Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV17738, Date: 2024-02-16 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Disney Human Resources Services Co., LLC. (“DHRS”), The Walt Disney Company (“TWDC”), Disney Worldwide Services, Inc. (“DWWS”), and Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. (“WDPR”)

This is an employment case. Plaintiff Kristin Jacobson alleges her employers, Defendants Disney Human Resources Services Co., LLC. (“DHRS”), The Walt Disney Company (“TWDC”), Disney Worldwide Services, Inc. (“DWWS”), and Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. (“WDPR”) (collectively, “Defendants”), wrongfully terminated her employment based on her disability. Plaintiff asserts nine causes of action, six of those under FEHA.

Each party has submitted objections to evidence. This Court is unaware of any legal authority which requires a court to rule on evidentiary objections on a motion, except as to a motion for summary motion/adjudication (CCP § 437c (q)] or a special motion to strike (CCP § 425.16 (b)(2)); see also, Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-949.)

Regarding the reply evidence, this court is aware that as a general rule, new evidence may not be submitted in reply. But “a trial court may properly consider new evidence submitted with a reply brief ‘so long as the party opposing…has notice and an opportunity to respond to the new material.’” (Wall St. Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal. App. 4th 1171, 1183.) Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to address the “new evidence” at the hearing, as necessary.

“Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made.” (Brown v. Superior Court of Alameda County (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482.) A plaintiff’s choice of venue is presumptively correct, and defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that venue is not proper there. (Battaglia Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 309, 313-14.)

Per CCP section 396b, on timely motion, the Court must order a transfer of an action “whenever the court designated in the Complaint is not the proper Court.” If the transfer is ordered on the ground that plaintiff filed in the “wrong court,” plaintiff is responsible for paying the costs and fees of transferring the action to whichever county the court orders, within 30 days after service of notice of the transfer order. If plaintiff fails to do so within 5 days after service of notice of the court, any other interested party, whether named in the complaint or not, may pay such costs and fees in order to expedite the transfer. If the fees and costs are not paid within 30 days, the action is subject to dismissal. (See CCP § 399.)

The FEHA has its own venue rules. Under FEHA’s venue provisions, venue lies (a) in any county in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, (b) in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or (c) in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice; but if the defendant is not “found” within these counties, the action may be brought in the county of defendant's residence or principal office. (Gov. Code § 12965(c)(3)) [FN 1] ; see Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 487 [where FEHA claims were joined with non-FEHA claims arising from same facts, special venue provisions of FEHA governed entire action, prevailing over general venue provisions].)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues venue is proper in Los Angeles County because Disney Human Resources is headquartered and maintains its servers in Burbank. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that persons in Los Angeles County were not involved in Plaintiff’s termination decision. Finally, she argues that all Defendants reside in, or have their officers and mailings addresses in, Los Angeles County.

In Brown, the Supreme Court of California addressed whether the special venue provisions controlled over the general venue provisions when both FEHA and non-FEHA causes of action are alleged. (Id. at 480.) The Court engaged in a detailed discussion of the legislative intent of § 12965 and held that because the special provision “affords a wide choice of venue to persons who bring actions under the FEHA,” it should extend to include the non-FEHA claims. (Id. at 486.) In so holding, the court implicitly emphasized that the separate venue analyses are indeed distinct, because finding otherwise “would render the special venue provisions of the FEHA mere surplusage and frustrate the intent of the Legislature.” (Brown, 37 Cal. 3d at 488.) The court went on to apply section 12965 and found that the plaintiffs’ choice of venue was in full accord with the special venue provision because the suit was filed in the county in which the discriminatory acts were alleged to have occurred, even though none of the defendants resided in that forum. Hence, prong (a) had been satisfied.

A leading case interpreting Brown is Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Superior Ct. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 306, 308.) There, a defendant moved to change venue from Los Angeles County to Sacramento County pursuant to § 12965. (Id.) All of the alleged acts giving rise to the harm had occurred in Sacramento County, and the defendants also kept their offices there. (Id.) Referencing Brown, the Court recognized the “wide latitude” granted to Plaintiffs in choosing a venue, but nonetheless, found venue in Los Angeles was improper. (Id. at 309.) Applying the factors of § 12965, the Court found that venue was mandatory in Sacramento under at least two of the three factors because the acts occurred in Sacramento and the relevant records were held there. (Id. at 310.) Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion to transfer venue.

Turning to the instant case, the Complaint contains causes of action under FEHA, and all causes of action are based on the same underlying allegations. Thus, the FEHA venue rules govern the entirety of this action. (Brown, 37 Cal.3d at 487.)

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is silent on these facts, Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff worked as a Merchandise Hostess at Disneyland Park in Orange County. (Gurecki Decl. ¶ 5; Santana Decl. ¶ 4.) Thus, it appears the alleged discriminatory conduct giving rise to the Complaint—as alleged, and, as a practical matter—necessarily occurred in Orange County.

Therefore, applying prong (a), it appears the alleged termination and discrimination occurred solely in Orange County. Even assuming Defendants had corporate officers in Burbank, there is no evidence that her discrimination or termination came from the top-down.

Moreover, applying prong (b), to the extent employee documents are maintained in physical form, they are stored in Orange County. (Santana Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff cites no binding California authority suggesting that server location, which may be maintained in Burbank, is dispositive. The nonbinding cases she does cite suggest it is, at most, merely a factor to consider in the analysis.

Turning this analysis to Los Angeles (the current venue), it becomes apparent that the alleged conduct did not occur in Los Angeles County, that relevant records are less likely to be stored here, and that there is zero evidence that Plaintiff would have worked in Los Angeles County had she not been terminated.

This court is aware that Plaintiff contends Defendants maintain their “principal place of business” in Los Angeles County. But as evidenced by Brown and the plain text of the FEHA venue statute, a corporation’s “residence” is not dispositive when the corporation is otherwise “found” in a county that meets each prong of the test.

Thus, the facts establish that Orange County is the proper venue under the FEHA Special Venue Statute because Orange County—and not Los Angeles County—is (1) where the alleged violations occurred, (2) where the relevant records are administered and maintained, and (3) where Plaintiff would have continued to work but for the alleged unlawful conduct.

“In its discretion,¿the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known.¿As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except¿on notice contained in a party's papers, or on the court's own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.”

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.