her employment records, although to an extent, Plaintiff has reduced that privacy interest by bringing this case. When balancing Plaintiff’s privacy interests against Defendant’s interest in discovering documents that are particularly relevant to Defendant’s defense of the action, this court finds the balance shifts in favor of disclosure. The court agrees with Defendant that the categories are relevant and not overbroad.  In addition to addressing Plaintiff’s work conditions at the subsequent employer and the interplay with her disability, the documents sought are relevant to Plaintiff’s performance as an employee—questions Plaintiff has put in issue by bringing this action. It also appears there are no feasible alternatives to obtain the documents sought.

Moreover, admissibility at trial is not to be mistaken with discoverability. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [“discovery is not limited to admissible evidence”].) Evidence is relevant if it “ha[s] any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code § 210.)  The discovery here sought is relevant, even if it is ultimately not admissible at trial—a question this court expresses no opinion on now. 

This conclusion is consistent with the legislature’s “very liberal and flexible standard of relevancy,” such that any “doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at 542.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash is DENIED. The third party is ordered to turn over all documents consistent with the Subpoena.

C. Sanctions

In making an order pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   May 29, 2025 ___________________________________