Edna Palomares v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

DEFENDANT VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): None  [FN 1]

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a lemon law case.  Plaintiff Edna Palomares purchased a 2019 Audi Q3 manufactured by Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.  Plaintiffs allege the vehicle had electrical, powertrain, and braking defects, among other things. Plaintiff brings Song-Beverly violations for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b), (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3), (4) breach of express warranty, and (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 

Defendant Volkswagen now moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication.  No opposition was filed. 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to file a [Proposed] Judgment consistent with this Ruling.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

DISCUSSION: 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

I. Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294).  Thus, summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

As to each claim as framed by the Complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if it demonstrates the absence of any single essential element of plaintiff’s case or a complete defense to plaintiff’s action.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(o)(2); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.)  Once the defendant moving party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.  (§ 437c(o)(2).)

II. Analysis

Defendant Volkswagen moves for summary judgment or adjudication of the Complaint. Defendant argues each cause of action fails because Plaintiff’s vehicle was not a “new motor vehicle.” 

Even where a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the moving party still must meet its initial burden. (Wright v. Stang Mfg. Co. (1997) 54 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1228; Harman v. Mono General Hospital (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 607, 613.)

Defendant presents the following evidence: On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a used 2019 Audi Q3 (the “Vehicle”) from Walter’s Audi. (SSUMF 1.) At the time of purchase, the vehicle had over 19,000 miles on it. (Scholz Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.) VWGoA did not issue or extend any warranties on the Vehicle as part of the sale of that vehicle to Plaintiff. (SSUMF 2.) VWGoA is not – and never has been – a distributor or retailer of used motor vehicles. (SSUMF 3.) 

In Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 189, the California Supreme Court addressed whether Song-Beverly Act’s phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” covers sales of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer's express warranty. The Court, affirming the Court of Appeal, concluded that the phrase refers to cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty. (Id. at 198-200.) The court distinguished that scenario from the one in Jensen, in which a demonstrator vehicle received a brand new, 36,000-mile warranty “on top of the miles already on the car.” (Jensen, supra, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 119.) 

Here, the vehicle was a “used” vehicle accompanied not with a full warranty that typically accompanies new vehicles, but rather, with some remainder, if any. Under Rodriguez, this is not a new motor vehicle. This means that each cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act fails. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   April 24, 2025 ___________________________________