Sergio D. Medina v. General Motors LLC

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Sergio D. Medina

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant General Motors LLC

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff Sergio D. Medina brings this action against Defendant General Motors LLC under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff alleges his 2017 Chevy Volt exhibits transmission, HVAC, steering, and engine defects, among others. 

Plaintiff now moves for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. Defendant opposed.

TENTATIVE RULING:

  

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.  Any and all non-viable causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act must be eliminated from the FAC.  [FN 1]

A stand-alone FAC must be filed and served to all current parties within 10 days.  Defendant shall respond accordingly within 30 days.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

I. Legal Standard

If a plaintiff wishes to amend a complaint after the answer has been filed or after the demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the complaint “of course,” permission of the court must be obtained before the amendment will be allowed. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)  

 

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) 

 

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.  

Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature.  The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment.  (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 (overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390).) 

II. Analysis

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend to file a First Amended Complaint. 

The subject vehicle in this case is “a used vehicle that did not come with a new car warranty, but only the remainder of the original warranty.” (Khodanian Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff cites an “unforeseen change in applicable law” holding the Song-Beverly Act does not apply to used vehicles.  In Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 189, an October 2024 decision, the California Supreme Court addressed whether the Song-Beverly Act’s phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” covers sales of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer's express warranty. The Court, affirming the Court of Appeal, concluded that the phrase refers to cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty. (Id. at 198-200.) The court distinguished that scenario from the one in Jensen, in which a demonstrator vehicle received a brand new, 36,000-mile warranty “on top of the miles already on the car.” (Jensen, supra, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 119.) 

Thus, under Rodriguez, supra, Plaintiff apparently has no remedy under the Song-Beverly Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff now moves for leave to amend to add two new causes of action under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. Plaintiff contends that “Defendant will suffer no prejudice from the filing of the FAC because it does not add any new facts or damages that could require additional discovery.” (Mtn. 4: 19-21.) 

Complaint but chose not to do so.” (Roybal Decl. ¶ 6.) 

The court’s e-filing system does not contain any memorandum of points and authorities in opposition—just the Roybal declaration. This court assumes Defendant intended to file an opposing memorandum and the failure to do so was in error. Defendant will be afforded the opportunity at the hearing to raise any arguments as to why leave to amend should not be granted. 

Here, while it appears that Plaintiff could have brought this motion sooner, delay alone is not grounds to deny the motion. Rather, Defendant must have suffered prejudice from this delay. (See Morgan, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d at 530; see also Hirsa, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at 490). Any prejudice to Defendant here is minimal. The new causes of action are based on the same underlying facts. Courts have explained that “it is irrelevant that new legal theories are introduced as long as the proposed amendments ‘relate to the same general set of facts.’ [Citation.]”  (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 761.)

Finally, the court need not address the merits of the new claims. Rather, the “better course of action” is to permit the amendment, “and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings.”  (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.) 

Therefore, leave to amend is appropriate. This conclusion is consistent with the “policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits.”  (Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Ct. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1163.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED.

Be that as it may, by granting the requested leave to amend, this Court makes no finding whatsoever at this time as to whether the previous attorney’s fees and/or costs incurred to date were reasonable or not.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   May 8, 2025 ___________________________________

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at  Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.