Judge Randolph M. Hammock, Case Number: 23STCV18300, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randolph M. Hammock, Case: 23STCV18300, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Remini is a former Scientologist who alleges that Defendants have “undertaken a campaign to ruin and destroy her livelihood” after she publicly departed Scientology in 2013. Plaintiff alleges that she, friends, and family members have been stalked, surveilled, harassed, and more by persons controlled and coordinated by Scientology. Plaintiff now brings this action for (1) Civil Harassment, (2) Stalking, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (4) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship, (5) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (6) Defamation and Defamation Per Se, (7) Defamation by Implication, (8) False Light, and (9) Declaratory Judgment.

In reply, Defendant asks the court to take judicial notice of two unpublished opinions. With certain exceptions, not applicable here, the Rules of Court generally prohibit judicial notice of unpublished opinions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a); see also Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal. 5th 260, 269.) Trial court opinions are unpublished and have no precedential value. (Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 282.)

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at pp. 1441-1442.) When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.) “A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process.” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.)

(b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.

Specially appearing Defendant Miscavige has filed two pending motions to quash service. The first, filed on November 1, 2023, is set for hearing on this date (February 14, 2024) (the “First Motion”). The second, filed on January 22, 2024, is set for hearing later on May 15, 2024 (the “Second Motion”). Plaintiff’s opposition, filed on January 31, 2024, addresses the motions jointly. Defendant, however, maintains that the court should address only the First Motion at this hearing.

The court has read and considered the moving papers filed for both motions, and Plaintiff’s joint opposition thereto. Technically speaking, the court should focus its analysis only on the First Motion, as the Second Motion is not set to be heard until May. Be that as it may, the issues raised in the motions are essentially the same, and resolution of one essentially resolves the other. Therefore, the court addresses both motions here.

1. Proof of Service Filed on October 25, 2023

The Court first addresses the service attempts listed in Plaintiff’s October 25, 2023, Proof of Service, which is the subject of Miscavige’s First Motion to quash.

The process server’s Declarations of Diligence demonstrate that between September 13th and 22nd, the process server visited 5 different addresses associated with the Church. (10/25/23 Proof of Service, Exhs. 2 & 4.) At each, the process server encountered security guards or other security measures that prevented him from entering the premises. (Id.)

The attached Proofs of Service and accompanying Declarations of Diligence show substitute service on Miscavige at two addresses: (1) 4401 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90027; and (2) 5930 Franklin Ave, Hollywood, CA 90028. (See 10/25/23 Proof of Service, Exhs. 1-4.)

4401 Sunset Boulevard:
On September 22, 2023, the process server left the summons, complaint, and other documents with “John Doe,” a “Security guard, person in charge.” (10/25/23 Proof of Service, Exh. 1, ¶ 5(b).) The documents were mailed to Defendant Miscavige at that address the same day. (10/25/23 Proof of Service, Exh. 2, p. 9.)

5930 Franklin Avenue:
Also on September 22, 2023, the process server left the summons, complaint, and other documents with “Chuck ‘Doe,’” a “Security guard, person in charge.” (10/25/23 Proof of Service, Exh. 3, ¶ 5(b).) The documents were mailed to Defendant Miscavige at that address the same day. (10/25/23 Proof of Service, Exh. 4, p. 9.)

The court now turns to the service attempts listed in Plaintiff’s December 20, 2023, Proof of Service, which is the subject of Miscavige’s Second Motion to quash.

The attached Proofs of Service and accompanying Declarations of Diligence show substitute service on Miscavige at two additional addresses: (1) 6331 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90028; and (2) 1710 Ivar Avenue, Hollywood, CA 90028. (12/20/23 Proof of Service, Exhs. 1-4.)

6331 Hollywood Boulevard:
On December 7, 2023, the process server left the summons, complaint, and other documents with “John Doe,” a “church staff member.” (12/20/23 Proof of Service, Exh. 1, ¶ 5(b).) The documents were mailed to Miscavige at that address the same day. (12/20/23 Proof of Service, Exh. 2, p. 7.)

1710 Ivar Avenue:
On December 12, 2023, the process server left the summons, complaint, and other documents with another “John Doe” and “church staff member.” (12/20/2023 Proof of Service, Exh. 3, ¶ 5(b).) The documents were mailed to Miscavige at that address the same day. (12/20/2023 Proof of Service, Exh. 4, p. 8.)

In his First Motion, Miscavige argues neither 4401 Sunset Boulevard nor 5930 Franklin Ave are proper places to serve him because they are not his residence or usual place of business. In his second motion, he contends the same of 6331 Hollywood Boulevard and 1710 Ivar Avenue. Miscavige also argues Plaintiff has not made “reasonably diligent” efforts to serve him personally. Now that the guffaws have subsided, the speciousness of that argument becomes readily apparent when one actually examines the facts.

“[A]n individual may be served by substitute service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first been made: the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the summons and complaint “cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered” to the individual defendant. (§ 415.20, subd. (b); Evartt v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 795, 801 [152 Cal. Rptr. 836].) Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as “‘reasonable diligence.’” (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:196, p. 4-30 (rev. # 1, 2006) .)” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389.)

Here, Plaintiff has met her burden to demonstrate reasonable diligence and then some. Plaintiff’s counsel, Carmen S. Scott, explains her diligent efforts to locate an address for Miscavige. (Scott Decl. ¶¶ 4-14.) Based on those leads, Plaintiff attempted service at seven addresses, on multiple dates, believed to be affiliated with the Church and/or Miscavige. Plaintiff’s counsel has spent “nearly $10,000.00 thus far in [their] attempts to serve Miscavige.” (Id. ¶ 65 [emphasis added].)

Admittedly, it is difficult to identify which of the numerous properties owned or operated by the Church is Miscavige’s “usual place of abode” or “usual place of business.” The difficulty in doing so comes from the Church’s use of gates, lawyers, and private security to obscure Miscavige’s whereabouts. But “[i]t is established that a defendant will not be permitted to defeat service by rendering physical service impossible.” (Khourie, Crew & Jaeger v. Sabek, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1013; Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Grp., Inc. (1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 1387, 1393 [“Litigants have the right to choose their abodes; they do not have the right to control who may sue or serve them by denying them physical access”].) Defendant does not dispute that these four locations at which substitute service occurred are affiliated with or owned by the church. He also does not dispute that process servers have been denied entry at all of these locations.

Plaintiff has therefore met her burden to establish that any one of the four addresses at which substitute service occurred qualify under the statute, and any one of those substitute service attempts was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over Defendant Miscavige. “Statutes governing substitute service shall be ‘liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual notice has been received by the defendant.’” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201, quoting Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 [citations omitted].)

As this Court commented at the most recent hearing in this case, this motion should never have been filed. This Court had encouraged the lawyers for both sides to resolve the issue of service against Miscavage without the need for court intervention. Be that as it may, this Court recognizes that Miscavage certainly has the right to be served by proper process of law. Although we are well within the 21st century, these rather antiquated service laws still exist and must be enforced by the courts. So be it. Miscavage was, in fact, properly served.

It is simply time for Miscavage to simply step up, as a responsible member of our community, to generally appear in this case and defend himself against the serious allegations being made against him by the Plaintiff in this case. He is the apparent leader of a worldwide religious organization with considerable funds and support. He has (literally) teams of lawyers to defend him. Now is the time to utilize them to defend this case on the merits.